This is a motion to dismiss an appeal filed by plaintiff-appellee, Lucien S. Bonck, on the grounds that the appeal is being taken from an interlocutory judgment of the trial court ordering that certain interrogatories propounded to the defendant be answered, and further that no irreparable injury would result from this order.

The facts are that plaintiff filed an action for the return of a subscription fee in the sum of $1,000 from The Plimsoll Club, Inc., to which he alleged he was entitled upon his resignation as a charter member. *311Plaintiff resigned his membership on April 2, 1970, and his resignation was acknowledged by the defendant on April 8, 1970.

The defendant club has not returned the subscription fee to the plaintiff though acknowledging his resignation and contends that plaintiff is not entitled to its return as provided under the Articles of Incorporation of The Plimsoll Club for the reason that the conditions relative to the return of the amount have not been satisfied in full. Defendant contends that the charter membership of plaintiff must be transferred to a new charter member on a “first in first to be transferred” 1 basis.

Apparently, defendant’s contention is that no new charter members or not a sufficient number of new charter members have been admitted which would enable Bonck’s membership to be transferred as provided in the said Articles.

The issue giving rise to this appeal and the motion to dismiss is that plaintiff seeks to obtain by interrogatories from the defendant the names of those persons serving on the Board of Directors during 1970, the members of the membership committee in 1970, as well as the names of the persons who tendered their resignation during that period of time and those persons whose resignations were accepted, the dates of said acceptances and the names of those resigned members who received the return of their subscription fee.

Plaintiff additionally seeks the effective date of his resignation according to The Plimsoll Club’s records and the total number of charter members of the club. Further, he seeks to be furnished the name of the club’s Treasurer in 1970 and the names of those persons who sought membership during that year and those persons who were refused membership during the same period. He also seeks to obtain the names of the membership that have been returned since the inception of The Plimsoll Club.

Defendant provided plaintiff with the names of the Board of Directors and the names of the charter members who resigned in 1970 and who were returned their subscription fee; the effective date of Bonck’s resignation; the total number of charter members; and the name of the treasurer but objected to the other interrogatories. Defendant’s objections are predicated on the contention that the interrogatories propounded and the information sought therein is irrelevant to plaintiff’s claim, and that if defendant were require to answer, irreparable harm would result to the defendant club and further that the interrogatories are calculated for harassment and annoyance purposes only.

The trial court overruled the defendant’s objections and ordered that the interrogatories be answered as propounded. Defendant appeals from said judgment. Plaintiff filed the motion to dismiss the appeal now pending.

It is conceded that the order of the trial court is an interlocutory one and hence there can be no appeal from such an order or judgment unless the appellant or relator is able to show that irreparable injury would result. See C.C.P. 1841; C.C. P. 2083; Stevens v. Patterson Menhaden *312Corporation, 191 So.2d 692 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1966); Matte v. Continental Casualty Company; 185 So.2d 842 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1966); In re Canal Bank & Trust Co., 216 La. 410, 43 So.2d 777 (1949).

Our initial concern is whether the error complained of is properly a matter to be considered by appeal or by application to this court for supervisory writs.

In the case of Advertiser, Division of Independent, Inc. v. Tubbs, 199 So.2d 426 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1967) appellant appealed from a judgment holding him in contempt of court for failing to comply with an order compelling answers to written interrogatories propounded by plaintiff. The court therein explains our position in the case at bar. It stated that the judgment compelling answers to the interrogatories was not appealable and suggested the proper remedy in this instance:

“To impede the progress of litigation by granting an appeal whenever statutory enforcement provisions of the discovery devices are invoked seems to us a policy most unwise, for the every purpose of discovery devices is to reduce the delays inherent in the enforcement and defense of legal rights. Appellant’s remedy, an application to this court for supervisory writs, affords him speedy and ample protection against oppressive or unreasonable sanctions which may be imposed by the lower court during pretrial production of evidence.3

In view of the jurisprudence, it is our opinion that the proper vehicle for The Plimsoll Club, Inc. to use for review of the propriety of these interrogatories is by supervisory writs and not by appeal. Stull v. Rosenfield’s House of Fashion, 220 So.2d 160 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1969); Anderson v. Southern Consumers Education Foundation, Inc., 196 So.2d 686 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1967).

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.

Appeal dismissed.

(concurring).

I concur with the majority that the appeal should be dismissed; however, I am of the opinion that the motion to dismiss should be granted for additional reasons.

Since an appeal has been lodged in this court, I deem it advisable to consider the motion to dismiss the appeal on the question of whether the action of the trial judge was proper in ordering defendant to answer the interrogatories.

Were we to grant the motion to dismiss on the ground that the issue would more properly be considered on application for supervisory writs, we would be contributing further to the impeding of the progress of litigation in the trial court.

Obviously, as a result of the decision, writs would then be sought in this court, even though the very issues to he considered in the writs at a later time are before us now for our consideration. I deem it advisable not to burden the course of the litigation with further delay.

I am of the opinion, therefore, that we must consider at this time the question of whether irreparable harm would result from compelling The Plimsoll Club to answer the interrogatories propounded. In *313this respect, I do not find that irreparable harm would result to the defendant.

The information sought is clearly relevant as it relates to membership in the club, to the resignations of club members, to committee memberships, as well as to those subscription fees returned during a period of time germane to plaintiff’s request for the return of his fee. I fail to understand how defendant can complain that divulging those names would result in harm either to the organization or to its members. Moreover, it is well settled that irreparable harm and injury is that which cannot be measured by pecuniary standards. Danzie v. Rutland, 232 So.2d 303 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1970); Pennington v. Drews, 209 La. 1, 24 So.2d 156 (1945). In the event that any harm would conceivably result in this instance by answering the interrogatories, I feel that harm could nevertheless be measured in damages by such standards. Therefore, I find no merit in defendant’s contention in this regard.

I am of the opinion that plaintiff’s interrogatories are relevant to the issues that might be encompassed in the trial of this matter on its merits. Plaintiff does not inquire into policies and operations of the defendant club which are not pertinent to the issue. Each interrogatory has some relation to the question of whether Bonck might have been entitled to have his membership transferred in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation or may have been bypassed in this respect.

It is well established that broad latitude ought to be given in the use of the discovery articles of the Code of Civil Procedure provided the information sought is relevant and not calculated to harass, annoy, or embarrass the other party. See: C.C.P. Articles 1436, 1491; Chesson v. Hungerford, 228 So.2d 332 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1969); Gaudet v. Lawes, 166 So.2d 337 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1964). Were we to restrict the use of discovery, as suggested by defendant, in limiting the interrogatories, we would defeat the very purpose of those statutes relating to discovery. This we should not do.

I am further of the opinion that defendant’s contention that plaintiff is without capacity to sue and therefore not entitled to propound interrogatories is also without merit. The allegations of the petition and the answers of the defendant acknowledging that plaintiff was in fact a charter member and that he had resigned obviously provides him with the capacity to file suit. Whether or not his cause of action will prevail on the merits is a question to be decided in further proceedings, however.

Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons, I concur that the motion to dismiss should be granted.