Rau & Rieke v. Boyle & Boyle
Rau & Rieke v. Boyle & Boyle
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion oe the court:
Appellants having purchased a quantity of tobacco in that part of Kentucky west of the Tennessee river,
On the 26th of January, 1866, John Boyle and J. T. Boyle brought this action in equity against appellants, Rau & Rieke, the said John Boyle joining in the action as plaintiff, for the use of said J. T. Boyle, on said two contracts, which are made parts of their petition, marked “A” and “ D,” respectively, and allege in substance that said Rieke represented that they had fifty-nine hogsheads of tobacco, purchased west of the Tennessee river, all of which was paid for; that other tobacco had been purchased, on which there was represented to be five thousand' dollars of the purchase money unpaid and due, in which said John Boyle was to be interested to the same extent that he was interested in the fifty-nine hogsheads, to-wit: one half; that neither that sum, nor any part of it, was owing on said tobacco, nor was any amount paid by said Rieke; but that Rieke had executed and delivered to said John Boyle a transfer of the fifty-nine hogsheads, in which
The assignment by John Boyle of the part claimed by him of the proceeds to J. T. Boyle, is in writing, and is filed as a part of the petition.
It is also alleged, that, in addition to the one half of the proceeds of the fifty-nine hogsheads, appellants are indebted to them in the sum of $ 1,387 85, which grew out of the second agreement in writing, between the parties before referred to, to the following effect: That Rau & Rieke, being acquainted with the business, should buy cotton and tobacco, and ship the same under a permit then held by said John Boyle, from Major General Burbridge, or other permits which he might thereafter obtain; and the profits realized from said purchases and shipments were to be divided equally between the parties.
Under said agreement, appellees allege only twenty-two hogsheads of tobacco and three bales of cotton were purchased; but that appellants, pretending that' they needed money to make the purchases contemplated by
They allege, finally, that the proceeds of the whole of the tobacco and cotton were insufficient to satify said bills by the sum of $2,775 70, the one half of which J. T. Boyle was compelled to pay, and which appellants are legally bound to refund to him; and that, added to the one half of the price realized for the fifty-nine hogsheads of tobacco aforesaid, makes the aggregate of $5,876 57, for which appellees pray judgment, together with all proper and equitable relief. And the chancellor, having rendered judgment in their favor for that sum, with interest from the day on which the action was instituted, and costs less the half of the $204 87, pleaded as a counterclaim in the answer, Rau & Rieke have appealed.
In their answer appellants aver that five thousand dollars were due on the purchases of tobacco, which they paid after the date of the contract, and for which payment they insist they have, by the terms of said contract, a right to a credit. They deny that there were as many as fifty-nine hogsheads of tobacco embraced by the transfer to John Boyle, but fail to state the quantity. They deny that they appropriated to their own use the greater portion, or any part, of the sixteen thousand dollars pro
Finally, they plead in bar — 1st. That the contracts are champertous; 2d. That their agreements were mere promises to pay appellees for their loyalty, and for the exercise of their influence with officers of the United States Government, and consequently illegal as against public policy; and 3d. That appellees, availing themselves of their position and presumed power as officers of the United State army, and the necessities imposed on appellants by the illegal seizure of their property, they extorted from them an unconscientious contract, and one which is not legally binding on them.
We will first consider the intent and effect of the writing executed, by Rieke to Jbhn Boyle, purporting to transfer to him fifty-nine hogsheads of tobacco. As has been before noticed, appellants assert in their answer that there were not, in fact, as many as fifty-nine hogsheads seized by General Payne, nor then purchased by them; but that said number was arbitrarily assumed, and inserted in t'he writing, in order that the release, when obtained, might be broad enough certainly to embrace all the tobacco that might be claimed to be held by General Payne’s order. That writing, according to its literal terms, transferred the absolute property in the fifty-nine hogsheads of tobacco to John Boyle; still he did not claim the whole; and in answer to the seventh cross-interrogatory, he says: “The paper transferring the amount was drawn up to enable me to control the tobacco, so as to obtain its release, and the paper of the same date showed the manner of division between us; ” showing very clearly that the rights of the parties on a final adjustment, as between themselves, were not to be settled by the terms of that paper; but that it was made to present to General Payne as evidence that the tobacco had been sold to Boyle, whose sym
The next question to be considered and determined is, whether, at the time the contract evidenced by exhibit “A” was made, five thousand dollars, or any other sum, was owing for the tobacco? and if anything was due for it, how, or out of what fund, should it be paid ?
In their petition appellees allege that when the contract was made Rieke represented that there were fifty-nine hogsheads west of the Tennessee river purchased and paid for, and also represented that other tobacco had been purchased, on which five thousand dollars were represented to be due, and in which said Boyle was to be interested , to the extent of one half, as in the fifty-nine hogsheads; that neither the five thousand dollars, nor any part thereof, was due on said tobacco, “ nor was the same so paid by said Rieke.”
This writing includes all the tobacco bought west of the Tennessee river. If there was more than fifty-nine hogsheads, no distinction is made between it and the fifty-nine hogsheads; and, by its terms, five thousand dollars are declared to be owing for the tobacco, which sum is to be first paid out of the proceeds, and the residue thereof to be equally divided. No terms could have made the contract plainer. It is free from ambiguity, and cannot be misunderstood. There is no allegation in the petition that the contract, as made by the parties, was different from the one expressed by the writing. No allegation of fraud or mistake in reducing it to writing. Why, then, are not the five thousand dollars therein stipulated for, first to be taken from the proceeds of the fifty-nine hogsheads, before any division can be made or adjudged?
