Anderson's v. Mason
Anderson's v. Mason
Opinion of the Court
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In October, 1820, John T. Mason purchased the respective interests of Robert Stockton and Joseph Me* Murtry in the Iron works and appurtenances which, up to that time, had been held by Mason, Stockton and McMurtry, as partners under the name of the Beaver Company — except five hundred acres of land, called the Salt Lick tract, which had been contributed to the joint stock by McMurtry, and was, in this contract of dissolution, surrendered back to him. ' •
For McMurtry’s interest, besides this surrender, Mason agreed to give “six thousand dollars, in three equal annual payments, from the first- day of January (then next ensuing,) in equal parts of bar .iron and castings, at the wholesale prices; but the said McMurtry to have the amount of each instalment in castings at any time of the year preceding the period stipulated for payment, that he makes demand thereof.” Mason also reserved the right of purchasing, at any time, the Salt Lick tract, at the price of two thousand dollars in castings, and acquired, by the express terms of the contract, the entire interest in several stores connected with the establishment, and in the debts due thereto, except certain accounts charged to Stockton. 'By this acquisition, he became entitled to all balances justly chargeable to Mc-Murtry, on his past dealings with said stores; and as to all subsequent accounts, while he should continue to be the proprietor of the stores, hp of course would be the creditor. But no reference is made to any past or future accounts of McMurtry, except what is contained in the stipulation that he is to have the amount of each instalment in castings when demanded during the year
At the date of the contract, there were several ac- ’ counts standing .against McMurtry, in the different branches of the establishment; and he continued until some time in the year 1824 or 1825, to take up various articles, which were charged to him in account. Various particular credits were entered'on these accounts, but they all remained unsettled. The earlier accounts were left standing, probably under the expectation that they would always be allowed against so much of the demand, growing out of the contract of 1820; and the credit afterwards given to McMurtry was no doubt founded on the debt due to him, and kept open under the expectation that the accounts against him, would, on settlement, discharge so much of that debt. The condition of both the parties authorizes the assumption that neither intended or expected any thing else than that these accounts, when correctly adjusted, should be set-off against McMurtry’s demands. One item alone, consisting of a charge, under date of May 31, 1821, of two hundred and twenty one salt kettles, at one hundred dollars per ton — three thousand and forty eight dollars seventy five cents, is to be distinguished from the rest of the account.
On the first of March, 1821, McMurtry, by letter, ordered at least thirty tons of salt kettles, of a designated pattern, to be made for him ás soon as it could be done; and although he makes no reference to the contract, he must be understood as making the requisition on the
Before the end of the year 1821, Mason took the Salt Lick tract, according to the terms of the contract.
On the 22d of November, 1821, the first note for bar iron, due the first day of January, 1822, was assigned by McMurtry to S. D. Everett, and on the 8th of January following, he assigned it to John Anderson, who shortly afterwards commenced suit on it, and on the 12th of November, 1823, obtained a judgment for eleven hundred dollars, in damages. In October, 1826, that judgment, for the reversal of which the defendants had prosecuted a writ of errof with supersedeas, was affirmed by this Court; and in October, 1827, the obligors in the note (except James Johnson, who was then dead,) filed this bill, against Everett, Anderson and McMurtry, praying, not only ¿hat the judgment on the first note should be enjoined, but that the other notes should be surrendered up, on the ground that the first note was in fact discharged before it was assigned, by the salt kettles delivered in the year preceding the time of its falling due; and that, of the other, notes, some were discharged, also, by that item, and the rest should? in equity, be set-oif against the pums due from McMurtry on the various accounts above referred to — it being, alleged that McMurtry was insolvent, except to the extent of his demands against the complainants, growing out of said contract, and which they said were restricted to the six notes, as they denied that the ‘Salt Lick tract’ had been purchased by Mason.
Before this bill was filed, the second note for bar iron had been assigned to Ennis Combs and John B. Duke, and the third to E. Combs, T.'Jameson and C. Banks, and suits had been brought upon both notes, though judgments were not obtained until 1830, when Combs and Duke recovered fourteen hundred and sixty five dollars — and the other assignees fourteen hundred and five dollars. In the same year, McMurtry, who had never assigned either of the three notes for castings, recovered judgments, upon the first for fifteen hundred
In 1828, an amended bill was filed, by which Duke and Combs and the administrators of Jameson and Banks were made defendants.
The answer' of McMurtry denies the correctness of the accounts set up against him, and especially in regard to the time of delivery of the two hundred and twenty one salt kettles, and the price charged; he also alleges, that the Salt Lick tract had been bought by Mason, before the first of January, 1822; and claims a credit for four hundred dollars in castings, due before the same time, on an agreement made before the sale of his interest to Mason.
The other defendants require proof of the allegations, of the bill.
