Averill v. Guthrie
Averill v. Guthrie
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a contest for priority between a senior and a junior mortgagee. Averill’s mortgage was executed in March, and Guthrie’s in April, 1834; and each of them was recorded within the. time prescribed by the statute.
A part of the property included in those mortgages had been previously mortgaged by the same mortgagor, to one Nelson, for about three thousand dollars, and, with the assent of Aerill, Locke, the mortgagor, sold and conveyed that property to Nelson, in June, 1834, for the price of four thousand dollars — of which Locke received one thousand dollars.
As Nelson was the fii-st mortgagee, the registration of Guthrie’s mortgage of the equity of redemption was not constructive notice to him; and there being no proof of his having had. actual notice before his absolute purchase, he should, as decided by the Chancellor, be unaffected by Guthrie’s mortgage.
The controversy between AveriU and Guthrie, is confined to a house and lot on Chesnut street (Louisville,) embraced in each of their mortgages.
JberiWs mortgage, of March, 1834, was given as an indemnity against enumerated liabilities, previously in
But, between the date of Guthrie’s mortgage and Locke's death, in November, 1834, Averill had incurred , ....... . , . _ .... , , other liabilities lor the latter, most of which he had discharged by payments before the date of the decree, and about two hundred and forty seven dollars of which he had become liable for, as Locke’s surety, before August, 1834, when, for securing indemnity against those liabilities, he took a deed of trust on the same Chesnut street property, and an assignment of a leasehold interest held by Locke, in another house and lot also included in Guthrie’s mortgage.
As Locke held an unincumbered legal interest in the lease when he mortgaged it to Guthrie, the registration of that mortgage was, without doubt, constructive notice to Averill; and therefore, as to Guthrie’s prior right to the leasehold estate, there can be no nnpdtion no question.
Whether, as to the Chesnut street property, Averill shall be preferred to Guthrie, to the extent of the liabilities, or of any of them, which were incurred for Locke alter the date ot Guthrie’s mortgage, is the principal question discussed by the Chancellor, in two learned and very elaborate opinions, in which he recognizes the British doctrines of tacking, in extenso.
Having decided that Averill had no actual notice of Guthrie’s mortgage before the 15th of August, 1834, when he took the deed of trust and the assignment of the lease, the Chancellor decreed that he should tack to his prior mortgage the amount of the liabilities ($247) incurred by him, as Locke’s surety, between the date of Guthrie’s mortgage, and the 15th ol August, 1834; and relused to allow him to tack the amount of any liability incurred since the latter date. And having ascertained that Averill owed Locke five hundred and twenty five, dollars, for work, for
And each party now complains. Averill insists that the Chancellor erred in charging him with the five hundred and twenty five dollars, and in not giving him priority for all liabilities incurred after, as well as before, the 15th of August, 1834. And Guthrie objects to all allowance for liabilities incurred by Averill, since the date of his mortgage; and insists also, that Averill should be postponed to the extent of the sum ($1,000) which he permitted Locke to receive from Nelson.
When a prior mortgage does not provide for subsequent liabilities or advances, the British doctrine of tacking all such liabilities as shall have been incurred, or all such advances as shall have been made, on the faith of the property thus mortgaged, and without actual notice of a subsequent mortgage thereon, has not been conclusively established in this Court. And whether it should be recognized here, as either authoritatively settled, or as consistent with principle or analogy, we shall not now pause to determine or to consider; for, even as understood in England, it could not be applied to liabilities incurred or advances made by Averill since the date of his deed of trust, because there is no sufficient evidence to connect them with the Chesnut street property; and as to the two hundred and forty seven dollars included in the deed of trust on that property, we are of the opinion, that the liabilities for even that sum, were not incurred without actual notice of Guthrie’s mortgage.
We do not concur with the Chancellor in the opinion that, because Averill, when he took the assignment of Locke’s lease, had constructive notice of Guthrie’s mortgage, so far as it included the leasehold estate, therefore he should be presumed to have had,
But it appears that, about the date of Guthrie’s mortgage, Averill was told that Tyler was drawing, or was about to draw, such a mortgage; and it appears also that when, in June afterwards, Nelson was converting his mortgage into an absolute purchase, he expressed a wish to examine the clerk’s office, to ascertain whether there was any intermediate lien, and was then told by Averill, that he himself had examined the office, and had thus ascertained that there was no such lien. If he had so examined the office, he saw Guthrie’s mortgage. And therefore we are of the opinion that, considering these two facts, and the intimate association of Averill and Loche, and the known insolvency of the latter, the inference that Averill had actual notice of Guthrie’s mortgage, from the date of it, is almost conclusive. It is, we are sure, strong enough at least to repel’any assumed equity to the tacking of any of his subsequent liabilities not provided for or contemplated by his elder mortgage, .
But nevertheless, it seems to us, that there is no sufficient ground for charging Averill with the thousand dollars paid to Locke by Nelson; because we may presume, from the facts, that Locke would not have made the sale to Nelson, unless he had been permitted to receive the thousand dollars; and there is no proof that a coercive sale would have produced more than the amount of Nelson’s debt.
Then, taking from Averill, as we have done, the two hundred and forty seven dollars allowed to him by the decree, and relieving him, as we have also done, of two hundred and four dollars of the five hundred and twenty five dollars charged against him in the decree, it would ■appear that the Chancellor has allowed him about forty three dollars more than he is entitled to.
But the facts are so vague and indeterminate respecting this whole matter of the five hundred and twenty five dollars, and it is, moreover, so probable that Averill made, to some inconsiderable extent at least, payments to Locke after the date of the note for three hundred and twenty one dollars, as to bring us to the conclusion that more injustice might be done by a reversal than by an affirmance of the'decree. And we are not inclined, therefore, to reverse it for the mere semblance of error to the extent of not more, and probably much less, (if there be error at all,) than forty three dollars.
Wherefore, although we arrive at the same general conclusion by a process essentially different from that of the Chancellor, we are of the opinion that his decree should be affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.