Book v. Trigg
Book v. Trigg
Opinion of the Court
Opinion of the Court by
Affirming.
Eighteen, of the one hundred and fifty landowners, whose lands were assessed for the construction of the Sellars public ditch, in Henderson county, and who, now, compose the landowners within the Sellars public ditch drainage district, brought this action against the sheriff and the members of the board of drainage commissioners, for an injunction to restrain the sheriff from collecting the assessments, levied upon the lands within the district, for the years, 1916 and 1917, and to restrain the commissioners from making and levying any further assessments. The drainage district was established by a judgment of the county court, which was affirmed upon an appeal to the circuit court, and finally upon an appeal to this court, in the year, 1909, and the construction of the Sellars public ditch ordered to be made, and to be paid for by an assessment upon the lands within the district, in accordance with the benefits to be derived by the lands from the construction and operation of the ditch. The proceedings, for a judgment, establishing the district and directing the construction of the ditch, were begun in the year, 1901, and were continued from time to time, until the final judgment, in the year, 1909. The purpose of the construction of the ditch, was to straighten Canoe creek, and thereby, to more effectually drain twenty to forty thousand acres of fertile land,
(a) The assessment of special taxes upon lands such as are assessed for the construction and maintenance of public drainage ditches, can only be justified upon the grounds, that they are imposed to pay for local improvements, which confer special benefits upon the lands, assessed and only to the extent of such benefits. Williams v. Wedding, 165 Ky. 373; City of Owensboro v. Sweeney, 129 Ky. 607; Zable v. Louisville Baptist Orphans Home, 92 Ky. 89; Bradley v. McAatee, 7 Bush 667; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush, 508; Preston v. Roberts, 12 Bush 570. The evidence, in the instant case proves, that the existence of the ditch in the manner in which it was constructed, from the time of its acceptance until the bringing of this action, has been of very little benefit to the lands, assessed for its construction and maintenance, as only upon occasions of high tides in the waters of the creek, will any portion of the waters flow through the ditch, but, upon such occasion, it doubtless assists in relieving the lands, intended to be drained, from excessive overflows. It must, however, be conceded that the question of whether the construction of the ditch in accordance with the plans and specifications adopted by the court for its construction, would benefit the public health and general welfare, and the further question of whether the lands, embraced in the drainage district, established for the construction and maintenance of the ditch would be benefited in the ratio
(b) It is insisted, that the board of drainage commissioners are without authority to expend the taxes, collected from assessments, made by them, for any year after the assessment made for the original estimated cost of the construction of an improvement, in completing an improvement according to the specifications, adopted by the court, for its construction, where for any reason it has not been so completed before its acceptance by the county engineer, and for such reason that the drainage commissioners can not, lawfully, expend the money, which will arise from collection of the taxes here complained of in deepening the ditch, and therefore, the ditch in its present condition being of no benefit to the lands, assessed, and nothing short of deepening the ditch will avail to make it of any benefit, the imposition of the taxes, is unwarranted, and an arbitrary exercise of power by the commissioners. As a matter of course, if the commissioners are not authorized to expend the taxes for the purpose of deepening the ditch to the original specifications, they would be without authority to levy the taxes for such purpose and if the assessments are not of any benefit to the lands assessed for any purpose for which the commissioners have authority to levy and collect them, their imposition is not warranted. The authority for the commissioners imposing the special taxes or assessments for the years, 1916 and 1917, is found in subsection 39 of section 2380 Kentucky Statutes (1915), vol. 2. The section so far as is necessary to be quoted, is as follows: “It shall be the duty of said board to keep all such . . . ditches . . . under its charge, open-, free from obstructions and in good repair. For the purpose of providing funds to pay the compensation, herein provided, to the board of drainage commissioners, its agents, servants and employees, outside of that portion of same which shall be provided for and paid out of the original assessment on any drainage ditch as well as to pay the cost and expense of repairing, keeping open and looking after the various public -ditches . . . the lands in each drainage district . . . shall be, and the same are hereby authorized to be assessed in proportion to the original assessment, made or which may be made against them for the original establishment and construction of such drainage system,”
“The provisions of this act shall be liberally construed, so as to carry into effect the true intent and meaning'thereof, and to promote the levying, ditching, draining and reclamation of wet, swampy or overflowed lands.” A distinction should be drawn between the state of case, which exists, where the drainage commissioners under the guise of “keeping open, free from obstructions and in good repair” a ditch, they proceed to expend the taxes, which they are authorized to levy, under the section of the statute, supra, in enlarging, widening or deepening a ditch, beyond the limits of the specifications for the ditch, which were adopted by the court, for its construction; and the state of case, where the only attempt to keep it “open and free from obstructions” is within the limits of the adjudged specifications, and in doing so, remove any obstruction, which should have been originally done, in endeavoring to make the ditch conform to the specifications, which the court, in its establishment, adjudged, that it should have.' Applying to the statute the liberal construction, which the legislature enacted should be applied to it, it should be held, that the ditch, which, “to keep open and free from obstructions,” was made the duty of the commissioners, was the ditch, which the court ordered to be constructed, and that anything which obstructs it, within the limits of the specifications adopted for its construction, is an obstruction, within the meaning of the statute. To keep it open, is to maintain it, so that the waters will flow through it, as it was intended. A construction, which would require a ditch, when for any unforeseen occurrence, or mistake of an officer, and when substantially completed, at a great cost to the landowners, to be abandoned, or to remain abandoned, unless and until revived by a proceeding, in the nature of an original proceeding to construct it, to remove something, though of inconsiderable dimensions, out of the ditch, within the limits of the original specifications, would not be a construction of the statute, which would carry into effect, the true meaning or intent thereof, or in the promotion of the ditching or draining of wet or swampy*672 lands. To undertake to deepen or enlarge a ditoli beyond the original specifications adjudged for its construction, of course, would not be within the discretion of the commissioners, and they would be without authority to levy or collect or expend taxes for such purpose. Racer v. State, 131 Ind. 393; Fries v. Brier, 111 Ind. 65; Weaver v. Templon, 113 Ind. 302; Dunkle v. Herron, 115 Ind. 473. The necessity of expenditures to “keep open and free from obstructions” a public ditch and the work to he done to that end, are things within the sound discretion of the drainage commissioners, and this discretion will not be interfered with, unless it is abused. Williams v. Wedding, supra.
The commissioners were authorized to levy the assessments, complained of, if not in excess of 10 per ■ centum of the original assessments, and apply same to the purposes mentioned in subsection 39, supra, which includes an expenditure of whatever is available of such levies, to making the ditch “open and free from obstructions” to the width and depth of the specifications adopted for its construction, and this, they may do, although by legislation subsequent to the establishment of the district, means are provided, whereby another assessment may be made, by a proper proceeding in the courts, sufficient to deepen the ditch to its original specifications, or heyond same, at once; and not to wait for the application of the limited assessments, which the commissioners are enabled to make from year to year. •
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.