UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PADUCAH DIVISION

CINDY MITCHELL PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:24-CV-P59-JHM

DAVID KNIGHT DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a pro se

prisoner civil-rights action. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss this action. I. Plaintiff Cindy Mitchell is incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at McCracken County Jail (MCJ). She sues MCJ Jailer David Knight in his official capacity. She alleges that on August 26, 2023, she slipped and fell in a puddle of water and that there was no “wet floor” sign. As relief, she seeks damages. II. Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); and McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock,

(2007). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,

(6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin,

(6th Cir. 2009)

(citations omitted)). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

(1976)). However, while liberal, this standard of review does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum,

, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The Court’s duty “does not require [it] to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall,

(1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,

(6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to

the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton,

(4th Cir. 1985). III. “Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr.,

, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo,

(1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,

(1988). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett,

(6th Cir. 1991). A. Official-Capacity Claim “Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham,

(1985) (quoting

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.,

, 691 n.55 (1978)). Thus, Plaintiff’s official- capacity claim against these Jailer Knight is actually against his employer, McCracken County. A municipality such as McCracken County cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a policy or custom of the municipality and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell,

(1978); Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio,

(6th Cir. 1993). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability” of the municipality under § 1983. Searcy v. City of Dayton,

(6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson,

(1981) (citation omitted)).

In the instant case, Plaintiff does not allege that any constitutional violation occurred pursuant to a policy or custom of McCracken County. Thus, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against Jailer Knight fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. B. Individual-Capacity Claim Even if Plaintiff had sued Jailer Knight is his individual capacity, her claim against him would still fail. Plaintiff makes no allegations against Jailer Knight and the doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors. Monell,

; Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,

(6th Cir. 1995); Bellamy v. Bradley,

(6th Cir. 1984). Supervisory liability “must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon ‘a mere failure to act.’” Shehee v. Luttrell,

(6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn.,

(6th Cir. 1998)). Thus, because Plaintiff makes no allegations against Jailer Knight, any individual-capacity claim against him would also fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. IV. The Court will enter a separate Order dismissing this action consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. Date: June 14, 2024 MMSinf Joseph H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge United States District Court ce: Plaintiff, pro se 4414.011