Meredith L. Lawrence v. Bingham, Greenebaum, Doll, LLP, Renamed Dentons Bingham Greenebaum, LLP

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED NOT TO BE PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT RAP 40(D) THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE HOWEVER UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1 2003 MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL IE SET OUT AS AN] UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION fiupreme (Lauri 11f fienhxrkg P

2025 SC 0445 D (2023 CA 1446 2024 CA 0572)

MEREDITH LAWRENCE ET AL MOVANTS

GALLATIN CIRCUIT COURT V 14 CI 00055

BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL LLP RESPONDENT RENAMED DENTONS BINGHAM GREENEBAUM LLP

OPINION AND ORDER

Th1s Court granted d1scret10nary review to consider Lawrence’s cla1m that the Court of Appeals improperly restricted his ab11ity to file future appeals Upon review, we vacate the final three paragraphs of the Court of Appeals’ September 12 2025 Order In its September 12, 2025 Order (hereinafter “Sanctions Order”), the Court of Appeals COHSldCI‘ed Bingham Greenebaum Doll’s motion for RAP 1 1 sanctions against Lawrence BGD argued that Lawrence’s appeals were fr1volous because they sought to relitigate the validlty of BGD’s mortgage, which was finally adjudicated in Bmgham Greenebaum Doll LLP 1) Cut N Shoot LLC 1 The appellate panel agreed W1th BGD’s contention that Lawrence’s appeals were frivolous and ordered Lawrence to pay the costs and attorney’s fees that BGD incurred on appeal $11 010 50 Although BGD requested no other rehef, the Court of Appeals sua sponte proceeded to enter orders restricting Lawrence’s ability to file future appeals In the final three paragraphs of the Sanctions Order, the Court of Appeals adopted a process for reviewing Lawrence’s future appeals That rev1ew process (1) enjoins Lawrence from filing appeals from Kenton Circuit Case No CI 01620 or any related cases l1tigating the same issues that have been addressed in prior appeals; (2) tasks the Clerk of the Court of Appeals with reviewmg Lawrence’s new appeals; and (3) instructs the Clerk to reject Lawrence’s new appeals without filing them if they violate the injunction’s terms Although Lawrence does not provide detailed arguments, he asserts that the appellate court’s review process violates his right to appeal, right to access the courts, and the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure We agree Members of this Court have prev1ously expressed doubts regarding the legality of filing restrictions In Lee U George, this Court considered a pro se litigant’s claim that the trial court improperly required him to pay a $7,500 bond before filing future mot1ons in his divorce case 2 The majority of this Court found that the litigant failed to clearly seek relief from the bond

1 2020 CA 1131 MR 2022 WL 4587681 (Ky App Sept 30 2022) 369 S W 3d 29 35 (Ky 2012) requirement in his writ petition; therefore, it declined to deCide whether the bond was proper 3 In a concurring opinion, Justice Noble agreed with the majority’s result but raised concerns about filing restrictions 4 She wrote

The question then would be whether this type of bond is an “appropriate sanction” available to Kentucky courts to be used against pro se litigants Under CR 11, by signing a document filed with the court, a party affirms that the pleading or motion is grounded in fact and law and that it is not being filed for “any improper purpose,” such as harassment, unnecessary delay, or “needless increase in the cost of litigation ” The rule applies to both lawyers and self represented litigants who Sign documents filed With the court If a filing Violates this rule, the court “upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred/ because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee ” CR 1 1 (emphaSis added) It should be noted, however, that any sanctions are post filing, not a prior restraint The right of access to the courts is fundamental to our system of justice Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution prov1des “All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay ” This provision has appeared in each of Kentucky s Constitutions Ky Const of 1850 art XIII § 15 Ky Const of 1799 art X § 13' Ky Const of 1792 art XII § 13 (statements of Robert Rodes) It appears that a Kentucky appellate court has not addressed the use of a “contempt bond,” but in cases about similar restrictions, Kentucky courts have recognized the importance of access to the courts See Collins v Combs 320 S W 3d 669 (Ky 2010) (affirming order prohibiting litigant from phySically entering certain courts because of his threatening behaVior in the past, but noting that the order did not impede his ability to file pleadings With the court Id at 35 36 Id at 36 37 (Noble J concurring) because the clerk was directed to accept pleadings by mail fax, or email) Lattanzzo v Joyce 308 S W 3d 723 726 27 (Ky App 2010) (reversing trial court’s order that litigant could only proceed under supervision of a licensed attorney and recognizmg importance of right to represent oneself in court) Because of the fundamental nature of the right of access to the courts, restrlctions on a litigant’s ability to file motions must be approached with great caution

