Marksberry v. Commonwealth
Marksberry v. Commonwealth
Opinion of the Court
Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
The appellant, Marksberry, was indicted in the Bracken circuit court charged with the crime of murdering Jesse Glenn, and when put upon his trial under this indictment was found guilty by the jury and his punishment fixed at life .imprisonment. .To reverse the judgment on the verdict he prosecutes this appeal.
The evidence up on. which Marksberry was convicted was purely circumstantial but nevertheless very convincing of his guilt. Briefly recited it shows in substance that Jesse Glenn, a single man.and trader in live stock who was also fond of hunting, lived in Braken county several miles from the home of Marksberry, who was a married man. Marksberry and Glenn had been acquainted
About seven days .after this Marksberry went to the house of Claude Glexxn, a brother of Jessie, riding in the Ford machine that Jesse -Glenn took with him and in-1 quire'd of Claude where his brother was. Claude told him " he did’not know’ and' Marksberry..replied 'that "he had stayed at his house on Tuesday "night but he had not seen - him since .the follownig, Wednesday morning. He also told Claude that he had traded Jesse a Buick roadster ■for his. Ford machine on Wednesday morning -and that Jesse had gone to'1 North or South Dakota in the: Buick machine on a hunting expedition, taking with him his dogs, guns and some clothing. Shortly after this Claude becoming uneasy about the absence of his brother-went to Sam Marines, who lived nearby, to make some inquiry : about his brother rind while there Marksberry came in ahditold him that he had just received a po'stal card from his' brother‘Jesse written5 at Connersville, Indiaha; 'but that tfxri crird' had' beéri misplaced and he could not find it.
’ ‘ ‘ ' On the,‘same day Marksberry again told him that he hq,d seen Jessé the- last time ’oh Wednesday morning. ■Soon' after this' Glaude, suspecting that’'.Marksberry had killed his brother, secured a warrant for his arrest' and also'a sedrch'warrant'to’searctíhis premise's. ' ■■"
• , A few1 days! íat’er a 'search"of the. premises of' Marks-berry was'made and sPnxe articles', of clothing that, Jesse
In’ short, nearly every article that Jesse took with him when he left the home of his brother at which he had lived was found in the possession of Marksberry- or concealed about his premises or in the possession of some person to whom he had traded.or sold it. Besides this it ■appears’ that Jesse had with him when he went to the ■ home of Marksberry about $400.00 in money, and the theory of the Commonwealth is that Marksberry, who was at the time hard pressed for money, murdered Jesse for the purpose of getting possession of the money and other property that he had with him.
Marksberry in his defense testified that Glenn left his house on Wednesday morning, stating that he was going on a hunting trip; that the articles formerly owned by Glenn had been obtained by him in trades with Glenn. He did not undertake to give any explanation of how Glenn came to his death, as he claimed not to know anything about this.
On this appeal he asked a reversal upon the grounds that the court committed error in refusing his application for a change of venue, that error was committed in the instructions and in impaneling the jury, in causing soldiers to be placed in and about the court house during the trial, in admitting and rejecting evidence and in failing to admonish witnesses who were separated. The
A motion for a change of venue was made and the court after hearing five or six witnesses for the defendant and probably twenty for the Commonwealth overruled the motion, and in so doing did not abuse the sound discretion vested in the court in respect to matters like this. If it should be held that the court under the evidence heard on the subject committed error in refusing to grant the motion, there would scarcely be any im-. portant homicide case in which it would not be the duty of the court to grant a change of venue if requested by the defendant. 'There was no such showing made as would warrant the court in ruling that the defendant could not have a fair trial in Bracken county. Of course widespread and great interest was manifested by the people on account of the horrible manner in which the crime was committed, and that there was a general desire that the perpetrator should be punished is admitted, but these circumstances are not sufficient reasons to authorize a change of venue.
There is a suggestion of error growing out of the manner in which the jury was selected, but an inspection of the record satisfies us that no error in this respect was committed, although we should say that even if error appeared, it would not be available grounds for reversal as we have written many times.
There is also some criticism on account of the failure of the court to instruct the jury upon the whole law of the case, but there is no merit whatever in this complaint, as the court fully and accurately gave to the jury every instruction to which the defendant was entitled.
The trial continued for several days and towards the end increasingly large crowds of people were in attendance, but there was no disorder or violence or threat of violence. Two days before the trial closed the court found that the officers of the court were not able to control the movements of the assembled crowd and requested that soldiers be sent in order that the crowd might be better managed than it was being or could be by the county officers. For this purpose, a company of soldiers arrived and assisted the sheriff and his deputies in keeping the court house clear of more people than could be
The ground that some error was committed by the failure of the court to admonish witnesses placed under rule that they must not after they had testified discuss with other witnesses the evidence they had given is not pressed by counsel in their brief, and as no error was committed in this particular we need not spend further time discussing this ground.
It is said in the brief of counsel that errors were committed by the trial court in permitting incompetent evidence to go to the jury, but an inspection of the record assisted by brief of counsel satisfies us that no error in the admission or rejection of evidence was committed by the trial court.
In conclusion we want to say that this record is singularly free from error, considering the importance of the case and the wide scope the evidence necessarily took in establishing by circumstances the guilt of the defendant. The trial judge presided with absolute fairness; the attorney for the Commonwealth did not at any time or in any way exceed his legitimate duty. The case for the defendant was practised with skill and ability by his capable counsel and every opportunity was afforded both the Commonwealth and the defendant to present their respective contentions.
The evidence, although circumstantial, pointed so unerringly to the defendant that we have never had occasion to consider a case resting on circumstantial evidence that so completely established guilt.
Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.