UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

LARRY WAYNE WEATHERS PLAINTIFF v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-P50-JHM VIA PATH DEFENDANT MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Larry Wayne Weathers, a prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this

action. The complaint is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock,

(2007). For the following reasons, this action will be dismissed. I. STATEMENT OF CLAIMS Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Marion County Detention Center (MCDC), names as defendant “(‘Via Path’) [] the owner and operator of the websites within connectnetwork.com.” Within the complaint, Plaintiff further identifies Defendant as “Touch Payholdings LLC d/b/a CTC Financial Services Tel-Link Corporations d/b/a U.S. compensation law,” the “phone service at [MCDC].” He alleges: Criminal conspiracy to obtained monies liberty by money liberty in violation of 5th Amendment “double jeopardy” life, liberty[.] Defendants acting under color of state law deprived rights garateened by the constitution of the United States by conspiracying to obtain monies illegally stealing monies one’s liberty by phone service the federal government allowing these deprevations against the constitution of the United States Double Jeopardy life and liberty 5th Amendment violation United States Constitution!!!

Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages and unspecified injunctive relief. II. ANALYSIS When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) and (2). When determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky.,

(6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall,

(1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (citing Twombly,

). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”

at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). Section 1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere. Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr.,

, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo,

(1980). “A plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,

(1988). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett,

(6th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff seems to allege that Defendant conspired to violate his constitutional rights. The Court first observes that Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant is a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983. However, even if Plaintiff could show that Defendant was a state actor, the complaint

fails to state a claim against it for conspiracy. A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is “an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action.” See Hensley v. Gassman,

(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hooks v. Hooks,

(6th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must show the existence of a single plan, that the alleged co-conspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right, and that an overt action committed in furtherance of the conspiracy caused an injury to the plaintiff. Id.; Bazzi v. City of Dearborn,

(6th Cir. 2011). Moreover, a plaintiff must plead a conspiracy with particularity; vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient. Twombly,

(recognizing

that allegations of conspiracy must be supported by allegations of fact that support a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy,” not merely a “possible” one); Fieger v. Cox,

(6th Cir. 2008); Spadafore v. Gardner,

(6th Cir. 2003); Gutierrez v. Lynch,

(6th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff’s allegation of conspiracy is wholly conclusory. He alleges no facts that indicate that Defendant conspired, or formed a plan with, anyone to violate his constitutional rights. Thus, the Court will dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Il. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate Order, dismiss this action. Date: May 22, 2024 Ar layf Joseph H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge United States District Court ce: Plaintiff, pro se 4414.009