Thompson v. Lemelle
Thompson v. Lemelle
Opinion of the Court
After stating pleadings and facts. On the trial of the case several bills of exception were taken, but we do not consider it necessary to notice them separately, as the questions they raise are so intimately connected with the issues on the merits, that they can all be decided together.
It is contended, on the part of the plaintiff, that the proceedings of the United States District Court, in the estate of Dejean, have become final as to defendants, and that they cannot enquire into the regularity of those proceedings in a State court; and further, that the order tor the sale of the property contains a judicial finding of facts which cannot be contradicted by the defendants.
In Willard v. Bringham, 25 La. An. 600, the Court held: That a mortgage creditor might enquire in to. the regularity of proceedings of the United States Court under which property had been sold free of encumbrances, and determine whether or not the order for the sale of the property had been properly rendered.” In Pickett v. Haynes, 28 La. An. 844, the defendant claimed to be the owner of the land under his title from the assignee in bankruptcy, which he said he purchased free from all mortgages, or other encumbrances. The plaintiff alleged that the sale set up by the defendant was a nullity, because it was made without any notice to plaintiffs, and in fraud of their rights, and was not made in conformity with the requirements of law. They denied that there were ever any lega.1 proceedings had in bankruptcy, and averred that if the recorder of the parish had assumed to cancel their mortgages, bis action was illegal and unauthorized, and that the cancel
It now remains to consider whether or not the proceedings had in the United States District Court, in the estate of Benjamin Dejean, were such as the law requires in order to convey an unencumbered title to the purchaser. It is not, nor can it be questioned, that notice to the mortgage creditor is necessary in order to dispose of property free of his mortgage. The plaintiff in this case relies upon the recitals of the judge in the order for the sale to establish the fact that the necessary notices were given to the defendants.
Under the authority of the decisions to which we have already referred, we are constrained to consider that the recital in the order of sale is only prima facie evidence of the fact recited, and may be rebutted by contrary proof. To make this' proof, the. defendants offered the depositions of Loéw, and a copy of all the proceedings in bankruptcy having reference to e sale of the property.
The absence of any return of the Marshal, and the depositions of the Clerk of the United States Court, satisfy us that the defendants were never notified of the motion to sell the
Judgment reversed and plaintiffs’ injunction dissolved, but without damages, he to pay costs of both court».
See, also, Foster et al. v. Ames et al., 2 Bankrupt Reg. 455; In re Kirkland, 10 Blatch. 515 ; Ray v. Norsworthy, 23 Wall. 128; Haynes v. Pickett, affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, under rule, March 13th, 1877, Opinion Book, October Term, 1876, p. 635; Widow Mary Murphy v. Factors’ and Traders’ Ins. Co. et al., No. 6399, late Supreme Court of Louisiana, lately decided. The foregoiug authorities are from the brief of Mr. Jas. D. Coleman, attorney for plaintiff in last cited case, which case is now pending before the. Supreme Court of the United States, on writ of error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. — Reporter.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.