Felipe Joel Medina Ramos v. Jeff Tindall, ET AL.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION FELIPE JOEL MEDINA RAMOS, Petitioner, v. Civil Action No. 3:26-cv-291-RGJ JEFF TINDALL, ET AL. Respondents.

* * * * * MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Felipe Joel Medina Ramos’s Writ of Habeas Corpus. [DE 1]. Respondents responded on April 28, 2026. [DE 9]. Respondents moved to cancel the upcoming evidentiary hearing. [DE 10]. This matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons below, this Court MOOTS Respondents’ motion to cancel the upcoming evidentiary hearing [DE 10] and GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [DE 1].

I. Background Petitioner Felipe Joel Medina Ramos (“Ramos”) is a 24-year-old native and citizen of Honduras. [DE 9-1 at 35-36]. In May 2019, Ramos entered into the United States without inspection. [Id.]. Although entering without inspection, Ramos encountered border patrol agents shortly thereafter near Hidalgo, Texas. [Id.]. He was then paroled into the interior of the United States and issued a Notice to Appear, with certain requirements such as periodic check-ins with immigration officials. [Id.]. After the filing of the Notice of the Appear, Ramos was put into standard removal proceedings, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. [Id.]. Ramos has been living primarily in Jefferson, Indiana since his arrival. [Id.].

Ramos has been in detention since December 16, 2025. [DE 9 at 26]. On December 14, 2025, Ramos was arrested by local police in Louisville, Kentucky. [DE 9-1 at 35]. Local police then contacted Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Two days later, after ICE issued Western District of Kentucky. [Id.]. Ramos remains in immigration proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. [Id.].

As stated, ICE had previously issued a Notice to Appear Form I-862. [DE 9-2 at 37]. The Notice to Appear marked Ramos as an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled” not an “arriving alien.” [Id.]. Ramos was also issued an I-200, Warrant for Arrest. [DE 9-3 at 39].

ICE contends that based on interim guidance from DHS, issued July 8, 2025, titled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” only those noncitizens who have already been admitted into the United States are eligible to be released during removal proceedings and all other noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (“Section 1225”), not Section 1226. [DE 1 at 2-3].

Ramos asserts that the United States illegally detained him under Section 1225 instead of Section 1226 in violation of the INA. [Id.]. And that this prolonged detention is in violation of his Due Process Rights under the Fifth Amendment. [Id]. Therefore, Ramos seeks release from his detention, or in the alternative, to hold a bond hearing before a neutral IJ to determine whether she should remain in custody. [Id.].

In response, the United States “rel[ies] on and incorporate[s] by reference the legal arguments from the briefs the government filed with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the four §§ 1225-1226 appeals.” [DE 9 at 26-27]. Those cases are Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Case No. 25- 1965 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2025); Alvarez v. Noem, Case No. 25-1969 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2025); Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft, Case No. 25-1978 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025); Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, Case No. 25-1982 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025). The United States concedes that the “relevant facts in all four matters on appeal” are “similar to the relevant facts in this matter” and the only “relevant legal question” is whether the Petitioner is detained under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) or Section 1226. [DE 9 at 27].

II. Discussion1 A. Section 1225 vs. Section 1226 While the relevant facts are undisputed by the parties, the United States argues Section 1225(b)(2) applies to Ramos’s detention, not Section 1226. The United States acknowledges that the Court has ruled on the substantive question regarding § 1225 mandatory detention, [DE 9 at 25-27], and, that the only relevant legal question is whether Ramos is “detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or § 1226?” [Id. at 27]. As Respondents acknowledge that the Court has previously ruled on the only “relevant legal question,” the Court incorporates by reference its reasoning in Edahi v. Lewis, 2025 WL 3466682, at *5-*13 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 27, 2025) and Vicen v. Lewis, 2026 WL 541171, *2–*9 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2026), holding that Section 1226 applies to the Petitioner based on the facts set forth above.

This Court’s holding is in agreement with the Second Circuit’s recent unanimous opinion in Cunha v. Freden, --- F.4th --- 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026), which discusses the identical Section 1225 vs. Section 1226 issue raised here. The Second Circuit held that the government’s attempt to muddy these textually clear waters defies the statute’s context, structure, history, and purpose; contradicts the Supreme Court’s dicta in Jennings and longstanding Executive Branch practice; and its interpretation of the statute raises serious constitutional questions that should be avoided even if the statutory language were ambiguous. Id. at *23.

