Currie v. Fowler
Currie v. Fowler
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion o'f the court.
This is an action of ejectment instituted by Fowler’s lessee against the appellants. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Motion for a new trial overruled. Various exceptions taken and the cause brought up for revision. The questions made in the court below are numerous and the errors assigned present all of them which were decided against the appellants. They will be disposed of with the more clearness by tracing the titles of the parties litigant from their origin. The foundation of the claim of Fowler is a patent for fifteen thousand acres to John Tibbs and Thomas Young as tenants in dated
■1st. A deed from William-Reddick, bearing date the 21st of April, 1802, in which Reddick as late sher* iff bf the county of Campbell, purports to convey two thousand five hundred acres of land to Fowler and which, according to the boundary mentioned in the .deed was laid off on the east end of the tract of fifteen thousand acres.
The grounds on which Reddiok undertook toibuko this deed as. sheriff are, that the auditor, in 1798, .transmitted to him- a list of lands owned by delinquents, in which there was-a tract mentioned of five thousand acres as the property of Willoughby Tibbs, situated in the then .county of Campbell, on Bank Lick, upon •which tract there were 'taxes due, and in arrears for 1792, S, 4 anil 5, amounting’to £8 5s. 5d. in order, -that lie, as sheriff, might make-out of the sale thereof, the sums-due as aforesaid, that in pursuance of law he .advertised said land for sale, and on the lUth of Oct. 1798,sold two thousand five hundred acres of said five thousand to Foivler “to be.laid off at-the-upper end of the five thousand acre tract,” no.one offering to pay the taxes due for less land, that the two thousand five hundred acres so sold, had been surveyed according to law and bounded, and that the said £8 5s. 5d. had been paid, wherefore, he .conveys, &c.
'2d. A deed from Thomas Young to Humphrey Marshall, dated the 10th of January, 1814, by which oung conveys all his interest in the tract of fifteen thousand acres, whether divided or undivided.
3d. A deed from Humphrey Marshall to John J. Marshall, dated the 25th .of January, 1815, in which said Humphrey recites, that he acquiesced in a division of the tract of fifteen thousand acres which had been made, whereby' the southern half became the /separate property of his vendor, Young; that he had conveyed to Thomas A. Marshall before his purchase from Young, so much of a tract of thirty-five thousand five hundred and seventy acres derived from Fish-back and Morgan, as lay within the survey of ten
4th. A deed from-. John J. Marshall to Jacob Fowler, the lessor of the pláintiffj dated 'the- 17th of February, 1824, which only conveys such interest as John J. Marshalbhas under-, the.claim, of Young, to the two thousand five hundred acres included, in Reddick’s deed.. There is also a deed presented..in the record-from Humphrey Marshall to Joan J. Marshall, bearing date the 5th of August, 1812, by which said Humphrey conveys to said John “all the land to which the said Humphrey hath any title in law or equity by deed-- and not heretofore sold by contract in writing, lying m Boone and Campbell counties, amounting to-twelve, thousand acres.”
A reference is mfikle fir the title papers for a more particular description of. the lands conveyed; but' where the title papers were to be found, and-in whose' names they originally stood, is not said. This deed-', cannot operate upon the controversy for any thing which appears in the record. There is nothing to - show that H. Marshall had any interest in the land-' which Young conveyed to.him in 1814, at the time-this deed was executed. Fowler’s attempt to connect himself with the patent to T.ibbs and Young, through, the Marshalls, is therefore not aided .by, H-MarshalFs deed'to J. J. Marshall executed in 1812, and the validity of his title depends entirely upon the other deeds., noticed. As the plaintiff in- ejectment must succeed^ upon the strength of his own title we,sh«ll proceed to. enquire how far Fowie/ has succeeded in showing that he has title, before noticing the grounds of defence relied- on by the appellants.
We think it perfectly clear that Fowler has no title to any part of Young's moiety of the fifteen thousand, acres, which can operate ugpa the land in controversy in the present aspect of' the cause. The land claimed by the appellants, is the tract of ten thousand acres sur-
If it be the same land, thén II. Marshall never conveyed it to J. J. Marshall as is shown by the terms of his deed. Whether it be the same or not, it was the duty of the lessor of the plaintiff to show and as he has not done so, it cannot be said that he has made out any title to .the land in controversy under Young through the Marshalls.
But if it were conceded that the deed from II. Marshall to J. J. Marshall covered the land in controversy still Fowler’s title, so far as it depended upon that deed would be unavailing; because the suit in chancery asserting the superior equity derived from Milcher’s entry was instituted against II. Marshall and he had answered the- bill before bis deed to J. J. Marshall was executed. A final ¿lecree was obtained against U. Marshall, and he, in pursuance thereof, relinquished all his interest in the interference to a part of the appellants, before the trial in this case.
