Gulley v. Barren County Detention Center

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY AT BOWLING GREEN CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24CV-P114-JHM COREY GULLEY PLAINTIFF v. BARREN COUNTY DETENTION CENTER et al. DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Corey Gulley filed the instant pro se prisoner 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. This matter is now before the Court on initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the action without prejudice.

I. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff is a convicted inmate at the Barren County Detention Center (BCDC). He sues BCDC and the following BCDC personnel in their official capacities only: Jessica Estes, Braden Thacker, Rob Richardson, and Jenny Key. Plaintiff states as follows: I was denied proper medical treatment as a state inmate for a broken hand and was placed in the hole after requesting to go to the hospital for x-rays over my hand. Then I was shipped to Marion County Detention Center for SAP there I was seen by there medical staff and was xrayed the next day which reveald it was severly broken. I was removed from SAP and sent back to Barren County Jail where I was placed back in the whole for 4 days and my hand was never x-rayed or anything else got done about it till I got these forms to fill out. Marion County sent me back here by they said Barren County was responsible for it and encouraged me to fill these forms out for my pain and anguish.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and “expungement of records and dismiss charges.”

II. STANDARD When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

III. ANALYSIS The Court construes the complaint as alleging claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and retaliation. Defendant BCDC is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments, such as jails, are not suable under § 1983. Marbry v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 99-6706, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 28072, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that a jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983). In this situation, Barren County is the proper defendant. Smallwood v. Jefferson Cnty. Gov’t, 743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990). Moreover, Plaintiff sues the other Defendants in their official capacities only. “Official- capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants are actually brought against their employer, Barren County. Id. at 165.

When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). In regard to the second component, a municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).

The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)).

Plaintiff does not allege that any action in the complaint was taken pursuant to a policy or custom of Barren County. He allegations pertain only to himself. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against BCDC and his official-capacity claims against the other Defendants must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Even if Plaintiff had sued Defendants in their individual capacities, the claims would still be dismissed. The Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff fails to identify any individual who denied him medical treatment or what specific action any individual defendant took. Therefore, the claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.1 However, the Court will dismiss the action without prejudice and with leave to amend to the complaint for Plaintiff to identify the specific individuals who he alleges denied him medical treatment and to state specifically how he alleges each denied him treatment. See Rashada v. Fiegel, No. 23-1674, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 7883, at *12 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2024) (approving dismissal of pro se complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place this case number and word “Amended” on a § 1983 complaint form and send it to Plaintiff, along with three summons forms, should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint.

1 Plaintiff’s request for expungement of his record and dismissal of charges would also be dismissed since these are not available remedies under § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come with the literal terms of § 1983.”).

IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Court will enter a separate Order dismissing the action.

Date: October 29, 2024 Ar layf Joseph H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge ce. Plaintiff, pro se United States District Court 4414.010