I recognize that the trial court’s order was motivated by its understandable frustration with Appellant’s Willingness to file repetitive and frivolous motions, with the fact that the $70,000 in attorney fees that had already been awarded to [Appellant’s ex w1fe] apparently had no effect on Appellant’s approach to the lltigation, with the negatlve effects of Appellant’s tactics on his children (such as the interruption of their therapy because of Appellant’s unfounded compla1nts against the1r therapist), and w1th the waste of the court’s and [Appellant’s ex w1fe]’s resources But 1t is important to note that the trial court has the ability to respond to any abuses and to protect the court’s resources by using other sanctions under CR 11 and the court’s contempt powers For example, the trial court could find that by filing a new frivolous or repetitious motion, Appellant violated CR 1 1, and the court could 1mpose a monetary fine and hold the Appellant in contempt 1f he did not pay it It may seem easier and cleaner to prevent Appellant from filing any more motions unless a bond is posted But the right of litigants to present claims to a court, and the danger of foreclos1ng a meritorious claim must always be considered The trial courts are well equipped to deal with frivolous filings without the use of a prospective bond requirement In this case, for example, it appears that the large majority of Appellant’s motions were merltless and could be denied outright by the court Such mot1ons W111 not take up much of the court’s resources [5]

5 Id at 37 38 (Noble J concurring) We are persuaded by Justice Noble’s concurrence and find that filing restrictions generally confllct with the Kentucky Constitution and our procedural rules Although the instant case involves a d1fferent filing restriction an injunction as opposed to a bond and a higher court the Court of Appeals as opposed to a trial court—Justice Noble’s reasoning applies With equal force That is because the Kentucky Constitution protects the right to appeal and the right to access the courts in Sections 115 and 14 respectively Additionally, the Rules of Appellate Procedure contain an analogue to CR 11 RAP 1 1 RAP 1 1 sets forth the parties obligations to certify that their appeals are filed in good faith and the procedures for dealing w1th frivolous filings

(A) Obhgation of Counsel and Self Represented Partles (1) A party who is not represented by an attorney shall Sign the party’s filing and state the party’s address The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification that the s1gnatory has read the fil1ng that to the best of the signatory’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded 1n fact and is warranted by ex1st1ng law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 1nterposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 11t1gation

(B) Fr1volous Filings An appeal or motion 1s frivolous if the court finds that it is so totally lacking in merit that it appears to have been taken in bad faith If an appellate court determlnes that an appeal or appellate filing is frivolous, it may impose an appropriate sanction, including but not limited to (1) Striking of filings or briefs or portions thereof; (2) A dismissal of the appeal or denial of the motion; (3) Awarding Just monetary sanctions and single or double costs to the opposing party; (4) Imposition of fines on counsel of not more than $1,000; and (5) Such further remedies as are specified in any applicable rule

While courts “have inherent power to prescribe rules to regulate their proceedings and to facilitate the administration of justice[,]” absent extraordinary circumstances, we believe that courts should avOid imposing filing restrictions to deal With vexatious litigants 6 Instead, courts should use our existing procedural rules The review process adopted in the Court of Appeals’ Sanctions Order runs afoul of RAP 11(B) in several ways First, the Order prohibits Lawrence from filing appeals in the Kenton Circuit Case and related cases Nothing in RAP 11(B) authorizes the prohibition of future appeals as a sanction for prior frivolous appeals Second, the Sanctions Order tasks the Clerk With evaluating the frivolousness of Lawrence’s future appeals However, the plain language of RAP 1 1(B) requires the “appellate court” to determine whether an appeal is frivolous Third and finally, the Sanctions Order requires the Clerk to re] ect withoutfilzng—any appeal by Lawrence from the Kenton Circuit Case and related cases 7 RAP 1 1 does not authorize the

6 Collins 1) Combs 320 S W 3d 669 675 (Ky 2010)

7 The pre filing rejection of Lawrence’s appeals could also create review problems In the event that Lawrence challenged the Court of Appeals decision to reject his appeal, this Court would not have any official record of what Lawrence attempted to file Clerk to refuse to file Lawrence’s appeals as a sanction for frivolousness The closest remedy authorized by RAP 1 1(B) is dismissal, which occurs after filing with an order of the court While this Court shares the Court of Appeals’ frustratlon with Lawrence’s tactics, we should not allow a difficult litigant to compromise our adherence to the rule of law Because the Sanction Order’s final three paragraphs violate Lawrence’s right to appeal, right to access the courts, and RAP 11, those paragraphs are vacated 8 Importantly, we observe that the Court of Appeals is not Without adequate recourse under RAP 11 In 2024 CA 0571, another appeal 1nvolving Lawrence and BGD, the Court of Appeals adopted a review process that occurs after Lawrence files a new appeal The process set out in the appellate court’s July 1, 2024 Order, requires the Clerk to present Lawrence’s future appeals from Gallatin Circuit Case 23 CI 00123 to a three judge motion panel The three Judge panel reviews the notice of appeal and any supporting documents for fr1volousness and determines Whether the appeal should proceed on the merits or be summar1ly dlsmissed That review process comports with RAP 1 1 and protects Lawrence’s r1ght to appeal and access the courts Based on the foregoing, the final three paragraphs of the Court of Appeals’ September 12, 2025 Order are vacated

8 To be entirely clear, the final three paragraphs of the Sanctions Order beginnmg with the first full paragraph on page 6 (“And, because this ”) and ending with the first full paragraph on page 7 (“These orders shall ”) are vacated No further proceedings are necessary in the Court of Appeals All Sltting All concur ENTERED March I I 2026

CHIEF JUSTICE