concurring.

The bank, without written directions from the maker of the note, credited the loan proceeds to another person’s account. There is no parol evidence rule which prohibits the use of testimonial proof and circumstantial evidence to establish that the maker authorized the proceeds to be handled in this manner.

The testimonial proof and circumstantial evidence in this case are sufficient to support the judgment. LeBouef knew that the bank was to extend funds based, at least in part, on his credit standing. On the alleged assurance that his signature on the note was only an endorsement, he executed the note and entrusted it for delivery to the bank to the person who allegedly gave that assurance. Thereafter, he failed to inquire over the next 90 days about disposition of the note and the loan proceeds.

Under these circumstances the conclusion is warranted (and virtually compelled) that LeBouef knew and approved of, and consented to, the bank’s disposition of the loan proceeds. Whether he intended to be primarily or secondarily liable on the note which gave rise to the loan proceeds is of no significance to the issue as to whether he authorized the bank’s disposition of the loan proceeds. That question has significance only as between LeBouef and the person he clothed with authority to direct disposition of the loan proceeds.

On August 2, 1974, appellant, William LeBouef, executed a promissory note in the amount of $5,000, due October 31, 1974, in favor of appellee, First National Bank of Commerce (hereafter, “bank”), resulting in that sum being credited to the campaign fund account of a candidate for judicial office, which account was also with the bank. Not receiving payment of the note by the due date, the bank ultimately filed suit, seeking recovery of $5,000, plus interest and attorneys’ fees as provided for in the note. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the bank and against LeBouef in the sum of $5,000, with interest from August 2, 1974, plus twenty percent attorneys’ fees and all costs.

The trial court, in written reasons for judgment, made the basic factual determination that LeBouef intended to donate the $5,000 to the campaign fund of the candidate for judicial office and further found, as a fact, that LeBouef knew that the $5,000 was “to be transferred to the campaign fund,” that the deposit of those funds in that particular campaign account was “accomplished in accord with the intent of Mr. LeBouef,” and that such intent, thus acknowledged and acted upon by the bank, was “adequate consideration for the note.”

LeBouef suspensively appeals.

We find no manifest error in the factual conclusions of the trial court noted above.

On those facts, we address the issues raised by appellant as follows:

1. Did consideration flow to LeBouef? We must answer in the affirmative since the facts, as found by the trial court, evidence an intention on LeBouef’s part to donate $5,000 to the particular campaign fund involved.

2. Did LeBouef receive adequate compensation? Again, the answer must be in *886the affirmative based upon the facts found by the trial court.

3. Was the transaction illegal? The so-called Election Campaign Finance Disclosure Act of 1975, as amended in 1976, was not in effect at the time of this transaction. LSA-R.S. 18:1482, et seq. and 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 610 would, as vigorously urged by appellant’s able and tenacious counsel, apply under certain factual circumstances. However, the facts found by the trial court (which we find supported by the record and, thus, not manifestly erroneous) obviate the applicability of these statutory provisions. Appellant’s counsel urges that “the transaction was illegal and the bank knew it.” He contends that this was a “subtle scheme” which was devised “to avoid the detection of the illegality of the transaction” and warns us against prostituting the legal process to the point where persons who have engaged in illegal activity can flee to the courts for refuge. In oral argument, counsel refers not once but often to the contention that “this situation stinks” and admonishes us to “let the parties stew in their own juice.” However, on the facts found, there is no basis for concluding that the bank did anything other than that which LeBouef desired it to do.

It is possible that LeBouef was misled. But, on the facts found,1 we see no basis upon which the misleading (if any there was) can be attributable to the bank.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans must be affirmed at appellant’s cost.

AFFIRMED.

LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.