Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

In Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; *20it was held that section 16 of c. 96 of the laws of Tennessee of 1881, enacting .'that: “All drummers and all persons not having a regular licensed house of business in the Taxing District of ‘ Shelby County ’ offering for sale, or selling goods, wares, or merchandise therein by sample, shall be required to pay to the county trustee the sum of $10 per week, or $25 per month for such privilege,” so far as it applied to persons soliciting the sale of goods on behalf of individuals or firms doing business in another State, was a regulation of commerce among the States and violated the provision of the Constitution of the United States which grants to Congress the power to make such regulations. The question involved was stated by Mr. Justice Bradley, who delivered the opinion of the court, to be: “ Whether it is competent for a State to levy a tax or impose any other restriction upon the citizens or inhabitants of other States, for selling or seeking to sell their goods in said State before they are introduced therein,” (p. 494;) and it was decided that it was not. At the same time it was conceded that commerce among the States might be legitimately incidentally affected by state laws, when they, among other things, provided for “ the imposition of taxes upon persons residing within the State or belonging to its population, and upon avocations and employments pursued therein, not directly connected with foreign or interstate commerce, or with some other employment or business exercised under authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States.” And it was further stated: “To say that the tax, if invalid as against drummers from other States, operates as a discrimination against the drummers of Tennessee, against whom it is conceded to be valid, is no argument, because the ■ State is' not bound to tax its own drummers; and if it does so whilst having no power to tax those of other States, it acts of its own free will, and is itself, the author of such discrimination. As before said, the State may tax its own internal commerce; but that does not give it any right to tax interstate commerce,” (p. 499).

In the case at bar the complainants were established and did business in the Taxing District as general merchandise brokers, and were taxed as such under section nine of chapter ninety-*21six of the Tennessee laws of 1881, which embraced a different subject matter from section sixteen of that chapter. For the year 1887 they paid the $50 tax charged, gave bond to report their gross commissions at the end of the year, and thereupon received, and' throughout the entire year held, a general and unrestricted license to do .business as such brokers. ' They were thereby authorized to do any and all kinds of commission' business and becaine liable to pay the privilege tax in question, which was fixed in part and in part graduated'according to the amount of capital invested in the business, or if no capital -were invested, by the amount of commissions received. ■ Although their principals happened • during 1887,'as to the one party, to be wholly non-resident, and as to the other, largely such, this fact might have been otherwise then and afterwards, as their business was not confined to transactions for nonresidents.

In the case of Bobbins the tax was held, in effect, not to be a tax on Bobbins, but on his principals; while-here the tax was clearly levied- upon complainants in respect of the general commission business they conducted, and their property engaged therein, or their profits realized therefrom. '

No doubt can be entertained of the right of a state legislature to tax trades, professions and occupations, in the absence of inhibition in the state constitution in that regard-;, and where a resident citizen engages in general business subject to a particular tax the-fact that the business done chances to consist, for the time being, wholly or partially in negotiating sales between resident and non-resident merchants, of goods situated in another State, does not necessarily involve the taxation of interstate commerce, forbidden by the Constitution.

The language of the court in Lyng v. State of Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 166, was: “We have repeatedly held that no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects oij that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, for the reason that such taxation is a burden on-that-commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, which' belongs *22solely to Congress.” But here the tax was not laid on the occupation or business of carrying on interstate commerce, or exacted as a condition of doing any particular commission business; and complainants voluntarily subjected themselves thereto in order to do a general business.

In McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, it was held that: “ An agency of a line of railroad between Chicago and New York, established in San Francisco for the purpose of inducing passengers going from San Francisco to New York to take that line at Chicago, but not engaged in selling tickets for the route, or receiving or paying out money on account of it, is an agency engaged in interstate commerce; and a license tax imposed upon the agent for the privilege of doing business in San Francisco is a tax upon interstate commerce, and is unconstitutional.” This was because the business of the agency was carried on with the purpose to assist in increasing the amount of passenger traffic over the road, and was therefore a part of the commerce of the road, and hence of interstate commerce.

In Philadelphia and Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 345, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court, said: “ The corporate franchises, the property, the business, the income of corporations created by a State may undoubtedly be taxed by the State; but in imposing such taxes care should be taken not to interfere with or hamper, directly or by indirection, interstate or foreign commerce, or any other matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal government.” And this of course is equally true of the property, the business and the income- of' individual citizens of a State. It is well settled that a State has power to tax all property having a situs within its limits, whether employed Jn interstate commerce or not. It is not taxed because it is so employed, but because it is within the territory, and jurisdiction of the State. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196.