But it is contended, that as Rieke has said, in his transfer of the fifty-nine hogsheads to John Boyle, that
The recital in the transfer, that Rieke had received from John Boyle the value of the tobacco, was not true. Then, looking to this statement, and the object and purposes of the parties in making and accepting said transfer, it would be unreasonable to allow the mere recitals thereof to neutralize and control a positive stipulation in a paper deliberately made to evidence their true and entire contract.
It is rendered reasonably certain, from the petition of appellees, and exhibits filed as parts thereof, that fifty-nine hogsheads constituted all the tobacco that Rieke had purchased west of the Tennessee river, at the date of the first contract.
It is alleged that John Boyle did devote all his time and energies to procure the release of the tobacco after he became interested, and did actually procure the release of the fifty-nine hogsheads. No more is claimed. The terms were liberal; and, if more tobacco had been actually purchased, he would have ascertained it, and procured the release thereof also, as the part he was to get was remunerative. It is not alleged in the petition
But we have already seen that the writing, under which appellees claim, states the fact, that, at its date, five thousand dollars of the price of the tobacco were owing, and appellees are concluded by it as to that-question.
It may be true that appellants sympathized with the Confederacy in the late civil strife; still they are not charged with any hostile act against the Government of the United States, and could not rightfully be treated-as enemies to the Government in the war, but were entitled to the same protection and all the constitutional rights of other citizens of Kentucky. Their property was in the State, its destination for sale within Federal jurisdiction, “ the articles not contraband,” “nor the trade illicit.” General Payne, therefore, as a Federal officer, commanding the district, had no lawful authority to seize their property and hold it, for the purpose of extorting from them contribution, or impose on them a tax. Such acts were wrongful and tyrannical; and, if done when and where laws could have been enforced, he might have been made to account for them, both civilly and criminally; but laws were then silent in that part of Kentucky, and when they would again speak, or be heard, appellants did not know. But they were anx
, Nor was the transaction tainted with champerty; although appellees were lawyers, they were not employed for their legal learning or skill; other qualifications than these were requisite for success in this enterprise, which appellants thought they possessed, and hence they employed them to transact business much more diplomatic than legal in its character. But it is charged that the compensation exacted is exorbitant and oppressive. There seemed to be danger that the property would be lost to appellants; at least they might have reasonably apprehended such danger. In that emergency they must have deemed Boyle’s services important to them. The price to be paid was contingent, depending upon success; time and labor were requisite, and expenses were to be incurred. Neither fraud nor imposition is made out; and we cannot say, under all the circumstances, that the compensation agreed to be paid was so oppressive as to authorize the court to set the contract aside on that ground.
But it is insisted that, on the purchases under the second contract, losses were sustained, and that appel
The avowed object of appellants in getting the sixteen thousand dollars on the bills accepted by J. T. Boyle, on which Shotwell & Co. advanced the money, was to invest in cotton and tobacco under the second contract. They got it, and it was their duty to furnish to the Boyles a statement in full of the amount which was invested in cotton and tobacco, and if the whole was not so invested, to return the balance. Such account was easily kept and furnished, and we see no sufficient excuse, even in the answer, for the failure. We conclude, therefore, that they are justly chargeable with the one thousand three hundred and eighty-seven dollars and eighty-five cents, the one half of the unpaid balance of said bills after exhausting the proceeds of tobacco and cótton shipped to Shot-well & Co., with interest thereon from the 9th of May, 1865 (that being the time when the money was advanced), at the rate of six per cent, per annum till paid.
In Warner vs. Turner (18 B. M., 758) the actions were originally brought in the names of the Porters as plaintiffs. Subsequently Thomas Turner was, by an- order of court, substituted as plaintiff in the actions, and the costs, future as well as passed, ordered to be charged to him. After this was done he took the depositions of the Porters. Warner excepted to their depositions, .and the same were overruled. Warngr then brought the case to this court, and the, only point relied on for reversal was the decision of the court below admitting the depositions of the Porters.
In the opinion delivered, this court said: The effect of the. order thus made was to release the Porters from liability for costs, and inasmuch as their assignment to Turner was without recourse, no perceivable objection then remained to their competency as witnesses. Can it be doubted, that if they had continued liable for costs, or that if their liability for costs, both past and
After denying that Boyle got the tobacco released, appellants, in their answer, admit, that when the “first contract was made six thousand seven hundred and seventy-nine dollars and sixty-three cents were paid on the tobacco then embraced by that contract,” and say that “they are willing to stand by their agreement with John Boyle as far as it is an executed contract, and has been acted upon bjr the parties, and understood in their dealings afterwards.” Now what was intended by that, unless it was executed by getting the release of the tobacco, and giving credit for the one half of said sum; but they insist on charging him with one half the losses on the tobacco, which they allege amounted to more than that sum? Indeed, upon their theory the precise loss on the tobacco could be ascertained as follows: They said at the date of the contract they had paid six thousand seven hundred and seventy-nine' dollars and sixty-three' cents, and owed on the tobacco five thousand dollars, making the whole cost eleven thousand seven hundred and seventy-nine dollars and sixty-three cents, and netted, when sold, the sum of eight thousand nine hundred- and seventy-seven dollars and forty-four cents, making the loss two thousand eight hundred and two dollars and nineteen cents; but the Boyles, by the contract, are not bound for any part of that loss. The foregoing quotation from the answer is an admission in effect that John Boyle did procure the release of the
The proper basis for the settlement is as follows :
Proceeds of fifty-nine hogsheads of tobacco - $8,977 44
Deduct amount due for same...... 5,000 00
2) $3,977 44
To the one half of this sum Boyles are entitled, viz:...........$1,988 72
To which add amount paid Shotwell on bills, 1,387 85
Making the sum of........$3,376 57 with interest from the 9th of May, 1865, till paid, and costs in the court below.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, and the. cause is remanded, with directions' to render judgment for the amount stated, and for further proceedings consistent herewith.
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