United States v. Harralson
United States v. Harralson
Opinion of the Court
INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMISSIONERS
The following instructions were tendered to the Court by counsel for the plaintiff in the above-styled action for the general guidance of the Commissioners appointed by the Court in accordance with Section 25 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as amended. The instructions were approved by counsel for the defendants and were entered by The Honorable Roy M. Shelbourne, United States Senior District Judge, sitting by designation. They are intended as general instructions to be used by the Commissioners in all similar cases but are not intended as a complete set of instructions on all issues.
INTRODUCTION
You have been selected to serve on a Commission, appointed by the Court under the provisions of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act,
JUST COMPENSATION
The Constitution of the United States provides that private property shall not be taken for a public use without the payment of “just compensation.”
In general “just compensation” means the fair and reasonable market value of the land or interest therein that is taken by the Government, to be determined as of the date of taking.
By “fair and reasonable market value” is meant the highest price that a piece of property, as enhanced by the improvements thereon, if any, would bring when offered for sale in the market. It is the highest price that those having the ability and occasion to buy would be willing to pay. This does not mean the price that could be realized at a forced sale on short notice, but the price that could be obtained after reasonable and ample time,
The fact that this case involves a controversy between the Government and private citizens is no reason why you should make a greater or lesser award than you would if such controversy were between private citizens. As said by the Supreme Court of the United States:
He is entitled to receive the value of what he has been deprived of, and no more. To award him less would be unjust to him; to award him more would be unjust to the public.5
Consequently, in determining the value of any lands or interests therein, the same considerations are to be regarded as in the sale of property between private individuals, and in such cases the inquiry is: “What is the property worth on the market?”, and “What is it worth with respect to the uses for which it is plainly adapted?”
Just compensation is not to be determined necessarily by the particular use to which a landowner may have put his property, but rather by reference to any and all uses for which it was available at the time of the taking.
In determining the fair market value, you should take into consideration all elemente of value which would affect the market price of the land at the time it was taken, that is to say, all elements and factors which would be taken into consideration by reasonable buyers and sellers in arriving at a price to be paid for the property in arm’s-length private negotiations between themselves. An “element of value” may be defined as anything which would induce a reasonable seller to demand more for the property because of the existence of such element and which would induce a reasonable buyer to give more because of the existence of such element.
You should take into consideration all elements of value of these lands as shown by the evidence to have existed at the time the lands were taken; but elements affecting value that depend upon events or combinations of occurrences which, while within the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be reasonably probable, should be excluded from considera
You are to consider the value of the land as a whole, as a unit. While in making your award you should consider all elements of value, such as farming value, if any, timber value, if any, or mineral value, if any, you cannot separately value each of these elements and aggregate them to reach the value of the entire tract. This is true because these factors of value do not exist independently of each other and cannot be realized at the same time.
You are not to consider the value of the property to the Government,
PARTIAL TAKING
You may have instances in which the Government has taken a part only of a larger tract, leaving the remainder to the landowner. In such a situation the taking may not affect the value of the remainder in any way. On the other hand, it may either damage or benefit the remainder, depending upon the circumstances of the case. In any such situation the measure of just compensation is the same; that is, the difference between the fair and reasonable market value of the entire tract of land immediately before the taking and the fair and reasonable market value of the portion that remains after the taking, as shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
Where only a part of the property has been acquired and the remaining portion has been enhanced in value by reason of the project for which the Government is talcing part of the land, these special benefits resulting from the project must be taken into consideration in arriving at your award.
IMPROVEMENTS AND TIMBER
In eases of improved properties you should determine the fair and reasonable market values of the lands, as enhanced by the improvements thereon, but your award will be for the fair and reasonable value of the property as a whole.
MINERALS
It may be claimed with respect to some of the lands involved that they are underlain with deposits of minerals which enhance the value of such lands. If you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that any of the lands here involved do contain mineral deposits, such deposits shall be taken into consideration by you in fixing the market value of such lands if you believe that the presence of such deposits in fact affects market value. That is to say, you will find the market values of such lands at the time of taking with the minerals in the ground.
DIVIDED OWNERSHIPS AND LEASES
You may encounter tracts where there is a divided ownership of lands and minerals, or lands and timber—that is to say a case where one person owns the surface of the lands and another person or persons owns the minerals or timber. Such a situation will require you to apportion the fair and reasonable market value of the land as a whole, including the minerals and timber, between the owner of the surface and the owner of the minerals or timber. In order to do this you will first find the fair and reasonable market value of the tract of land as a whole, just as though all interests therein were owned by one person, disregarding the fact that one person owned the surface and another the minerals or timber.