1 Neither party asserted any jurisdiction-related arguments. However, the Court has analyzed jurisdiction of remedies in similar circumstances, such as Edahi v. Lewis, 2025 WL 3466682, at *2-3 (W.D. Ky. Nov.

27, 2025) and incorporates its reasoning into this opinion. Neither party asserted any exhaustion-related arguments and no applicable statute or rule mandates exhaustion. However, because many decisions in similar cases by district courts within the Sixth Circuit discuss this principal, the Court incorporates its analysis on exhaustion of remedies from a previous case, Edahi, 2025 WL 3466682, at *3, and the Court In sum, the plain meaning of “seeking admission” in Section 1225(b)(2)(A)— presently pursuing lawful entry into the United States—is not undermined by any of the other statutory provisions to which the government retreats to find support.

Therefore, we find no basis to justify departing from the unambiguous meaning of the text, under which Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention, because he is not “seeking admission” under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. at 13. In concurrence, Judge Cabranes stated that “no one can seriously contend that Petitioner is ‘seeking admission’ twenty-one years after he entered the country. The words, properly defined, are clear. That ought to be the end of the matter.” Id. at *24 (Cabranes, J. concurring).

The Second Circuit noted that divided panels in two other circuits have agreed with the government, see Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 508 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1138 (8th Cir. 2026), while the Seventh Circuit has preliminarily reached the same conclusion as the Second Circuit in reviewing a stay motion. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025). This Court recognizes the circuit split; however, for the reasons set forth in its prior orders and those in the Second Circuit’s opinion, this Court agrees “with the decisions of over 370 district judges across the Nation who (as of mid- February 2026) have also rejected the government’s position” (over ninety percent of district court judges). Cunha, 2026 WL 1146044 (citing American Immigration Council and American Immigration Lawyers Association Amici Br. at 5 n.6 (citing Kyle Cheney, Even Trump's Own Appointees are Ruling Against ICE's Mass Detention Strategy, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2026) [https://tinyurl.com/yc7e5sbd])). i. Related Case Law The United States incorporated brief cites to several nonbinding district courts, and one BIA decision, to support their interpretation.2 However, the Court is not persuaded by these None of the cases cited by the United States are controlling authority within the Sixth Circuit. Further, the BIA is neither binding, nor should be viewed as persuasive authority, on any district court. See Loper Bright Enter., 603 U.S. at 413 (“courts. . . may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a decisions for the reasons previously explained in Edahi, 2025 WL 3466682, at *9–*13 and Vicen 2026 WL 541171, at *2–*9, incorporated here by reference. * * * For the reasons above and incorporated, Ramos, who has been present in the United States for approximately seven years, after being paroled into the country is not “seeking admission” into the United States and cannot be placed in expedited removal. This fact is acknowledged by his arrest pursuant to the I-200 Warrant which authority arises out of Section 1226. Section 1226, not Section 1225 applies to his detention.

B. Lawfulness of Current Detention As stated, Ramos is detained under Section 1226. The United States contends that because Ramos is properly detained under Section 1225(b)(2), not Section 1226, and Ramos has not been “deprived of any due process.” [DE 9 at 33]. Otherwise, the United States does not respond to Ramos’s alleged violation of due process. Because the Court found that Ramos’s detention is guided by Section 1226, the Court must determine whether the continued detention pursuant to Section 1226 is in violation of his Due Process.

The Due Process Clause extends to all persons regardless of status. A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025). This includes non-citizens. Id. To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s due process rights, courts apply the three-part balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court must weigh: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the United States’ interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 335. The United States does not address the merits of his Due Process claim, but instead focuses solely on the legal argument of Section 1225(b)(2) versus Section 1226 as referenced above.

1. Private Interest It is undisputed Ramos has a significant private interest in not being detained. One of the “most elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Courts can also consider the detainee’s condition of confinement. Martinez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2598379, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 8, 2025).

This is to determine whether the conditions are indistinguishable from criminal incarceration. Id. Ramos is being detained at Oldham County Jail. [DE 1 at 1].

Ramos had lived in Indiana. [DE 9-1 at 35-36]. But because of his detention in a separate state, he is separated from his family and community. [Id.]. The detention is thus making it difficult for Ramos to participate in his community, work, and care for others. [Id.]. As a result, the first Matthews factor favors Ramos’s position.

2. Risk of Error The second factor concerns the risk of the erroneous deprivation of Ramos’s liberty. A re- detention, without any individualized assessment, leads to a high risk of erroneous deprivation of an individual’s liberty interest. Munoz Materano, 2025 WL 2630826, at *15 (holding that “re- detention without any individualized assessment” establishes a “high risk of erroneous deprivation” of a protected liberty interest). As of today, Ramos has not had a merits bond hearing, with counsel and evidence. Munoz Materano, 2025 WL 2630826, at *15 (holding that Due process requires at a minimum the opportunity for the petitioner to submit evidence and be heard).