Many depositions and exhibits were filed; and the Circuit Court having, by interlocutory decree, declared that the salt kettles delivered under McMurtry’s order of March, 1821, should be credited upon the note for bar iron, assigned to Anderson, and also, that Mason should be charged with the purchase of the Salt Lick tract, at two thousand dollars in castings, appointed a commissioner to state an account between the parties, reducing such of Mason’s accounts as were charged at Commonwealth’s paper prices, to their specie value at the time, &c.
Upon the return of the commissioner’s report, it appeared that, charging Mason with eight thousand, dollars — the amount of the notes and the stipulated price of the Salt Lick tract, without interest, and without any reference to the amount of the judgments, or to the time when the notes respectively become due; and crediting him by the several balances appearing on his various accounts against McMurtry, reduced to their specie value at the time — there was a balance against Mason, of four thousand three hundred and thirty seven dollars forty seven and a half cents; and the exceptions of Mason, on one side, and Anderson on the other, to the report, having been overruled, a decree was pro
To. re verse this decree, the defendants prosecute a writ of error. And we think the decree is fatally erroneous in several particulars.
First. As to the perpetual injunction of Anderson’s judgment. The decree seems to be based upon the idea, that the advances of' castings made to McMurtry, during the year 1821, were to be applied specifically to the discharge of the note for bar iron due in January, 1822, and assigned to Anderson, although the amount of such advance might not exceed the amount due from Mason in castings at the same time. This could not be justified, except upon the ground of a special agreement between the parties, to that effect; and if the stipulation authorizing McMurtry to demand and receive in castings the whole amount of any instalment, at any time in the year before it fell due, could be construed to give Mason the right to claim credit for any such advances first on the note for bar'iron — still as, in that case, he should and ought to have claimed such credit in the action at law, the chancellor would not enforce it against the judgment of the assignee; when, as was determined in the affirmance of the judgment by this Court, there was no sufficient excuse for not having asserted it at law; and when ample justice can still be
In all this there is obvious error. On the most favorable construction of the contract, Mason had no right to claim a specific credit on the notes for bar iron, or any of them, in preference to a credit on the other demands of McMurtry against him, except for such items as .were demanded and furnished under the stipulation of the contract, during the year before the instalment became due. As to all other items, his accounts constituted only general demands, which might be set-off, on • equitable principles, against McMurtry’s demands on him. And even as to those items, if there were any, which accrued under a' demand made in virtue of the stipulation above referred to, not having been claimed as credits in the actions at law upon the bar iron notes, and not having been ever noted in Mason’s books, as delivered in discharge of those notes, or any of them, nor so received by McMurtry, they must also be re-, garded, in equity, as mere general demands, not attaching specifically to the notes in the hands of the assignees, especially when there is debt enough in the hands of the original obligee to set off against all of Mason’s accounts.
Third. In point of fact, the two hundred and twenty one salt kettles, though ordered in March, 1821, were not all delivered, nor even made, during that year.— There is no express proof that more than about sixty were made and delivered during the year, and it appears that all were not delivered until the spring of 1823". It may, however^be fairly assumed that one half were de
Fifth. It is manifest, however, that, as the balance appearing against Mason, upon the commissioner’s report, and ascertained by the decree, exceeds the aggregate amount of the three assigned notes, he might and should have had all his credits set-off against that por
We are also of opinion, that there are errors on the other side, arising from the commissioner’s having assumed too high a rate of discount in reducing some portions of the accounts against McMurtry from their amount in Commonwealth’s paper to their specie value. But as these errors seem substantially to balance and compensate each other, and as their precise amount cannot, on either side, be ascertained from the evidence, and as, in consequence of the death of several important witnesses, and also of some of the parties, great injustice, might be done by opening the accounts for re-adjustment and correction, we are inclined to regard the mutual demands of the parties as being presented with sufficient accuracy in the commissioner’s report, to authorize a final decree.
Looking to the report, we find that all the subsisting accounts against McMurtry, after allowing the credits properly belonging to each, amount to thirty six hundred and sixty two dollars fifty two and a half cents— part of which accrued as early as 1819 — to be set-off
Adjusting the set-off on these principles, the thirty ■six hundred and sixty two dollars fifty two and a half cents will extinguish the two thousand dollars for the Salt Lick tract, and the first note for castings, due in 1822, and six hundred and sixty two dollars fifty two and a half cents of that which fell due in January, 1823 —leaving three hundred and thirty seven dollars forty seven and a half cents then due on that note; as to which amount, with its interest up to the rendition of the judgment, on the 30th of September, 1830, (as interest was allowed by the jury,} McMurtry’s' representative (he having died before the date of the decree) was entitled to the benefit of the judgment upon the second note for castings.
It follows that the injunction, as to the judgment on the last named note, should have been perpetuated, except as to the sum of four hundred and ninety four dollars forty seven and a half cents — being the amount of principal and interest due on that note, at the date of the judgment, and as to that sum it ■ should have been dissolved, with damages. As to the' judgments upon the first notes for castings, the injunction should have been perpetuated, and the collection of the two thou
Wherefore, the decree is reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to render a decree according 'to the directions above given. The plaintiffs in error ■are entitled to their costs in this Court.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.