Some six weeks before the first anniversary of an alleged slip and fall in a Piggly Wiggly grocery in Winnfield, plaintiff sued the non-resident franchisor, Piggly Wiggly Corporation, for damages.

Thereafter, but still before the anniversary of the alleged accident, plaintiff’s counsel was informed in writing, of the name and address of the franchisee and of its agent for service of process, that the franchisor did not own, operate, or maintain the store, and that the proper party defendant was the franchisee of the store, a Louisiana corporation, Winnfield Piggly Wiggly, Inc.1

*846More than 24 months after plaintiff learned these things, plaintiff amended her petition in an attempt to substitute the franchisee as the defendant in the case.2 The franchisee then filed an exception of one year liberative prescription which was sustained. She appealed. We affirm.

The Supreme Court has indicated in its writ consideration in Clark v. McDonald’s System, Inc., 386 So.2d 95 (La. 1980), that a suit against a franchisor interrupts prescription against a franchisee where the franchisee is joined as a defendant after the anniversary date of the alleged accident. There the plaintiff joined the franchisee of a McDonald’s restaurant two days after the franchisor asserted in a motion for summary judgment that another and not the franchisor owned and operated the restaurant where the alleged accident occurred.

Here the plaintiff learned of the proper party defendant and where and through whom that defendant could be served even before the anniversary of the alleged accident and plaintiff allowed 24 months to elapse before attempting to name the franchisee as defendant in the case.

As to solidary obligors, it is true that, once interrupted by the filing of a suit against one obligor, liberative prescription against another solidary obligor remains interrupted for as long as that suit is pending,3 but here, plaintiff has not shown and does not contend that the franchisee and franchisor are solidary obligors.

A plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the identity of the party injuring him. Dean v. Hercules, Inc., 328 So.2d 69 (La. 1976); Martin v. Mud Supply Company, 239 La. 616, 119 So.2d 484 (1960). That obligation should follow plaintiff during the course of the transaction or the litigation out of which plaintiff claims an interruption of prescription. For example, a vendor’s attempt to remedy a redhibi-tory vice interrupts the liberative prescription accruing against a vendee who has discovered the vice. The interruption, however, does not continue indefinitely and the liberative prescription begins to run anew when the vendor’s attempt to remedy is concluded. See Hermeling v. Whitmore, 140 So.2d 257 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1961) and Smith’s Materials on Sales and Leases by Litvinoff at p. 386. Similarly, the interruption of the liberative prescription of non-use of a mineral servitude by the drilling of a well in search of oil does not continue indefinitely but ends when the well is abandoned as a dry hole or is shut-in after testing. See LRS 31:30 and 34. That is the very nature of an interruption of liberative prescription.

We hold then that when a plaintiff learns the name and address of the proper but unnamed defendant, who is not solidarily obligated with the named defendant, the interruption or claimed interruption of prescription against the unnamed defendant is ended and prescription then begins to run anew. Here, plaintiff learned of the name and address of the unnamed defendant more than one year before she filed her amended petition seeking to substitute defendants on January 7, 1980.

AFFIRMED at appellant’s cost.