Watson v. Woods
Watson v. Woods
Opinion of the Court
Affirming.
In 1909 Presley Rogers and Lucinda Rogers exe
The four appellants paid dues to, the local treasurer, who was one of their number, until 1935. One of the appellees, Early West, paid until the same year. Richard Thomas paid until 1932 and no other of the appellees' paid after 1930. During the next five years the meetings were held, apparently, in the private homes of the appellants. No state or national dues were paid by any of them. Appellants rented out the first two floors of the lodge building for a number of years, collected the rents, and paid taxes thereon. In 1946 appellants entered into a contract for the sale of the property, claiming to be the last surviving members. When this attempted sale was made, some of the older members applied to the state and national lodge for a reinstatement of their old charter, paid the required dues, took in new members, reinstated the Women’s Auxiliary, and attempted to hold meetings in the lodge hall, but were prevented from so doing by appellants who placed new locks on the doors.
'The cause was submitted and considered by the chancellor, who, in his opinion and judgment, found the facts to be that the property in question was deeded many years ago to the trustees of Hiram Gem Lodge No. 1813; that the lodge functioned as such until about the year 1929, when it merely ceased activity for the reason that many of the members, due to financial stress, were unable to continue paying dues; that there never was at any time a formal disbandment of the lodge nor a surrender. of its charter, as required by the by-laws of the national lodge before it can or does cease to exist as a lodge; that during the last four or five years the meetings held by the four defendants (appellants here) in their private homes, to the exclusion of other members, did not constitute regular meetings of the lodge to such an extent that the defendants became the last members of same; that the defendants paid no dues to the national lodge during that period, although they did pay dues to the local treasurer, who is one of the defendants; that the lodge began to function again in 1947; that it renewed its original charter, paid its dues to the national lodge and had been reinstated as a member thereof; that the defendants paid certain debts of the lodge and made repairs, but since they had received all the. rents and proceeds from the building during the period between the inactivity and reinstatement, they were compensated in full for any amount so spent; that the defendants have rented the lodge building to certain persons without authority to do so; and that any moneys collected as rentals therefrom since January 1947 be turned over to the Hiram Gem Lodge No-. 1813, excepting taxes and insurance paid.
Based upon the above findings of fact, the court adjudged tfie property to belong to the duly appointed trustees of the lodge, and that the defendants have no right, title, interest or claim in and to same; and that the defendants turn over to the lodge the keys to the building and all of the money received as rental from the building since January 1947.
Appellants in urging reversal of the chancellor in
It is claimed that the four remaining members of the organization decided in 1946 to sell the property, and that at a meeting of the four the organization was dissolved in pursuance of that purpose. Admittedly, it required 7 members to constitute a quorum for transaction of business. 'Consequently, there could not be a formal dissolution by a resolution. of the body since there was not a sufficient number to constitute a quorum. We must, therefore, dismiss the idea of a formal dissolution by active resolution on the part of the lodge and direct our attention to the question of dissolution by abandonment.
It seems to be the general rule that, in the case of a voluntary association, such as this, where there is an abandonment of the objects and purposes thereof, a court of equity may decree a dissolution and a distribution of the funds among the several contributing members. It seems, however, to be as equally true that there must be an entire failure of purpose. In 7 C. J. S., Associations, sec. 9, subdivision 3, it is said:
“An association may be regarded as dissolved if it abandons the purposes of its creation and ceases to exercise its functions, especially where power to resume business does not exist. However, neither the loss of the association’s property, nor a failure to hold regular meetings or to elect officers, nor all combined, necessarily amounts to an abandonment.
“The question whether the society has become dissolved by abandonment is one of law for the court.”
In 4 Am. Jur., Associations and Clubs, Section 54, we find; ‘ ‘ * * * But a voluntary unincorporated association should not be dissolved for slight causes. It is only when it is entirely apparent that the organization has ceased to answer the ends of its existence and no other mode of relief is attainable that this should be done.”
Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.