Krieg v. Warden of USP McCreary

District Court, E.D. Kentucky

Krieg v. Warden of USP McCreary

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY SOUTHERN DIVISION (at LONDON)

ERIC KRIEG, Petitioner, Civil Action No. 6:24-CV-033-CHB v. WARDEN OF USP MCCREARY, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Respondent. *** *** *** *** Federal inmate Eric Krieg filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241

in which he argues that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) incorrectly determined that he is ineligible to earn First Step Act (“FSA”) time credits. [R. 1]. That petition is now before the Court on initial screening pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2243

. See Alexander v. N. Bureau of Prisons,

419 F. App’x 544, 545

(6th Cir. 2011). The Court has reviewed Krieg’s petition and will deny his request for relief. In 2019, Krieg pled guilty to multiple federal crimes, including making an unregistered destructive device in violation of

26 U.S.C. §§ 5861

and 5845; mailing a destructive device in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1716

; malicious use of explosive material in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 844

(i); and mailing threatening communications in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 876

. See United States v. Eric Krieg, No. 2:17-cr-00146-JVB-JEM, at Rs. 28, 43 (N.D. Ind. 2019). Ultimately, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana sentenced Krieg to a total of 348 months in prison. See

id.

at R. 43. Krieg is currently serving his sentence at the United States Penitentiary – McCreary in Pine Knot, Kentucky, and he argues in his present § 2241 petition that the BOP should consider him eligible to receive FSA time credits. [R. 1]. It is true that the FSA allows a prisoner to earn time credits toward prerelease custody or supervised release if he successfully participates in evidence-

based recidivism reduction programs and other productive activities. See

18 U.S.C. § 3632

(d)(4). However, the FSA also provides that a prisoner is ineligible to receive such time credits if he is serving a sentence for a disqualifying offense, and the statute specifically includes convictions under

18 U.S.C. § 844

(i), relating to the use of an explosive, as one such disqualifying offense. See

id.

at § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xix). In light of Krieg’s § 844(i) conviction, the BOP determined that he was ineligible to earn FSA time credits. [R. 1-2, pp. 1-2]. Krieg nevertheless claims that the BOP should consider him eligible for FSA time credits because only a portion of his overall sentence is attributable to his § 844(i) conviction. See id. In other words, Krieg suggests that FSA time credit should be applied toward the sentence imposed for his other convictions because they are not disqualifying convictions and the § 844(i) sentence

runs consecutive to the rest of his sentence. See id. Krieg’s argument, however, is unavailing. As Krieg acknowledges in his petition, id. at 2, the BOP aggregated his prison terms in accordance with

18 U.S.C. § 3584

(c), which specifically “instructs the [BOP] to treat multiple terms of imprisonment, whether imposed concurrently or consecutively, ‘for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.’” United States v. Gonzales,

520 U.S. 1, 8

(1997) (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 3584

(c)). Although Krieg claims that § 3584(c) “has nothing to do with The First Step Act,” [R. 1-2, p. 2], the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently recognized that “courts have consistently and correctly held that the calculation of a prisoner’s sentence, and the awarding of credits that reduce the length of that sentence, are administrative functions of the BOP subject to § 3584(c).” Keeling v. LeMaster, No. 22-6126,

2023 WL 9061914

, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2023) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, in Keeling, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court “did not err in concluding that [the petitioner’s] aggregated sentence precluded him from receiving earned time credit under the FSA and denying his § 2241 petition.” /d. That reasoning applies to this case as well. Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: 1. Krieg’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241

[R. 1] is DENIED; 2. All pending motions are DENIED as moot; 3. This action is STRICKEN from the Court’s docket; and 4. The Court will enter a corresponding Judgment. This 8th day of March, 2024. Z a. (Wantn HousBoon Sie ie ae os as COURT JUDGE aes EASTERN AND WESTERN DISTRICTS OF © KENTUCKY

-3-

Reference

Status
Unknown