‘J. J. Marshall was, therefore, a Us pendens purchaser and as such, his deed was void or at least subject to be avoided by the result of the chancery suit; see II Maddox, Chancery, 189, and the authorities referred
, Whether the lessor of the plaintiff exhibited Any title derived from John Tibbs the co-pafentce with Young, is the next subject for enquiry in the investigation of his title. The only direct and positive proof of the death of John Tibbs was excluded by the court. There was evidence that Willoughby Tibbs, was the brother of John and was reputed to be his heir. The evidence conduced to show, that John Tibbs had no sister and
There is no evidence (for the excluded deposition cannot be regarded) which shows that an interest in the fifteen thousand acres had been before that time cast by discent' upon Willoughby Tibbs, on his brother John’s death. If Willoughby Tibbs owned no part of the land granted to' John Tibbs and Young at the date of the sheriff’s sale, it is plain, that a sale of a part of that land, for taxes, as the property of Willoughby Tibbs, could pass no title to the purchaser. Conceding that the evidence was sufficient to prove the heir-ship of Willoughby Tibbs, still, it is fatally defective in not showing that the title had been cast upon him by discent, before the sale by the sheriff. But suppose it granted, that Willoughby Tibbs was the owner of bis brother’s interest in the fifteen thousand acres before the sale made by the sheriff, for the taxes, there is still another question of importance to be disposed of. .Does it appear that it was Willoughby Tibbs’ interest or any part thereof, in the fifteen thousand acres which were exposed to sale by Reddick and purchased by Fowler? It appears from the transcript furnished by the auditor, that in 1798, he placed in Reddick’s hands a list of lands returned by the sheriffs of the several counties, as lying in Campbell, on which taxes had not been paid for the years, 1792,3, 4 and 5. In this list, there were three tracts in the name of Willoughby Tibbs, one of two thousand five hundred acres, lying on the waters of Eagle Creek, and two tracts lying on the waters of Bank Lick, one of five hundred, the other of five thousand acres. It seems from the return made to the auditor’s office, that two thousand five hundred acres of the tract of five thousand wore sold
Yhe first act for the establishment of a permanent revenue, passed after the organization of the state government, (I Littell’s Laws, 71,) required all persons to-list their lands for taxation, with the commissioners off the district in which such land is situated. If this was 'not done and the taxes paid on or before the 4th February, 1795, the lands were forfeited. By an act off December, 1793, (I Littell’s Laws, 213,) non-residents were allowed to list their lands with any commissioner, of the tax within the state, and to pay their taxes to the treasurer. Citizens were, likewise, authorized to list' all their lands with the commissioner of the district irt which they lived, specifying the quantity of acres and
'In sales of lands for taxes, under our state authority, tBe rule is, that the acts of the officer shall be presumed; correct, until the contrary appeal’s; see Terry vs. Blight, &c., III Monroe, 271; Graves vs. Hayden, II Litt. 65. A different rule has been adopted by the supreme court, in relation to sales made for taxes, under the laws of the United States. The design of the law, in requiring the owner of land to state the water course on which it was situated, in his list of taxable-property, was two fold. 1st. To identify the tract, and to enable the sheriff, in his advertisement, to describe it accurately, if it became necessary to sell it. And 2d. To enable those who might he disposed to purchase, to find it by the description, to ascertain its value, and to regulate their bids accordingly. Now, presuming all the acts of the sheriff to have been in strict comformity to law, he then advertised for sale a tract of five thousand acres on Bank Lick; he sold a part of the tract as.situated on Bank Lick, and gave his certificate accordingly. When the surveyor, thereafter surveyed on Big Bone, and the sheriff-conveyed the land thus surveyed, they departed from the law, as is shown by the evidence, and so far their acts conferred no title. There is no evading this conclusion, unless we proceed upon the ground, that a mistake was committed in listing the land for taxation, by describing it as lying on Bank Lick, and that proof of such mistake should be received in. support of the title. In the case of Hood vs. Mathers, II Marshall, 556, it was said that .a variance in quantity might be cured by other evidence establishing the identity-of the land sold, hut we know of no case which forms a precedent for getting over a variance in the water course, and we are not disposed to make one. Bidders and purchasers have no right to complain, when they purchase land on one stream, that they must find it there or not get it at all. We arc not disposed to help them out in their speculations, although we will give them full justice by presuming that all was right until tbe contrary appears. In the case of Hood vs. Mathers, the court noticed that part of the -evidence, particularly, which
But there is still another view of the present controversy, growing out of the nature of the lessor’s title, which -will show thatthe court erred in refusing to-grant 'a new trial. If it be conceded, that his purchase for the taxes, conferred a valid title to two -thousand five hundred acres in the fifteen thousand acre tract, it cannot he pretended that -such purchase could interfere with the rights of Young, the tenant in common, or with the rights of others who were then interested in the tract. If, at that time, no division of the tract in severalty had been made, Fowler’s purchase could only entitle him to so much out of Tibbs’ share, after a division was made; or, to place him in the most favorable attitude, it could only make him tenant in common, to the extent of two thousand five hundred acres. In 1811, a division of the land, (whether legal or illegal need not be decided,) was effected by commissioners appointed by ,the county court* If this division be binding, then Tibbs’ part of the land, and consequently-, Fowler’s claiming under Tibbs, does not, according to the proof, interfere with the lands occupied by t[ie defendant in the circuit court. If this division is illegal, then Fowler cannot claim to he any thing more than a tenant in common, and had no right to appropriate to himself, the particular two thousand five hundred ■acres, covered by Reddick’s deed. Under every view of the case, in relation to the lessor’s title, the court erred in refusing a new trial.
We are relieved, by this conclusion, from a particular examination of the various other points presented»
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial. The appellants must recover their costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.