The same principle will apply with respect to a tract of land where there is an outstanding leasehold interest.
EASEMENTS
Sometimes the Government does not condemn the fee simple title to lands, but simply acquires certain rights and privileges with respect thereto, which are known as “easements,” leaving the landowner free to make such use of his property as he may find expedient or practicable so long as he does not interfere with the rights acquired by the Government. In such a case the landowner’s measure of just compensation is the difference between the fair and reasonable market value of the land free and clear of the easement and its fair and reasonable market value,
Where only an easement is acquired it is not proper to allow the full fee value of the land within the easement area.
OFFERS TO PURCHASE
It is not permissible for a landowner to state or prove what he has been offered for the property involved, nor for him to prove an unaccepted offer to purchase made by one not a party to the suit.
SALES OF SIMILAR PROPERTY
Evidence of sales of comparable property is admissible and should be considered by you and given the weight that you think it should have in determining the fair and reasonable market value of the lands in question. Sales at arm’s length of similar property are the best evidence of market value, and ordinarily such transactions are better evidence of value than the mere opinions of witnesses on the subject.
In evaluating such evidence you should take into consideration the facts and circumstances of such sales, as shown by the evidence and your view of those properties, the location and accessibility of the lands subject to such sales, as compared to the location and accessibility of the lands with which you are concerned, the quality of the lands so sold as compared to the quality of those here involved, and any other established factors of similarity or dissimilarity shown by the evidence.
SALES TO THE GOVERNMENT
While the prices paid in sales of similar property between private parties are admissible, the price the Government has paid for other property is not admissible in evidence and is incompetent to prove the market value of land under condemnation.
PRODUCTIVITY, INCOME, AND PROFITS
It may be that you will hear evidence as to the productivity of the lands involved and related to income derived therefrom. That evidence may be considered only to the extent, if any, that it may shed light upon the fair and reasonable market value of the lands as of the date of talcing. Of course, the productivity of agricultural lands is a factor going into the market value of a farm, and it should be given its just weight.
LANDOWNER’S PLANS
It is not proper for the landowner to show the purpose for which the land was purchased by him or how he intended to use it in the future.
ATTORNEY FEES AND INTEREST
In making your award you are not to allow anything to the landowner for his attorney’s fee or expenses in connection with this litigation. These are not proper elements for you to take into consideration in reaching your decision.
VIEW OF PROPERTIES
The law contemplates that the Commissioners will personally view the properties to enable them to better understand and weigh the testimony which they hear during the course of the trial.
CONDUCT OF HEARINGS
You will conduct your hearings- at such times and places as you may select. With regard to times, it is desirable, of course, that your work be done as expeditiously as is compatible with efficiency and consistent with justice. Reasonable notice of the times and places of hearings should be given the interested parties or their attorneys, and you may call upon the Government attorneys to provide you with forms of such notices. As to the place of the hearings, it is suggested that a place be selected that is convenient to the Commissioners, the attorneys, the parties, and the witnesses, and preferably in reasonable proximity to the lands.
In the course of your hearings certain questions of admissibility of evidence will almost surely arise and will have to be decided. Since your Chairman is an experienced attorney, you should allow him to rule on those questions.
Since the burden of proof on the issue of value is on the landowner,
You are at liberty to impose a reasonable limit (say three or four per side) on the number of witnesses- who may testify as to land values or damages, provided this limitation is announced in advance of the hearing.
The law contemplates that there shall be a full and complete trial of the issues before the Commissioners, and it is therefore improper for the parties to withhold a part of their case with a view of presenting it initially on appeal to the Court.
While it is generally desirable for a landowner in a controversy with the Government over the value of his land to have an attorney, he is not obliged to employ one, but may, if he desires, prosecute his own claim before you. The chairman and the members of the Commission have the right to interrogate any witnesses that may be called by the parties.
A competent court reporter will normally be provided by the Government to report the evidence that you may receive. If you desire a transcript of any testimony, the Court should be notified and it will direct that such transcript be
WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE
When opinion evidence has been introduced as to the value of the land and the amount of compensation that in the opinion of the witness should be awarded, you should bear in mind that such opinion is not a statement of fact but it is an expression of the witness’ opinion of the market value.
In considering such testimony it is your duty to determine whether such opinion is correct or erroneous, and in arriving at your conclusion you should consider the manner and demeanor of the witness, his bias or lack of bias, the grounds upon which the witness bases his opinion, his experience and knowledge of the matters about which he testifies, particularly his knowledge of the property involved and of sales of similar property, along with other evidence in the case, and the reasonableness- or unreasonableness of his opinion as viewed in the light of the knowledge and experience of the witness.
