UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY SOUTHERN DIVISION PIKEVILLE

LINNELL RICHMOND, JR., ) ) Petitioner, ) Civil Action No. 7: 20-084-WOB ) v. ) ) HECTOR JOYNER, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ) AND ORDER Respondent. ) *** *** *** ***

Petitioner Linnell Richmond, Jr., is an inmate at the United States Penitentiary—Big Sandy in Inez, Kentucky. Proceeding without a lawyer, Richmond filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

challenging the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him. [R. 1.] In response, the Warden argues that Richmond’s claim is not actionable in a habeas proceeding. After reviewing the briefs,1 the Court finds Richmond’s petition must be DENIED. During a February 2019 disciplinary proceeding, Richmond was sanctioned with the loss of both commissary privileges and phone privileges for sixty days. [R. 7-1 at 8-9.] Richmond claims this disciplinary proceeding and resulting sanction violated his right to due process. [R. 1 at 5-6, 9.] But upon review, the Court disagrees. Wolff v. McDonnell,

(1974), articulates certain minimum procedures that prison officials must follow before sanctioning an inmate with the loss of good time credit. Here, however, Richmond did not lose good time credit. “An inmate cannot challenge the loss of non- custodial privileges by way of a habeas petition because the loss of such privileges has only a

1 Although the Court provided Richmond with an opportunity to file a reply brief to the Warden’s response within thirty days [see R. 4 at 2], Richmond chose not to do so. speculative or incidental effect on the length of a prisoner’s sentence and is not close to the core of habeas corpus.” Lutz v. Hemingway,

(E.D. Mich. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Ingram v. Jewell,

(6th Cir. 2004) (“In order to show the deprivation of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment, a prisoner must show that the act extended the duration of his sentence, or that he suffered an atypical, significant deprivation.”). If Richmond wishes to challenge his restricted commissary and phone access as unconstitutional conditions of confinement, he should do so in a civil rights proceeding. See Martin v. Overton,

(6th Cir. 2004). Further, when good conduct time is on the table as a sanction, Wolff v. McDonnell entitles a prisoner to advanced, written notice of the charges against him; the opportunity to call witnesses and present other evidence in his defense; and a written decision explaining the grounds used to determine the sanctions imposed. Wolff,

. Even though Richmond was not sanctioned with the loss of good time credit, the record suggests these requirements were satisfied in his case. Indeed, the Warden has provided evidence that the Wolff requirements were followed

[see R. 7-1 at 8-9], and Richmond has failed to file a reply brief challenging the Warden’s claims. Thus, even if the Wolff standard applied to Richmond’s claims, no violation of his due process rights occurred. For these reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 1. Richmond’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

[R. 1] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE so that Richmond may raise his potential civil rights claims in an appropriate civil rights action. See Martin,

; 2. Judgment will be entered contemporaneously herewith; and 3. This matter is CLOSED and STRICKEN from the Court’s docket. This the 5th day of January, 2021.

Jigs. Signed By: 0. By: William O. Bertelsman □□□□□ “ame United States District Judge