Loughridge v. Chenoweth's
Loughridge v. Chenoweth's
Opinion of the Court
Opinion of the Court by
Affirming.
This suit was brought by W. J. Loughridge and J. D. Walker against Mrs. Scotia I. Chenoweth’s Executor to recover $1,711.93, with interest from October 14, 1903. During the pendency of the action, Loughridge made an assignment for thg benefit of his creditors to Joseph S. Botts, and he was joined as a party plaintiff. The facts of the ease are briefly these: In January, 1900, W. J. Loughridge and J. D. Walker owned substantially all the capital stock in the Bluegrass Tobacco Company, a corporation doing business at Lexington, Kentucky. On January 10, 1900, the Tobacco company with Walker as surety, executed to Mrs. Chenoweth a note for $10,000, with interest from date payable in one year, and secured by a mortgage on the real estate of the Tobacco Company in Lexington; also on Walker’s residence in Lexington and two houses and lots he owned in Brooksville, Kentucky. The note not being paid, Mrs. Chenoweth on May 13, 1902, brought a suit in the Fayette Circuit Court to recover on the note and to enforce the mortgage lien. On July 7, 1902, she obtained a judgment against the company and Walker for $10,000 subject to credits amounting to $1,200; also a judgment for a sale of so much of the mortgaged property as was necessary to pay the debt. After the judgment was entered Walker, who was an acquaintance of Mrs. Chenoweth, urged her not to enforce the judgment by a sale of the property upon the ground that if this was done, Loughridge would buy it in and he would be closed out, thus losing all he had. A number of interviews followed between Walker, Lough-ridge, Mrs. Chenoweth and George S. Shanklin, her attorney. Finally an agreement was reached by which Walker was to pay $1,500 on the judgment, Loughridge $7,414.54; the mortgage on the Brooksville property was
“In consideration of $1,500 paid by J. D. Walker, the judgment is satisfied to that amount, and the lien and judgment as to the Bracken County property is also satisfied and released.
“In consideration of $7,414.54, paid by W. J. Lough-ridge, the within judgment to that amount and at the request of the defendants is hereby assigned to the Southern Mutual Investment Company together with the lien hereby adjudged on the Vine Street property and the machinery. The balance of said judgment, amounting to $1,500 as of September 5, 1902, is to remain in full force in plaintiff, together with the lien herein adjudged against the Merino and Maxwell Street property, to secure the payment of said $1,500, interest and cost, this 6th of September, 1902.
“(Signed) Sciota I. Chenoweth.
“Attest: J. C. Rogers, C. F. C. C.
“By R. Gr. Colbert, D. C.”
Previous to this meeting Loughridge had made an arrangement with Horace Bowman of Danville, who was a nephew of A. S. Bowman, in which he was to sell Horace Bowman one-half of the stock in the Tobacco Company. Shortly thereafter this sale was made, and Bowman paid to Loughridge $13,000 for a half interest in the stock of the company. Out of this $13,000 Lough-ridge paid to the Southern Mutual Investment Company the $7,414.54, which it had paid for him, and thereupon this entry was made on the margin of the judgment:
“The interest of the Southern Mutual Investment Company in this judgment has been fully satisfied, and is hereby released. October 2, 1902.
“Southern Mutual Investment Company,
“By A. S. Bowman, Secretary.
“Attest: J. C. Rogers, C. F. C. C.
“By J. H. Carter, Jr., D. C.”
There is neither allegation nor proof of mistake or fraud in the written contract evidenced by the endorsement signed by Mrs. Chenoweth on the margin of the order book. It is urged that only she signed this writing, but it is none the less a written contract; for it is only paper by which she released any of her rights. Though none of the other parties signed the writing, they accepted it, and have acted upon it. They paid her $8,954.14 under
By the writing in consideration of $1,500, the judgment is satisfied to that amount and the lien as to the Bracken County property is released. In consideration of $7,414.54 paid by W. J. Loughridge, the judgment' to that amount at the request of the defendants is assigned to the Southern Mutual Investment Company, together with the lien on the property of thó Company on Yine Street; and it is then expressly provided “the balance of said judgment amounting to $1,500 as of September 5, 1902, is to remain in full force in plaintiff together with the lien herein adjudged against the Merino and Maxwell Street property to secure the payment of said $1,500, interest and cost.” This language is capable of but one construction, to the extent of $1,500 as of date September 5, 1902, the judgment remains in full force in plaintiff together with the lien upon the Merino and Maxwell Street property. There was a personal judgment against both the defendants for this $1,500, and this personal judgment against both, is to remain in force; for the judgment would not remain in full force if one of them was released. It was manifestly not the purpose simply to retain the lien on the Maxwell Street property; for the judgment is to remain in full force in plaintiff together with a lien on this property.
It is earnestly insisted that the parol proof now offered shows that Mrs. Chenoweth agreed to release the Tobacco Company and to look alone to Walker and his property for this $1,500; but in the absence of fraud or mistake, the parol evidence cannot be heard to vary the written contract. The parties were negotiating for a' number of weeks before the contract was concluded, and when they reached an agreement and put that agreement in writing, all their previous oral negotiations were merged in the writing. In Worland v. Secrest, 106 Ky., 711, we said:
“It is a well settled rule that where parties have deliberately put their contract in writing, it is conclusively presumed that their whole engagement was reduced to writing, unless from the form of the instrument this does not appear to have been the intention of the parties.
This rule must be applied here. The parties deliberately put their contract in writing, and although the contract was only signed by Mrs. Chenoweth, it was accepted and acted upon by the others; and if such written contracts could, after the lapse of many years and after the death of one of the parties, be varied by parol evidence, on such facts as we have here, there would be little security in business transactions, which have been put in writing.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.