UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON

JERRY JEROME ELDRIDGE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) Civil No. 5: 21-084-JMH ) V. ) ) J. TACKETT, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ) AND ORDER Defendants. )

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Plaintiff Jerry Jerome Eldridge is an inmate currently confined at the Fayette County Detention Center in Lexington, Kentucky. Proceeding without an attorney, Eldridge filed a civil complaint pursuant to

against Fayette County District Judge John Tackett, the Fayette County Detention Center, and the Rowan County Jail. [R. 1]. Although Eldridge has filed an account activity ledger from his inmate account [R. 2], he did not file a formal motion to proceed in forma pauperis. In addition, a motion to proceed in forma pauperis must be supported by a statement of the plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account certified by appropriate prison staff, which Eldridge’s account ledger is not.

(a)(2); Local Rule 5.4(a)(2). For these reasons, to the extent that Eldridge’s submission of his account ledger could be construed as a request to proceed in forma pauperis, this request is denied. 1

Even so, the Court may conduct a preliminary review of Eldridge’s complaint pursuant to

(e)(2), 1915A. A district court must dismiss any claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. Hill v. Lappin,

(6th Cir. 2010); McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). The Court evaluates Eldridge’s pleading under a more lenient standard because he is not represented by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007); Burton v. Jones,

(6th Cir. 2003). At this stage, the Court accepts Eldridge’s factual allegations as true and liberally construes Eldridge’s legal claims in his favor. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). The facts of Eldridge’s complaint are sparse. Eldridge alleges that Fayette District Judge Tackett issued a false warrant against him. Eldridge also claims that he was not timely arraigned

via video, but instead Judge Tackett issued another warrant for his arrest on the 13th day. [R. 1, at 4]. Eldridge claims that he was then booked in the Rowan County Jail under false charges. He seeks monetary damages in the amount of $300,000.00 against Defendants Judge Tackett, the Rowan County Jail, and the Fayette County Detention Center. 2

However, Eldridge’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. A civil complaint must set forth claims in a clear and concise manner, and must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Eldridge’s claims against Judge Tackett are clearly based on decisions and rulings made during the course of Eldridge’s ongoing criminal proceedings, thus these claims are barred by judicial immunity.1 Judges have long been entitled to absolute judicial immunity from tort claims arising out of their performance of functions integral to the judicial process. Pierson v. Ray,

(1967). Indeed, “judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice . . . .” Mireles v. Waco,

(1991). Here, Judge Tackett’s alleged conduct falls squarely within his role as a judge in Eldridge’s criminal proceedings. See Huffer

v. Bogen,

(6th Cir. 2012)(“[T]he factors

1 Eldridge is currently in custody related to state criminal charges pending in Commonwealth v. Eldridge, No. 20-CR-999 (Fayette Cir. Ct. 2020) and Commonwealth v. Eldridge, No. 21-CR- 297 (Fayette Cir. Ct. 2021). The Court “may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts of record.” Granader v. Public Bank,

, 82-83 (6th Cir. 1969); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Records on government websites are self-authenticating. See Fed. R. Evid. 902(5). 3

determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”)(quoting Stump v. Sparkman,

(1978)).

Thus, Judge Tackett is entitled to absolute judicial immunity against Eldridge’s claims and these claims will be dismissed. Nor may Eldridge bring his claims against the remaining Defendants, the Fayette County Detention Center and the Rowan County Jail. These facilities are merely buildings – they are not suable entities apart from the counties that operate them. Matthews v. Jones,

(6th Cir. 1994) (“Since the Police Department is not an entity which may be sued, Jefferson County is the proper party to address the allegations of Matthews’s complaint.”). Even if the Court were to construe Eldridge’s claims as alleged against either the Lexington-Fayette Urban County

Government or Rowan County, because a county or municipal government is only responsible under

when its employees cause injury by carrying out the county’s formal policies or practices, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services,

(1978), a plaintiff must specify the county policy or custom which he alleges caused his injury. Paige v. Coyner,

, 4

284 (6th Cir. 2010). Eldridge makes no allegation that the events about which he complains are the product of a county or municipal policy or custom, and he therefore fails to state a claim for relief against either county. Thomas v. City of Chattanooga,

(6th Cir. 2005). For these reasons, the Court finds that dismissal of this action is required. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: (1) Eldridge’s construed Motion to Waive Filing Fee [R. 2] is DENIED; (2) Eldridge’s complaint [R. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; (3) The Court will enter an appropriate judgment; and (4) This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the docket. This 8th day of April, 2021. Kees. Signed By:

“Se” — Senior U.S. District Judge