Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Hogg
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Hogg
Opinion of the Court
— Affirming.
This is a personal injury action in which plaintiff, Charles Hogg, recovered of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company a verdict and judgment for $2,000.00. The railway company appeals.
Plaintiff’s account of the accident is as follows: He resided in Catlettsburg, but worked in Huntington, West Virginia, for the Ohio Valley Electric Railway Company. On the evening of December 3, 1913, he went to Kenova, West Virginia, in company with a boy by the name of Arnett, and shortly thereafter returned to 'Catlettsburg. While there he had two or three drinks of whiskey and a glass of beer. He and Arnett then went to the home of a family by the name of Yonts, who resided. near Clyffeside. After staying there about thirty minutes he left for home. As he approached the Chestnut street crossing in the village of Normal, there was a freight train going west on the westbound track. As soon as this train passed,, he started over the crossing. After crossing the westbound track and a passing track and while in the act of crossing the eastbound track, he was struck by an eastbound freight train and injured. The headlight on the engine was not burning and no warning of the train’s approach was given. It was a dark night and he never knew of the train’s approach until he was struck. In his opinion, the accident occurred between 10:30 and eleven o ’clock, but he was not sure as to the time. His right leg was crushed and broken between the knee and the hip. His head was bruised and his left hip and left hand were also cut. After being struck he crawled fifty or seventy-five feet to a fire that was burning beside the railroad track and then lost consciousness. He was discovered near the railroad tracks about five o’clock the next morning, and was. taken to the McKenzie home, near the crossing, and from there to the hospital. After remaining in the hospital about six weeks, he was removed to the home of his brother-in-law in Ashland, where he stayed for five weeks more, and then went to his home in Lawrence county. For three months he- could not walk, and for eighteen months he was unable to work. He suffered a great deal for several months, and his right leg is now shorter than his left leg. At the time of his injuries, he was earning from $2.50 to $3.00 per day.
The first ground urged for a reversal is that the verdict is flagrantly against the evidence. In this connection, stress is placed upon the following facts: Plain
Besides other instructions not necessary to set out, the trial court gave the following instructions:
“No. 1. The court instructs the jury that it was the duty of the defendant to keep a reasonable lookout ahead for persons, who were using the crossing at Chestnut street, mentioned in the evidence, to give notice of the approach of the train to the crossing, by ringing the bell or blowing the whistle far enough away from the crossing to give reasonable warning of the approach of the train to persons using the crossing, and to have the en*429 gine headlight lighted; and if it failed in any of these duties, and by reason thereof, the plaintiff was struck and injured, they should find for the plaintiff, unless they shall find as set out in instruction number two.
.“No. 2. The court instructs the jury that in using the railroad and street crossing, mentioned in the evidence, both parties were required to exercise the same degree of care; that it was the duty of the plaintiff to' use such care as may usually be expected of a sober person of ordinary prudence under like circumstances, to learn of the approach of the train, and to keep out of its way; and, if he failed to exercise such care, and but for this would not have been struck, the defendant is not liable, although there was also a want of proper care on its part as set out in instruction number one.”
Instruction No. 1 is assailed on the ground that it imposed on the railway company the absolute duty to keep a lookout to give warning of the train’s approach, and to have the headlight on the engine lighted, instead of requiring the company merely to use ordinary care to perform those duties. This criticism is not well founded, for defendant failed to show any circumstances which rendered the performance of such duties either impossible or more difficult than usual. Indeed, an instruction in the language of the given instruction has often been approved or directed to be given under similar circumstances. Louisville & Nashville Railway Company v. Gardners’ Adm’r, 140 Ky. 772, 131 S. W. 787; L. & N. Railway Company v. McNary’s Adm’r, 128 Ky. 408, 108 S. W. 898; C. & O. Railway Company v. Warnock’s Adm’r, 150 Ky. 74, 150 S. W. 29; C., N. O. & T. P. Railway Company v. Harrigan’s Adm’r, 149 Ky. 53, 147 S. W. 942.
Complaint is also made of the refusal of the court to give the following instruction:
“The court further instructs the jury that if the plaintiff by reason of intoxication at the time he was injured failed to exercise such care for his own safety as might be ordinarily expected of a sober person of ordinary prudence in attempting to cross defendant’s railway tracks at Chestnut street crossing, and by reason of such failure he was injured, the law is for the defendant and the jury will so find.”
This instruction was properly refused, because the question therein submitted was fully covered by instruction No. 2, given by the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.