Respondents have not established that Ramos is a flight risk or a danger to the community, nor is it likely they can. Ramos has no criminal convictions. [DE 9-1 at 35]. Therefore, it would appear to the Court the only material change within the past year, with respect to Ramos, is the United States’ interpretation of Section 1225 and Section 1226. Thus, because of a high, if not already evident, risk of erroneous deprivation of Ramos’s liberty interest, the second Matthews factor favors Ramos.

3. United States’ Interest The final Matthews factor concerns the United States’ interest in the procedure, as well as any financial or administrative burdens associated with permissible alternatives. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. The Court recognizes that the United States does have a strong interest in ensuring noncitizens do not harm their community and that they appear for future immigration proceedings.

Sampiao, 2025 WL 2607924, at *12. However, a “routine bond hearing” before an IJ presently “minimal” burdens to the United States.” Hyppolite v. Noem, 2025 WL 2829511, at *15 (E.D.

N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025). These procedures are also already in place. Id. Therefore, “existing statutory and regulatory safeguards adequately serve the governmental interest in promoting public safety.”

Günaydin v. Trump, 2025 WL 1459154, at *10 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025). Because of that, the Court finds that the third Matthews factor also favors Ramos.

Therefore, the Court finds that all three Matthews factors favor Ramos. The current detention of Ramos is in violation of the Due Process Clause and the INA.

III. Remedy Numerous courts across the country have ordered the release of individuals stemming from ICE’s illegal detention. Patel, 2025 WL 2823607, at *6; Beltran Barrera, 2025 WL 2690565, at *7; Roble v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2443453, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025) (ordering petitioner’s “release from custody as a remedy for ICE’s illegal re-detention”). The Supreme Court has also recognized that “Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful detention.”

Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 (emphasis in original). This Court is releasing Ramos because of the “unlawful detention” by ICE and the United States for the reasons stated above. Ramos is not being released because she is detained pursuant to Section 1226. But instead, the Court is ordering his release because of the United States’ illegal actions it undertook in Ramos’s detention.

Hyppolite, 2025 WL 2829511 *16 (holding that the United States cannot “detain [Petitioner] without first conducting a hearing before an IJ” because of the unlawful detention of Petitioner).

As a result of his release stemming from the “unlawful detention” in violation of his due process rights, and further under Section 1226 and its supporting regulations, Petitioner must be provided with a bond hearing on the merits before a neutral IJ before any re-detention. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). The IJ may consider the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in Matter of Guerra 24 I. & N. 37, 40 (BIA 2006). Courts across the country have routinely held this procedure proper. Alonso, 2025 WL 3083920, at *9; Lopez-Campos, F.Supp. 3d at 785-86; Mboup v. Field Off. Director of N.J., 2025 WL 3062791, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2025); Espinoza, 2025 WL 2675785, at *11; Ramirez Clavijo, 2025 WL 2419263, at *6; Munoz Materano, 2025 WL 2630826, at *20.

Ramos’s procedural due process rights are not violated by the fact he is detained. “Rather, [Petitioner’s rights] are violated because he has been detained without a hearing that accords with due process.” Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 2025 WL 2691828, *12 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2025) (citing to Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 149-150 (2d Cir. 2024)). Therefore, “the proper remedy” is the “full process due under [Section 1226] which includes a bond hearing before an [IJ].” Maldanado, 2025 WL 2968042, at *9-10; Morales-Martinez v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 3124695, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2025) (holding that because Petitioner had been detained “without a . . . hearing, he is in federal custody in violation of federal law.”)

Because Ramos 1s being detained pursuant to Section 1226, relevant regulations entitle her to a neutral bond hearing. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). Therefore, to afford Ramos with the “full [due] process” under Section 1226, the United States must provide Ramos with a neutral bond hearing before an IJ. Maldanado, 2025 WL 2968042, at *10.

VI. Conclusion For the above reasons, the United States has violated Ramos’s due process rights. The Court GRANTS Ramos’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [DE 1] and orders the following: I. The United States is directed to release Petitioner Ramos immediately because of the unlawful detention in violation of his due process rights.

II. The United States must provide him with a bond hearing before a neutral IJ pursuant to Section 1226.

IH. The United States must certify compliance with the Court’s order by a filing on the docket by May 6, 2026.

United States District Court May 4, 2026