City of Iola v. Merriman
City of Iola v. Merriman
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action brought in the district court of Allen county by Charles F. Merriman against the city of Iola, to recover upon certain interest coupons of certain negotiable bonds issued by the city of Iola, to pay for a subscription to the capital stock of the St. Louis, Ft. Scott & Wichita Railroad Company. The bonds and coupons were issued on July 1, 1881. They seem to be regular in form and are valid, provided the city of Iola had at the time any power to issue them. A recital is contained in each of the bonds, which reads as follows:
“This bond is one of a series of 53, each for $500, of like tenor and effect, and are issued under and by virtue of an act entitled ‘An act to enable counties, townships and cities to aid in the construction of railroads, and to repeal section eight of chapter thirty-nine (39) of the Laws of 1874, approved February 25, 1876.’”
The defendant answered, setting forth as a second defense to the plaintiff’s action the following, among other things:
“ The defendant alleges that it is now and always has been*50 a city of the third class and a part of the municipal township of Iola, in the county of Allen. . . • . And it further avers that said township of Iola, on or about the 11th day of August, 1880, voted and thereafter did issue to said railroad company the full amount of the bonds which it was authorized under the law to issue to any railroad corporation whatever, to wit, the sum of $33,500. . . . That the city council of said city of Iola did not, at the next city election after the passage by the legislature of the state of Kansas of an act entitled ‘An act to kmend section 4 of chapter 60 of the Laws of 1871, providing for the organization and government of cities of the third class; also, providing for the appointment of assessors for said cities/ — which act is chapter 55, on page 148, of the Laws of 1876 — nor did said city council at any other time, submit to the qualified voters of said city of Iola the question whether said city should be and constitute a separate township for all township purposes, and for voting and issuing bonds and subscribing stock for and in aid of building or constructing railroads.”
The defendant also alleged in this second defense, that while the township of Iola had within its borders more than $150,-000 worth of real and personal property, and, indeed, more than double that amount, according to the assessed valuation thereof for each of several years prior to the issuing of the bonds and coupons in controversy, yet, according to the various assessments of the property within the city of Iola, the city never had that amount of property within its borders. The plaintiff demurred to this second defense, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute any defense to the plaintiff’s action, which demurrer was sustained by the court; and the defendant, as plaintiff in error, brings the case to this court for review.
It is claimed that the city of Iola had no legal power or authority to issue the bonds and coupons in controversy: First? because no city of the third class has any power to issue bonds in aid of the construction of a railroad; and second, because the, city of Iola, which was a city of the third class, formed a part of the township of Iola, and that the township of Iola had already issued all the bonds which it as a township was
“Municipal corporations regulated and.governed by this act shall be and remain a part of the corporate limits of the municipal township in which the same are situated tor all township purposes of electing justices of the peace, constables, for the purpose of building bridges and subscribing stock in aid of constructing railroads. All elections for justices of the peace and constables, and for issuing township bonds for building bridges and railroads, shall be held at such place as shall be prescribed for holding the township elections.”
This section, so far as we have quoted it, is precisely the same as the section was in 1871, and up to the time when it was amended in 1876. Section 63 of the same third-class-city act, which section is still in force (Gen. Stat. of 1889, ¶ 988), reads as follows:
“The council shall take all needful steps to protect the interests of the city, present or prospective, in any railroad leading from or toward the same; but they shall not take or subscribe any stock in any railroad, unless at least two-thirds of the electors of such city voting at a legal election vote in favor thereof.”
And under § 35 of the same third-class-city act, which section is still in force (Gen. Stat. of 1889, ¶ 960), the city had and has the power to issue bonds for the payment of “any and all indebtedness” then existing or which might afterward be created against the city. Now it does not follow that because the city of Iola has remained and is a part of the corporate limits of the municipal township of Iola “for all township purposes,” or for various “township purposes,” including that of “subscribing stock in aid of constructing railroads,” “and for issuing township bonds for building bridges and railroads,” that the city might not, as a city and for itself, also subscribe for stock and issue its o.wn city bonds in aid of the construction of railroads. When a township subscription for stock is made, the stock will, of course, be taken in the name of the township, and township bonds will be issued there
The order and judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- The City of Iola v. Charles F. Merriman
- Status
- Published