UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

SYED F. AHMED Plaintiff

v. Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-662-RGJ-CHL

FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC. Defendants and AIG PROPERTY AND CASUALTY CO.

* * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Defendant FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (“FedEx”) moves to stay this case in light of related state court litigation. [DE 29]. Defendant AIG Property Casualty Company (“AIG”) and Plaintiff Syed Ahmed (“Ahmed”) responded. [DE 30; DE 31]. At the Court’s request [DE 32], the parties filed additional briefs addressing the Colorado River doctrine. [DE 33; DE 34; DE 35]. With its second brief [DE 33], AIG also moves to withdraw its initial response [DE 30]. Both Ahmed and AIG now fully support FedEx’s motion. For the following reasons, FedEx’s unopposed motion to stay this case [DE 29] is GRANTED. AIG’s unopposed motion to withdraw its initial response brief [DE 33] is also GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND According to Ahmed’s complaint, in 2018, a FedEx truck damaged a brick archway at his residence. [DE 1-3 at 8]. AIG was Ahmed’s insurer at the time. [Id. at 7]. Ahmed first sued FedEx and two related unknown parties, but not AIG.1 FedEx removed that case to this Court before seeking partial summary judgment.2 Over FedEx’s protest, with that partially dispositive motion

1 Complaint, Ahmed v. Federal Express Corp., No. 19-CI-7420 (Ky. Jefferson Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2019). 2 See Notice of Removal, Ahmed v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 3:20-CV-145-DJH-CHL (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2020), ECF No. 1. pending, Ahmed was allowed to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice.3 Meanwhile, Ahmed pursued a separate lawsuit against AIG.4 The case against AIG remains pending in state court and is scheduled for trial in January 2025.5 More recently, Ahmed initiated this lawsuit, naming both FedEx and AIG as defendants. [DE 1-3 at 6]. The complaint purports “to preserve the entirety of any claim” against FedEx and

to “join[] AIG as a real party in interest.” [Id. at 8]. As before, FedEx removed to this Court [DE 1] and moved for partial summary judgment [DE 14]. The Court granted that motion in part and denied it in part. [DE 28]. FedEx now seeks a stay based on Ahmed’s related state court lawsuit against AIG. [DE 29 at 273]. At first, AIG joined in the motion only as to the partial stay of litigation between Ahmed and FedEx. [DE 30 at 279]. Ahmed fully supported FedEx’s motion. [DE 31 at 291]. The parties’ initial briefs did not address the Colorado River doctrine, which governs in this case, and Ahmed’s brief did not address AIG’s suggestion of a partial stay. [See DE 32 at 294]. So the Court requested simultaneous briefs on (1) whether the pending cases are “parallel,” (2) “the Colorado River

factors,” and (3) “whether the Court may issue a stay against one defendant but not both defendants.” [Id. at 295]. The parties submitted additional briefs.6 [DE 33; DE 34; DE 35]. Because AIG, like Ahmed, now fully supports FedEx’s request for a global stay of this case, the third issue is moot.7 [DE 33 at 296].

3 Order, Ahmed, No. 3:20-CV-145-DJH-CHL,

(W.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 2021), ECF No. 37. 4 See Second Amended Complaint, Ahmed v. AIG Private Client Group, No. 20-CI-6604 (Ky. Jefferson Cir. Ct. May 27, 2021); First Amended Complaint, Ahmed, No. 20-CI-6604 (Nov. 17, 2020). 5 Civil Jury Trial Order, Ahmed, No. 20-CI-6604 (Jul. 2, 2024). 6 Ahmed’s brief discusses “the district court’s inherent power” rather than the Colorado River doctrine but also “fully agrees with” FedEx’s brief. [DE 35 at 308]. 7 In its brief on the Colorado River doctrine, AIG also moves to withdraw its initial response brief. [DE 33 at 298]. Neither FedEx nor Ahmed responded. See LR 7.1(c). Because the motion is unopposed, the Court will grant AIG’s motion and disregard AIG’s initial response brief [DE 30]. II. STANDARD Federal courts “have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by Congress.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,

(1995) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,

(1976)). Therefore, while they may “refrain from hearing . . . cases which are duplicative of a pending state

proceeding,” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins.,

(1996) (citing Colorado River,

), they may do so “only in ‘exceptional’ circumstances . . . and with ‘the clearest of justifications,’” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,

(1988) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818–19). “Before the Colorado River doctrine can be applied, the district court must first determine that the concurrent state and federal actions are actually parallel.” Romine v. Compuserve Corp.,

(6th Cir. 1998). If so, the court then must weigh relevant factors and “decid[e] whether to defer to the concurrent jurisdiction of [the] state court.”

. “Because Colorado River abstention is temporary,” an abstaining court generally enters “a stay . . . rather than a dismissal.” Bates v. Van Buren Twp.,

(6th Cir. 2004); see also Moses H.

Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,

, 27–28 (1983). III. ANALYSIS The parties agree that this case is parallel to the state case and that the Colorado River factors support abstention here. [DE 33; DE 34; see also DE 35]. The Court, considering its “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise its jurisdiction, will fully evaluate both questions despite the lack of dispute among the parties. Colorado River,

. A. Whether the Cases Are Parallel In assessing whether state and federal cases are “parallel,” courts consider the parties, allegations, claims and relief sought in each case. See Romine,

; Crawley v. Hamilton Cnty. Comm’rs,

(6th Cir. 1984). “The state court proceedings need not be identical, merely ‘substantially similar.’” Bates,

(quoting Romine,

). “There is also no requirement that the parties in the state court proceedings be identical to those in the federal case.”