And it has often been laid down that the property of corporations holding their franchises from the government of the United States is not exempt from taxation by the States of its situs. Railroad Company v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; Thomson *23v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530.

So in Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365, 374, where an annual license fee was imposed on the ferry company by the city of East St. Louis, the company having been chartered by the State of Illinois and^ being domiciled in East St. Louis, its boats plying between that place and St. Louis, Missouri, the court said: “ The exaction of a license fee is an ordinary exercise of the polibe power by municipal corporations: When, therefore, - a State expressly grants to an incorporated city, as in this case, thp power ‘ to license, tax and regulate ferries,’ the latter may impose a license .tax on the keepers of ferries, although their boats ply between landings lying in two different States, and the act by which this exaction is authorized will not be held to be a regulation of commerce.”

Again, in Maine v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 142 U. S. 217, we decided that a state statute which required every corporation, person or association operating a railroad within the State to pay an annual tax for the privilege of exercising its franchise therein, to be determined by the amount of its gross transportation receipts, and further provided that when applied to a railroad lying partly within and partly without a State, or to one operated as a part of a line oí system extending beyond the State, the tax should be equal to the proportion of the gross receipts in the State, to be ascertained in the manner provided by the statute, did not conflict with the Constitution of the'United States. It was held that the reference by the statute to the transportation receipts and to a certain percentage of the same, in determining the amount of the excise tax, was simply to ascertain the value of the business done by the corporation, and thus obtain a guide to a reasonable conclusion as to the amount of the excise tax which should be levied. Ih this respect the tax was unlike that levied in Philadelphia Steamship Company v. Pennsylvania, supra, where the specific gross receipts for transportation were taxed as such, taxed “ not only because they are money, or its value, but because they were received for transportation.”

*24Since a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce is liable^ to pay an excise-tak according to tbe value of the business done in the State,» ascertained as above stated, it is difficult to see why a . citizen doing a general business at the place of his domicil should escape payment of his share of the burdens of municipal government because the amount of his tax is arrived at by reference to his profits.' This tax is not on the goods, or on the proceeds of the goods, nor is it a tax on nonresident merchants; and if it can be said to affect interstate commerce in any way it is incidentally, and so remotely as not to amount to a regulation of such commerce.

We presume it would not be doubted that, if the complainants had been taxed on capital invested in the business, such taxation would not have been obnoxious to constitutional objection; but because they had no capital invested,- the tax was ascertained by reference to the amount of their commissions, which when received were no less their property than their capital would have been. We agree with the Supreme Court of; the State 'that the complainants having taken out licenses under the-law in question to do a general commission business, and having given bond to report their commissions during the year,.and to pay the required percentage thereon, could not, when they applied for similar licenses for the ensuing year, resort to the courts because the municipal authorities refused to issue such licenses without the payment of the stipulated tax. What position they would have occupied if they had not undertaken to do a general commission business, and had taken out no licenses therefor, but had simply transacted business for .non-resident principals, is an entirely' different question, which does not arise upon this record.

The judgment of the Supreme Court is

Affirmed.

dissenting.

It seems to me that the opinion and judgment in this case are not in harmony with numerous decisions of this court. : I do not assume that the court intends °to modify or overrule any of those cases, because no such purpose is expressed. And *25yet I feel sure that the present decision will be cited as having that effect.

'• In Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 496, 497, it was held that Tennessee could not require, even from its own people, a-drummer’s license for soliciting, the sale of goods there on behalf of’individuals or firms doing business in another State. This rule, the court said, “ will only prevent the levy of a tax, or the requirement of a license, for making negotiations for the conduct of interstate commerce, and it may well be asked where the State gets authority for imposing burdens on that branch of ■ business any more than for imposing a tax on the business of importing from foreign countries, or even on that of postmaster or United States marshal. The mere calling the business of a drummer a privilege cannot make it so. Can the state legislature make it a Tennessee privilege to carry on ithe business of importing goods from foreign countries? If not, has it any better right to make it a state privilege to carry on interstate commerce? It seems to be forgotten, in argument, that the people of this country are citizens of the United States, as well as of the individual States, and that they have some rights under -the Constitution and laws of the.for'mer independent of the latter, and free from any interference or restraint from them.” Again: “It is strongly urged, as if it were a material point in the case, that no discrimination is made between domestic and foreign drummers — those of Tennessee and those of other States; that all are taxed alike. But that does not meet the difficulty. Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce, or that which is carried.on solely within the State. This was decided in the case of The State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232. The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another State, for the purpose of introducing them into the Sta+° in which the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce. A New Orleans merchant cannot be taxed there for ordering goods from London or New York, because, in the one case, it is an act. of foreign, and, in the other, of interstate, commerce, both of which are subject to regulation by Congress alone.” ■ ■

*26.In Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, a tax, imposed in Pennsylvania, upon the gross receipts of a steamship company, incorporated under the laws of that State, such gross receipts being derived from-the transportation of persons and property by sea, between different States, and to and from foreign countries, was held to be a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce, and, therefore, unconstitutional.

In Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 648, an ordinance of that port requiring a license tax from telegraph companies was held to be invalid in. its application to a company having a place of business in Mobile, and being engaged there in the occupation of transmitting messages from and to points in Alabama to and from points in other States. This court, overruling Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479, said that “ no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, and the reason is that such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to. a regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress.”

In Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129, a state law exacting a license tax to enable a person, within the State, to solicit orders and make sales there for a person residing in another State, was held to be repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution.

In Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 147, the question was whether an act passed, in 1871, by the legislative assembly of the District of Columbia, requiring, commercial agents engaged in offering merchandise by sample to take out and pay for a license, was invalid when applied to persons soliciting in the- District the sale of goods on behalf of individuals or firms doing business outside of the .District. Referring to the particular clause of the act upon which it was attempted to sustain the case, this court said: “ This provision was manifestly regarded, as a regulation of a purely municipal character, as- is perfectly obvious, upon the principle of noseitnr *27a socids, if the clause be taken as it should be, in connection with the other clauses and parts of that act. But it is indistinguishable from that held void in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, and Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129, as being a regulation of interstate commerce, so far as applicable to persons soliciting, as Hen nick was, the sale of goods on behalf of individuals or firms'doing business outside of the District.”

. In McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, it was held that a license tax imposed by an ordinance enacted by the board of supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco upon an agent engaged at that city in the' business of soliciting travel for a line of railroad between Chicago and New York was invalid under the 'commerce clause of the Constitution.

In Norfolk &c. Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, a tax imposed by Pennsylvania upon a railroad company incorporated in another State, and whose line extended from Philadelphia into other States, for the privilege of keeping an office in Pennsylvania, to be used by its officers, stockholders, agents "and employés, was a tax upon commerce among the States, and therefore void.

In Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, the court adjudged to be void an act of the legislature of Kentucky, so far as it forbade foreign express companies from carrying on business between points in that State and points in other States, without first obtaining a license from the State..'

The principles announced in these cases, if fairly applied to the present case, ought, in my judgment, to.have led to a conclusion different from that reached by the cdurt. Fickldn took out a license as merchandise broker and gave bond to make a return of the gross commissions earned by him. His commissions in 1887 were wholly derived from interstate business, that is,, from mere orders taken in Tennessee for goods in other States, to be shipped into that State when the orders were forwarded and filled. He was denied a license for 1888 unless he first paid two and a half per cent on his gross commissions. And the court holds that' it was consistent with the.Constitution of the .United States for the local authorities of the Taxing District of Shelby County to make it a condition *28precedent of Ficklen’s right, to a license for ,1888 that he should pay the required per cent of the gross commissions earned by him in 1887 in interstate business. ' This is a very clever device to enable the Taxing District of Shelby County to sustain its government by taxation upon interstate commerce. If the ordinance in question had, in express terms, made the granting of a license as merchandise broker depend upon the payment by. the applicant of a given per cent upon his earnings in the previous year in interstate, business, the court, I apprehend, would not have hesitated to pronounce it unconstitutional. But it seems that if the local authorities are discreet enough not to indicate in the ordinances under which they act their purpose to tax interstate business, they may successfully evade a constitutional provision designed to relieve commerce among the States from direct local burdens. The bond which Ficklen gave should not, in my opinion, be coñstrued as embracing his commissions earned in business, upon which no tax can be constitutionally imposed by a State.

The result of the present decision is that while, under Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, a license tax may not be imposed in Tennessee upon drummers for soliciting there the sale of goods to be brought from other States; while, under Leloup v. Mobile, a local license tax cannot be imposed in respect to telegrams between points in different States; and while, under Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, commercial agents cannot be taxed in the District of Columbia for soliciting there the sale of goods to be brought into the District from one of the States,—the Taxing District of Shelby County may require, as a condition of granting a license as merchandise broker, that the applicant shall pay a license fee and, in addition, 2J per cent upon the gross commissions received, not only in the business transacted by him that is wholly domestic,-but in that which is wholly interstate.

For these reasons I am constrained to dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court in this ease.