Buckman v. Hart
Buckman v. Hart
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
DONALD E. BUCKMAN PETITIONER
v. Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-00763-JRW-LLK
DE’EDRA A. HART, Warden RESPONDENT ORDER This Court: 1. DENIES Buckman’s Motion for a Ruling (DN 14); 2. ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Lanny King’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation in its entirety (DN 12); 3. GRANTS Hart’s Motion to Dismiss (DN 9); 4. DENIES Buckman’s petition for Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(DN 1); and 5. DENIES a Certificate of Appealability. OPINION In 1987, a state court convicted Donald Buckman of murder.1 In 1994, he filed a state habeas petition. The petition was unsuccessful.2 Beginning May 5, 1996, Buckman’s state habeas petition was no longer pending.3 That means he had until May 5, 1997, to file a federal habeas petition, because AEDPA establishes a 1-
year period of limitation for filing a federal habeas petition.4
1 DN 1-1 at #25; DN 9-2 at #52. 2 DN 9-2 at 107-110. 3 Id.; see also Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.20(2). 4
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Buckman filed this federal habeas petition in 2018.° That’s 21 years too late. Magistrate Judge King explained as much in his Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation on May 7, 2019.° After that, Buckman filed a “Motion for Ruling.”’ The “Motion for a Ruling” should probably not be construed as objections to Judge King’s report. The Court therefore need not undertake a de novo review of Judge King’s report. But even under a de novo standard of review, Buckman’s arguments lack merit. We therefore adopt Judge King’s report in its entirety, including his second footnote regarding the habeas petition’s merits (or lack thereof).® Buckman is not entitled to a Certificate of Appealability because no reasonable jurist would find the question presented to be debatable.”
Justin R Walker, District Judge United States District Court
August 25, 2020
°DN 1. ° DN 12. TDN 14. 12. 9 See Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 483-4(2000); see also Moody v. United States,
958 F.3d 485, 488(6th Cir. 2020) (Thapar, J.) (“In short, a court should not grant a certificate without some substantial reason to think that the denial of relief might be incorrect.”).
Reference
- Status
- Unknown