(citing Heitmanis v. Austin,

(6th Cir. 1990)). In short, two cases are parallel if they “involve substantially the same parties and substantially the

same issues.” Ambrosia Coal & Const. Co. v. Pages Morales,

, 1330 n.21 (11th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases). FedEx argues that these cases are parallel because “they arise from the same set of facts . . . address the same physical damage to the property . . . and, for the most part, [address] the same damages.” [DE 34 at 302–03]. AIG argues that the cases “involve identical sets of facts” and are “identical” regarding AIG. [DE 33 at 296]. Indeed, Ahmed and AIG are parties to both cases, and while FedEx is a party only to this case, it is a central nonparty to the state court case.8 [DE 1-3 at 6–7]. Both cases arise from the same set of facts.9 [DE 1-3 at 7–8]. And in both cases, the claims and relief sought arise from the damage to Ahmed’s brick archway.10 [DE 1-3 at 8–9]. The cases

are substantially similar and therefore parallel. See Romine,

. B. Weighing the Colorado River Factors Because this case and the state court case are parallel, the Court must “decid[e] whether to defer to the concurrent jurisdiction of [the] state court.” Romine,

. The Sixth Circuit recognizes “at least” eight Colorado River factors that must be considered:

8 First Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 1–8, Ahmed, No. 20-CI-6604. 9 First Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 4–8, Ahmed, No. 20-CI-6604. 10 Second Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 52–55, Ahmed, No. 20-CI-6604; First Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 27–51, A–E, Ahmed, No. 20-CI-6604. Ahmed’s second amended complaint in the state court case appears to supplement, not replace, his first amended complaint. (1) whether the state court has assumed jurisdiction over any res or property; (2) whether the federal forum is less convenient to the parties; (3) avoidance of piecemeal litigation . . . (4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained . . . (5) whether the source of governing law is state or federal; (6) the adequacy of the state court action to protect the federal plaintiff's rights; (7) the relative progress of the state and federal proceedings; and (8) the presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction.

at 340–41 (internal citations omitted). “These factors . . . do not comprise a mechanical checklist. Rather, they require ‘a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a give[n] case’ depending on the particular facts at hand.

(quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15–16). “[T]he Court must apply the factors ‘in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case at hand.’” Walker v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t,

, 899 (W.D. Ky. 2022) (quoting Moses H. Cone,

). Here, the first two factors do not favor abstention. The state court has not assumed jurisdiction over any res. See PaineWebber, Inc. v. Cohen,

(6th Cir. 2001) (citing Romine,

); see also Bates,

. AIG and FedEx argue that this forum is less convenient because the state case has progressed further [DE 33 at 297; DE 34 at 304], but the second “factor relates to geographical considerations.” PaineWebber,

. The Court “cannot find that the federal forum in this case is any less convenient than the state forum, since both actions are pending in courthouses in the same city.” Romine,

; see also Bates,

. However, the six remaining Colorado River factors all encourage abstention here. Most importantly, the state case has progressed much further than this case. See Bates,

(noting that Sixth Circuit decisions “focus” on this factor). According to AIG and FedEx, AIG and Ahmed are ready for trial in the state case. [DE 33 at 297; DE 34 at 304]. That case is scheduled for trial in January 2025.11 Meanwhile, in this case, expert discovery has not concluded; trial is set for September 2025. [DE 22 at 188, 191]. This “substantial difference in the relative advancement of the state and federal proceedings justifies abstention.” Bates,

(discussing Romine,

); see also Moses H. Cone,

. It is also relevant that the state court obtained jurisdiction years before this Court did so.12 [See DE 1].

“Piecemeal litigation occurs when different courts adjudicate the identical issue, thereby duplicating judicial effort and potentially rendering conflicting results.” Romine,

. Here, one ultimate issue—liability for the damage to Ahmed’s brick archway—is being adjudicated in both cases. Different decisions in each case would risk conflicting liability. Cf. First Keystone Consultants, Inc. v. Schlesinger Elec. Contractors, Inc.,

, 189–90 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing risks “where a party in one lawsuit is absent from the other”). As the parties argue [DE 33 at 297; DE 34 at 304], avoiding that danger is “paramount.” Romine,

(quoting Moses H. Cone,

). Furthermore, this is a diversity case [DE 1 at 2], and Kentucky law governs both cases.

[See DE 33 at 297; DE 34 at 304]. There are no federal-law issues “weighing against surrender” of this Court’s jurisdiction. See Moses H. Cone,

. Because this Court’s jurisdiction is based on diversity, this Court and the state court have concurrent jurisdiction. See Deutsche Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Schwartz Homes, Inc.,

(N.D. Ohio 1999); see also Brandenburg Tel. Co. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co.,

, 449 (W.D. Ky. 2023). And because Kentucky law applies in both cases, “the state court action is adequate to protect [Ahmed]’s interests.” PaineWebber,

.

11 Civil Jury Trial Order, Ahmed, No. 20-CI-6604 (Jul. 2, 2024). 12 See Complaint, Ahmed, No. 20-CI-6604 (Nov. 16, 2020). In sum, only two Colorado River factors do not favor abstention in this case. The six remaining factors, including the two most critical—the cases’ relative progress and the risk of piecemeal litigation—all favor abstention. Given these circumstances, this Court “defer[s] to the concurrent jurisdiction of [the] state court.” Romine,

. IV. CONCLUSION For all these reasons, FedEx’s unopposed motion to stay this case [DE 29] is GRANTED. AIG’s unopposed motion [DE 33] to withdraw its initial response brief [DE 30] is also GRANTED. The parties SHALL submit a joint status report every sixty (60) days from the entry of this order (1) advising the Court of the state court case’s progress and (2) stating each party’s position on whether this case’s stay should be lifted.

October 30, 2024 United States District Court