Generally speaking, in condemnation cases valuation is not a matter of mere mathematical calculation but involves the exercise of judgment.
You are not bound to decide any issue in accordance with the testimony of any number of witnesses which does not produce in your minds belief in the likelihood of truth, as against the testimony of a lesser number of witnesses or other evidence which does produce such belief in your minds. The test is not which side brings the greater number of witnesses or presents the greater quantity of evidence, but which witness and which evidence appeals to your minds as being more reasonable and otherwise trustworthy. The testimony of a single witness which produces in your minds belief in the likelihood of truth and reason is sufficient for the proof and would
QUOTIENT VERDICT
Sometimes in determining values, fact finders are inclined to arrive at what is termed in law a “quotient verdict.” A quotient verdict is one arrived at by each of the jurors setting down some figures in writing or otherwise and then adding up the total of the 12 figures and dividing the figure by 12 to arrive at the verdict. Another method of arriving at a quotient verdict is by adding together the values fixed by all the witnesses who have testified as to a particular tract and then dividing that total by the number of witnesses, fixing the value of the land in that fashion.
A third method of arriving at a quotient verdict might be through taking the highest value and the lowest value and, as is commonly said, “splitting the difference.”
No one of these methods should be used or considered by you in any manner in arriving at just compensation.
REPORT AND AWARD
As soon as practicable after you have completed a hearing, you should file a report with the Court showing the award made by you. Standard forms of such awards may be secured from counsel for the Government. If you do not care to use this short form award, you may file a more complete report which will disclose your basic findings and such evidentiary findings and comment as you may consider necessary or desirable in explaining the basis on which you arrived at your decision.
GENERAL PRECAUTIONS
All of you have probably heard juries admonished in both civil and criminal eases not to discuss such eases with outsiders or to permit outsiders to discuss the cases with them. Your function in this case is somewhat, though not entirely, similar to that of a jury, and you may well have the problem that jurors sometimes have about interested parties wishing to have an outside discussion of the case. This should be avoided by you. If any person undertakes to discuss the case with you privately, tell him that you are on the Commission and that it is not proper for you to have a private conversation with him about the case or about the tract in which he is interested. Should such person persist in his efforts, the matter should be reported to the Court.
The instructions herein contained are general in their nature; some of the problems that have been touched upon may not arise in this case, and, on the other hand, some may arise which have not been mentioned. In the latter event you may call upon the Court for further instructions.
. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831dd (1964).
. U.S.Const. Amend. V.
. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 54 S.Ct. 704, 78 L.Ed. 1236 (1934); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943); United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 87 L.Ed. 1390 (1943).
. Instructions to Jury, 10 F.R.D. at 313.
. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574, 17 S.Ct. 966, 976, 42 L.Ed. 270 (1897).
. 10 F.R.D. at 313.
. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey y. Southern Pacific Co., 268 U.S. 146, 158, 45 S.Ct. 465, 467, 69 L.Ed. 890 (1925).
. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 54 S.Ct. 704, 78 L.Ed. 1236 (1934).
. 10 F.R.D. at 313-314.
. 10 F.R.D. at 314.
. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257, 54 S.Ct. 704, 78 L.Ed. 1236 (1934); 10 F.R.D. at 314; Cameron Develop. Co. v. United States, 145 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1944).
. 10 F.R.D. at 314; United States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 706, 61 S.Ct. 174, 85 L.Ed. 459 (1940); Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1937).
. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 333, 69 S.Ct. 1086, 93 L.Ed. 1392 (1949); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943).
. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 33 S.Ct. 667, 57 L.Ed. 1063 (1913); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 13 S.Ct. 361, 37 L.Ed. 170 (1893).
. J. A. Tobin Constr. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 422 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 830, 86 S.Ct. 70, 15 L.Ed.2d 74 (1965).
. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1946); United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180, 31 S.Ct. 162, 55 L.Ed. 165 (1911); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); United States ex rel. TVA v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F.Supp. 811 (E.D.Tenn. 1941); United States ex rel. and for Use of TVA v. Davis, 41 F.Supp. 595 (E.D.Tenn. 1941).
. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 17 S.Ct. 966, 42 L.Ed. 270 (1897); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943); Aaronson v. United States, 65 App.D.C. 14, 79 F.2d 139 (1935); 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, § 297 (1938).
. 3 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 8.6203 (rev. 3d ed. 1965).
. Ibid.
. United States v. 1,000 Acres of Land, etc., 162 F.Supp. 219 (D.C. 1958).
. United States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 706, 61 S.Ct 174, 85 L.Ed. 459 (1940); Fain v. United States, 145 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1944); Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1937).
. United States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 706, 61 S.Ct. 174, 85 L.Ed. 459 (1940); Fain v. United States, 145 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1944); Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1937); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, etc., 149 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1945).
. Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1937); United States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 706, 61 S.Ct. 174, 85 L.Ed. 459 (1940).
. Devou v. City of Cincinnati, 162 F. 633 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 577, 29 S.Ct. 685, 53 L.Ed. 658 (1908); Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1937).
. 10 F.R.D. at 315.
. United States ex rel. TVA v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F.Supp. 811 (E.D.Tenn. 1941); United States v. Certain Lands in Jackson County, 48 F.Supp. 591 (W.D.Mo. 1942); United States v. 620.00 Acres of Land, etc., 101 F.Supp. 686 (W. D.Ark. 1952).
. United States v. Certain Lands in Town of Highlands, 45 F.Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
. 10 F.R.D. at 316.
. Eagle Lake Improvement Co. v. United States, 160 F.2d 182 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 762, 68 S.Ct. 64, 92 L.Ed. 347 (1947) (minerals); United States v. 250 Acres of Land, More or Less, 43 F.Supp. 937 (S.D.Tex. 1942) (minerals); Meadows v. United States, 144 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1944) (timber).
. 10 F.R.D. at 317.
. United States v. City of New York, 165 F.2d 526, 1 A.L.R.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. 1.87 Acres of Land, etc., 155 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1946); Silberman v. United States, 131 F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1942).
. Carlock v. United States, 60 App.D.C. 314, 53 F.2d 926 (1931).
. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 17 S.Ct. 966, 42 L.Ed. 270 (1897); Karlson v. United States, 82 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1936); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 54 S.Ct. 704, 78 L.Ed. 1236 (1934); United States v. 2,648.31 Acres of Land, etc., 218 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1955).
. United States ex rel. and for use of TVA v. An Easement and Right of Way, etc., 182 F.Supp. 899 (M.D.Tenn. 1960); United States v. 213.43 Acres of Land, etc., 108 F.Supp. 446 (D.N.D. 1952); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Puyallup, 51 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1931).
. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 37 S.Ct. 380, 61 L.Ed. 746 (1917); United States v. 2,648.31 Acres of Land, etc., 218 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1955); United States ex rel. and for use of TVA v. An Easement and Right of Way, etc., 182 F.Supp. 899 (M.D.Tenn. 1960).
. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 37 S.Ct. 380, 61 L.Ed. 746 (1917).
. 20 C. J. Eminent Domain § 585 (1920); 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 451; Annot., 46 A.L.R. 1463 (1927); United States ex rel. and for use of TVA v. An Easement and Right of Way, etc., 182 F.Supp. 899 (M.D.Tenn. 1960).
. Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341, 24 S.Ct. 114, 48 L.Ed. 211 (1903); Jayson v. United States, 294 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Regents of New Mexico School of Mines, 185 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1950); St. Joe Paper Co. v. United States, 155 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1946); United States v. Smith, 355 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1966).
. Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 108 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, Welch v. United States ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority, 309
. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, etc., 144 F.2d 626, 155 A.L.R. 253 (3d Cir. 1944); Government of Virgin Islands v. 50.05 Acres of Land, etc., 190 F.Supp. 543 (D.V.I. 1961); United States v. Becktold Co., 129 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1942); Simmonds v. United States, 199 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1952).
. Slattery Co. v. United States, 231 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1956); United States ex rel. and for Use of TVA v. Bailey, 115 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1940); United States ex rel. and for Use of TVA v. Reynolds, 115 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1940); United States v. 13,255.53 Acres of Land, etc., 158 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1946).
. United States ex rel. TVA v. Neal, 45 F.Supp. 382 (E.D.Tenn. 1942); Stephens v. United States, 235 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Playa De Flor Land & Improvement Co., 160 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1947).
. Carr v. United States, 28 F.Supp. 236 (W.D.Ky. 1939); Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 108 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, Welch v. United States ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority, 309 U.S. 688, 60 S.Ct. 889, 84 L.Ed. 1030 (1940).
. Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 108 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, Welch v. United States ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority, 309 U.S. 688, 60 S.Ct. 889, 84 L.Ed. 1030 (1940); United States v. Meyer, 113 F. 2d 387 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 706, 61 S.Ct. 174, 85 L.Ed. 459 (1940);
. United States ex rel. and for Use of TVA v. Davis, 41 F.Supp. 595 (E.D.Tenn. 1941); Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 108 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, Welch v. United States ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority, 309 U.S. 688, 60 S.Ct. 889, 84 L.Ed. 1030 (1940).
. St. Joe Paper Co. v. United States, 155 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1946); Five Tracts of Land, etc. v. United States, 101 F. 661 (3d Cir. 1900); West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. United States, 200 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1952); United States v. 992.61 Acres of Land, etc., 201 F.Supp. 578 (W.D.Ark. 1962).
. United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 87 L.Ed. 1390 (1943); United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 80 S.Ct. 1134, 4 L.Ed.2d 1186 (1960); West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. United States, 200 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1952); United States v. 992.61 Acres of Land, etc., 201 F.Supp. 578 (W.D.Ark. 1962).
. Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904 (1930); In re Clark’s Estate, 187 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v. 251.81 Acres of Land in Meade County, Ky., 50 F.Supp. 81 (W.D.Ky. 1943).
. 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1964).
. Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 108 F.2d 95, 97 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, Welch v. United States ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority, 309 U.S. 688, 60 S.Ct. 889, 84 L.Ed. 1030 (1940); United States ex rel. TVA v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F.Supp. 811, 817 (E.D.Tenn. 1941).
. Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 108 F.2d 95, 101 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, Welch v. United States ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority, 309 U.S. 688, 60 S.Ct. 889, 84 L.Ed. 1030 (1940); see United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 197, 84 S.Ct. 639, 11 L.Ed. 2d 629 (1964).
. Fain v. United States, 145 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1944); United States ex rel. TVA v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F.Supp. 811 (E.D.Tenn. 1941); United States ex rel. and for Use of TVA v. Davis, 41 F.Supp. 595, 598 (E.D.Tenn. 1941).
. United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 273, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 87 L.Ed. 1390 (1943); Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 108 F.2d 95, 101 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 688, 60 S.Ct. 889, 84 L.Ed. 1030 (1940); United States v. Glanat Realty Corp., 276 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1960).
. United States v. Crary, 2 F.Supp. 870 (W.D.Va. 1932); United States v. A Certain Tract or Parcel of Land in Chatham County, Ga., 47 F.Supp. 30 (S.D.Ga. 1942); United States v. Savannah Shipyards, 139 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1944); 5 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 18.5 [2] (rev. 3d ed. 1962).
. Chapman v. United States, 169 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 860, 69 S.Ct. 134, 93 L.Ed. 406 (1948).
. United States v. Travis, 37 F.Supp. 336 (W.D.Ky. 1941).
. 10 F.R.D. at 319.
. Ibid.
. United States v. Certain Lands in Town of Highlands, etc., 36 F.Supp. 968, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 17 S.Ct. 510, 41 L.Ed. 937 (1897); Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627-628, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944); Weicker v. Howbert, 103 F.2d 105, 110 (10th Cir. 1939); Spero-Nelson v. Brown, 175 F.2d 86, 90 (6th Cir. 1949); United States v. 2,049.85 Acres of Land, etc., 49 F.Supp. 20, 23 (S.D.Tex.l943).
. Gilooley v. Pennsylvania R. R., 10 Fed.Cas. p. 417 (No. 5,448b) (S.D.N.Y. 1879); Kentucky Util. Co. v. Bruner, 400 S.W. 2d 203 (Ky. 1966); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 567 (1964).
. State of Washington v. United States, 214 F.2d 33, 43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 862, 75 S.Ct. 86, 99 L.Ed. 679 (1954); International Paper Co. v. United States, 227 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1955); City of Maryville v. Farmer, 244 F.2d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 1957); Alcott Co. v. Raphael, 275 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1960); Likins-Foster Monterey Corp. v. United States, 308 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Smith, 355 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1966).
. Viles v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 233 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956); Kite v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 217 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Smith, 355 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1966).
. United States v. Whitehurst, 337 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1964).
. 22 F.R.D. 144; United States v. 711.57 Acres of Land in Eden Tp., etc., 51 F.Supp. 30 (N.D.Cal. 1943).
. Myra Foundation v. United States, 267 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1959); United States v. 4,925 Acres of Land, etc., 143 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1944); United States v. 711.57 Acres of Land in Eden Tp., 51 F.Supp. 30 (N.D.Cal. 1943).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- UNITED STATES of America upon the relation and for the Use of the TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY v. Grayson Lee HARRALSON, an Easement and Right-Of-Way
- Cited By
- 2 cases
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- Published