Jordan M. Leffel v. Colby Crum, et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS JORDAN M. LEFFEL, Plaintiff, v. CASE NO. 26-3055-JWL COLBY CRUM, et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the El Dorado Correctional Facility in El Dorado, Kansas, his claims relate to his incarceration at the Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas (“LCF”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court finds that the proper processing of Plaintiff’s claims cannot be achieved without additional information from appropriate Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) officials.

I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff alleges that on February 2, 2025, he and his cellmate were removed from their cell to use the phones. (Doc. 1, at 3.) Because they were in a restrictive housing unit, they were placed in cuffs and belly chains based on restrictive housing protocol requiring all inmates to be secured before exiting their cells. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he and his cellmate exited their cell restrained and they should have been secured to the phone station before any other inmates were secured and released from their cell. Id. at 3–4. Plaintiff claims that the cell to his left was on the list to use the phones with him, but instead CO1 Crum opened the cell to the right without restraining one of the two inmates housed in the cell. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that the unrestrained inmate had been screaming threats at everyone on the run that entire day. Id. at 5.

Plaintiff alleges that while he was being escorted by CO1 Goldston he saw the other inmate rushing toward him with an “ice pick styled weapon.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff claims that instead of stopping the unrestrained inmate, Defendant Crum took ahold of Plaintiff’s cellmate, who was restrained. Plaintiff attempted to step behind Goldston for protection, but instead of deploying his mace or grabbing the attacker, Goldson fled, leaving Plaintiff to fend for himself even though his hands were cuffed to his waste. Id. Plaintiff claims that the inmate began stabbing Plaintiff several times before one of the officers finally hit the panic button to trigger a response team. Id. Plaintiff claims that he and the attacker were maced and the attacker was then placed in cuffs. Id. Plaintiff alleges that after the chemical detox, his attacker was again housed in the cell next to Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff claims that officers, including Goldston, later joked about the event. Plaintiff claims that Warden Howes failed to fire Crum and Goldston. Id. at 5.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and provided him with unsafe living conditions. Id. Plaintiff names as defendants: Colby Crum, COI at LCF; Jesse Howes, LCF Warden; and Gene Goldston, Jr., CO1 at LCF.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages “due to the gross negligence of KDOC causing [him] physical pain.” Id. at 7.

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)– (2).

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).

A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).

III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment violation based on a failure to protect him. “[P]rison officials have a duty to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement,’ including ‘tak[ing] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . . inmates.’” Hooks v. Atoki, 983 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1214 (10th Cir. 2018) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994))). “This duty includes ‘a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833).

A claim of deliberate indifference requires a plaintiff to allege “that an official acted (or failed to act) in an objectively unreasonable manner and with subjective awareness of the risk.”

Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting that “the word deliberate makes a subjective component inherent in the claim”). “[A]n official’s intent matters not only as to what the official did (or failed to do), but also why the official did it.” Hooks, 983 F.3d at 1204 (citing Strain, 977 F.3d at 992). Plaintiff must establish that the “official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Strain, 977 F.3d at 990 (citations and alteration omitted).

“The unfortunate reality is that threats between inmates are common and do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.” Turner v. Okla. Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 804 F. App’x 921, 926 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (citing Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1996) (same)). “[S]ubjective awareness of only some risk of harm to a prisoner is insufficient for a deliberate-indifference claim.” Id. (citing Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1238). Rather, “officials must possess enough details about a threat to enable them to conclude that it presents a strong likelihood of injury, not a mere possibility.” Id. (citing Marbury, at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted)). A prison official may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk. See Hooks, 983 F.3d at 1205 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (explaining that “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted”)). “[P]rison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845).

The Court finds that the proper processing of Plaintiff’s claims cannot be achieved without additional information from appropriate Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) officials.

See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the Court orders the appropriate KDOC officials to prepare and file a Martinez Report. Once the Report has been received, the Court can properly screen Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that: (1) The KDOC officials shall submit the Martinez Report by June 5, 2026. Upon the filing of that Report, the Court will screen Plaintiff’s Complaint. If the Complaint survives screening, the Court will enter a separate order serving Defendants and setting an answer deadline. (2) KDOC officials are directed to undertake a review of the subject matter of the Complaint: a. To ascertain the facts and circumstances; b. To consider whether any action can and should be taken by the institution to resolve the subject matter of the Complaint; and c. To determine whether other like complaints, whether pending in this Court or elsewhere, are related to this Complaint and should be considered together. (3) Upon completion of the review, a written report shall be compiled which shall be filed with the Court and served on Plaintiff. If the KDOC officials wish to file any exhibits or portions of the report under seal or without service on Plaintiff, they must file such portions separately from the public report and provisionally under seal, to be followed immediately by a Motion to Seal or Redact Document(s). The KDOC officials are exempt from filing the Notice of Proposed Sealed Record under D. Kan. Rule 5.4.2(b). (4) Statements of all witnesses shall be in affidavit form. Copies of pertinent rules, regulations, official documents, and, wherever appropriate, the reports of medical or psychiatric examinations shall be included in the written report. Any recordings related to Plaintiff’s claims shall also be included. (5) Authorization is granted to the KDOC officials to interview all witnesses having knowledge of the facts, including Plaintiff. (6) No motion addressed to the Complaint shall be filed until the Martinez Report required herein has been prepared. (7) Discovery by Plaintiff shall not commence until Plaintiff has received and reviewed any Court-ordered answer or response to the Complaint. This action is exempted from the requirements imposed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) and 26(f).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter the KDOC as an interested party on the docket for the limited purpose of preparing the Martinez Report ordered herein. Upon the filing of that report, the KDOC may move for termination from this action.

Copies of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff, counsel for the KDOC, and to the Attorney General for the State of Kansas.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated April 6, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.

S/ John W. Lungstrum JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE