UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

BRIAN MICHEAL FLETCHER PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-P576-JHM

HARDIN COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SIMCOE DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION This is a pro se

prisoner civil-rights action. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed. I.

Plaintiff Brian Micheal Fletcher brings this action against Hardin County District Judge Simcoe. Plaintiff sues Judge Simcoe in both his official and individual capacities. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Simcoe violated his rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments when he did not allow Plaintiff: to have option to take my case to trail I stated was it my only choice he said yes in point of taking plead deal or not. He was asking did I accept plead deal. . . . The Judge stated I had no choice or he would have just held me until he felt like letting me go if I didn’t accept. . .

Plaintiff continues:

My Public Defender spoke upon obtaining information of a restriction between me and the cop who arrested me and the Judge disregarded it saying I couldn’t get a chance to get the information placing me unlawfully imprisoned and ask me did I accept the deal. That is what made me ask did I have the choice. Then he said No . . . . Information on cop did exist. Officer (Nicholas Krohn). Asking me and saying I had no choice made me unsecure in my person especially after my Public Defender asked to obtain of information that could set me free and Judge Simcoe said No.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages. II. Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock,

(2007). Under § 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

. “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,

(6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin,

(6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

(1976)). However, while liberal, this standard of review does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum,

, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The court’s duty “does not require [it] to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall,

(1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,

(6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton,

(4th Cir. 1985). III. Section 1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere. Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr.,

, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo,

(1980). “A plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and

laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,

(1988). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett,

(6th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against Judge Simcoe fails for two reasons. First, state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

(1989). Thus, because Plaintiff seeks money damages from a state official in his official-capacity, he fails to state a cognizable claim under § 1983. Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against Judge Simcoe also fails because claims against state officials in their official capacities are deemed claims against the

Commonwealth of Kentucky and are, therefore, barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham,

(1985); see also Bennett v. Thorburn,

(6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that an official-capacity suit against a judge who presided over state-court litigation was barred by the Eleventh Amendment). Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claim against Judge Simcoe also fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This is because judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in their judicial capacity, unless those actions are taken in the absence of any jurisdiction. Bush v. Rauch,

(6th Cir. 1994) (citing Mireles v. Waco,

(1991) (per curiam)). Judicial immunity is embedded in the long-established principle that “‘a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’” Stump v. Sparkman,

(1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher,

(1872)). Thus, because Plaintiff's complaint pertains only to actions taken by Judge Simcoe in his judicial capacity and within his jurisdictional authority, the individual-capacity claim against Judge Simcoe is barred by judicial immunity. IV. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this action by separate Order. Date: November 14, 2024 MMSinf Joseph H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge United States District Court ce: Plaintiff, pro se 4414.011