Saylor v. Commonwealth
Saylor v. Commonwealth
Opinion of the Court
Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
At the time the transactions hereinafter mentioned occurred, the appellant Saylor was the local agent at Pineville, Kentucky, for the Henry Clay Fire Insurance
The indictment was in three counts, and charged a conspiracy and confederation between Saylor and Mrs. Williams for the purpose of practicing a fraud upon the Henry Clay Fire Insurance Company by which they obtained from it $450.00 in settlement of the loss under its policy, no part of which sum would have been paid had it known that there was other insurance on the property. In one count the indictment charged that in pursuance of this agreement and arrangement to defraud, the report by Saylor that there was no other insurance on the property, and the statement to this effect made by ,him to the adjuster, were made, and it was averred that by reason of the false statements in this report and in the conversation between Saylor and the adjuster the company was induced to settle the loss. In another count it was charged that in pursuance of the conspiracy and agreement to defraud, Saylor produced an estimate of the amount that it would cost to replace the building, purporting to have been made and signed by Davis, when in fact it was not made or signed by him; and, that induced by the statements contained in this estimate the company was influenced to and did settle the loss when otherwise it would not have done so. In another count it was charged that the affidavit made by Mrs. Williams, setting out that there was no other insurance on the property, was made in pursuance of the conspiracy and agreement to defraud, and that misled and deceived by the statements in this affidavit, the company was induced to settle the loss when it would not have done so if it had known the true facts.
When the case came on for trial,,the prosecution as to Mrs. Williams was continued, and the trial proceeded as to Saylor with the result that he was found guilty by the jury and his punishment fixed by the court at confinement in the-penitentiary from one to five years. He asks a reversal of the judgment for reasons that we will notice in the course of the opinion.
It may be said at the outset that the evidence es
It is first insisted that the demurrer to the indictment should have been sustained, but in óur opinion the indictment in each count charged in apt terms the commission of the crime of obtaining the draft by false pretenses, and, that except for these false pretenses, and each of them, the draft would not have been issued or the loss settled.
It is further said that the indictment charged three separate and distinct offenses, and that the Commonwealth should have been required to elect which one of these offenses it would prosecute the appellant for. The indictment did not charge three offenses. It only charged one offense, but the manner in which the one offense was committed was set out in three different counts. The offense was committed by obtaining from the Henry Clay Fire Insurance Company the draft for $450.00 which was collected and appropriated by Saylor, and the indictment charged that the parties to the conspiracy and fraud were enabled to obtain this draft by reason of the false report -made by Saylor, the estimate purporting to have been made by Davis, and the false' affidavit made by Mrs. Williams. It was proper for the Commonwealth to set out in separate counts in the indictment the different modes and manners by which the offense for which Saylor and Mrs.. Williams were being prosecuted was committed, and each count in the indictment was in itself sufficient. If the Henry Clay Fire Insurance Company was induced to pay the money by reason of the false report, or if it was induced to pay the money by reason of the false estimate, or if it was induced to pay the money by reason of the false affidavit, in either of these events the offense was committed, and, upon sufficient proof of either of them,, the Commonwealth was entitled to a verdict' of conviction.
It is strongly insisted that as Saylor knew of the existence of insurance in the other company, his knowledge was the knowledge of the company, and, therefore, the company could not have relied on the provision in its
It is also argued that the motion for a peremptory instruction should have been sustained, as there was no competent evidence that the Henry Clay Fire Insurance Company was authorized to do business in this State. Section 683 of the Kentucky Statutes provides in substance that when a fire insurance company is authorized to do business in this State, the Insurance Commissioner shall issue his certificate authorizing the corporation to commence business; and, it was shown by the certificate of the Insurance Commissioner of the State that the Henry Clay Fire Insurance' Company was authorized in May, 1910, to do business in this State, and had been so authorized since that date. This evidence was sufficient to show the authority of the company.
It is further insisted that the instructions did not present the defendant’s theory of the case, and, besides, did not properly give the law for the Commonwealth. The
Upon the whole case, this may be said: The indictment in language that could not be misunderstood advised the accused of the nature of the accusation against him — the evidence in behalf of the Commonwealth established beyond question his guilt — the instructions fairly submitted to the jury the law of the case; and, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.