Plaintiffs filed suit against K-Mart for damages sustained by Vicki Cooley (Cooley) when a K-Mart employee bumped Cooley’s arm and shoulder region with a lightweight stereo box. The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment, based upon a jury verdict, in favor of K-Mart. We affirm.

FACTS

Before the accident in question at K-Mart, Cooley sustained head, neck and shoulder injuries from a traffic accident occurring in the South traffic circle in Alexandria in May of 1991. Approximately six months later, on December 6, 1991, Cooley was either brushed, bumped, touched, or struck in her arm and shoulder region by Michael Granger (Granger), a K-Mart employee, when he placed a box containing a lightweight bookshelf stereo resembling a portable “boom box” on the K-Mart lay-away counter in DeRidder, Louisiana. Cooley, her husband, and children filed suit against K-Mart on February 26, 1992. Cooley alleged in her petition for damages that the contact with the “boom box” had caused serious and disabling injuries to her left arm, left hand, shoulder, collar bone, breast bone, shoulder blade, and right hand. At trial, Granger testified that he never felt the stereo box touch Cooley. Granger also stated that he was not even aware of the accident until another K-Mart employee working behind the lay-away counter told him about it.

|2The medical evidence is not disputed. Cooley had a thoracic outlet syndrome1 on both her left and right sides. She underwent corrective vascular surgery before trial to allay the pain caused by these injuries.

What was seriously disputed was the cause of Cooley’s injuries. In her medical history that she gave to her various doctors, she related the K-Mart accident with much more exaggeration than borne by the record. For instance: “... she fell with the box across the upper portion of her arm.” (she told Dr. James David); “... an employee of K-Mart dropped a stereo on her left shoulder and arm ...” (she told to Dr. Dale Bernauer); “... a stereo fell and hit her in the left shoulder ...” (she told to Dr. Dean Moore). Thus, her doctors opined that her thoracic outlet syndromes were as a result of the K-Mart accident.

The record shows that the object which hit or bumped Cooley was a lightweight bookshelf stereo resembling a portable “boom box,” weighing approximately 5-8 pounds. The object did not fall on her, nor was she knocked down from contact with it. The record shows that Cooley’s contact with the object was more in the nature of a slight bumping on her arm and shoulder region.

K-Mart countered Cooley’s version of the accident, as related to her doctors, with the testimony of an employee who witnessed the accident, as well as Granger, the employee who carried the box that hit Cooley. Gran-ger testified that the contact with Cooley was so light that he was not even aware that he had hit Cooley with the box. At trial, Cooley did not refute K-Mart’s version of the accident. She primarily relied upon the history she gave her doctors.

K-Mart also presented clear and persuasive evidence of Cooley’s injuries from the automobile accident six months prior to the K-Mart accident, wherein she sustained head, neck and shoulder injuries for which she was still being treated. She had complaints of pain consistent with thoracic outlet syndrome when the K-Mart accident occurred.

The jury heard all the evidence and resolved all issues in favor of K-Mart.

*837MANIFEST ERROR

In the case sub judice, the record shows that the jury was presented with two conflicting explanations for the eause-in-fact of Cooley’s injuries. K-Mart argued that Cooley’s injuries were 18caused by her traffic accident in May of 1991. On the other hand, Cooley argued that her injuries were caused by the events occurring at K-Mart on December 6,1991. The jury resolved this issue in favor of K-Mart.

Causation is a factual issue to be determined by the fact finder. Cay v. State, DOTD, 93-0887 (La. 1/14/94), 631 So.2d 393. A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s or a jury’s finding of fact in the absence of “manifest error” or unless it is “clearly wrong.” Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989). After a careful review of the entire record, we conclude that the jury, as trier of fact, was presented with two permissible views of causation and that the jury’s choice was not manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Cooley simply faded to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the accident at K-Mart caused her injuries. See, Theriot v. Lasseigne, 93-2661 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So.2d 1305. As summarized by the Louisiana Supreme Court:

[T]he issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfin-der’s conclusion was a reasonable one. See generally, Cosse v. Allen-Bradley Co., 601 So.2d 1349,1351 (La. 1992); Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d 973 (La. 1991); Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106, 1112 (La. 1990). Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the factfinder’s, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La. 1978). However, where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness’s story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable factfinder would not credit the witness’s story, the court of appeal may find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844-45. Nonetheless, this Court has emphasized that “the reviewing court must always keep in mind that ‘if the trial court or jury’s findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.’ ” Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d 973 (La. 1991) (quoting Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106, 1112 (La. 1990)).

Stobart v. State, DOTD, 617 So.2d 880, 882-83 (La. 1993).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court in favor of K-Mart is hereby affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiffs.

AFFIRMED.

AMY, J., concurs.

SAUNDERS, J., dissents with reasons.

dissenting.

Ms. Cooley was shopping at K-mart when an employee, carrying a stereo, bumped into her, allegedly causing injury. The majority states that “[t]he jury heard all the evidence and resolved all issues in favor of K-mart” and affirms, finding no manifest error in the jury’s concluding that plaintiff failed to show cause-in-fact of plaintiff’s injuries. After reviewing the record, I arrive at a different conclusion. Gonzales v. Xerox Corporation, 320 So.2d 163 (La. 1975).

The jury did not resolve all the issues; rather it only reached the negligence question. The jury did not reach the only issue examined by the majority, the question of causation contained in jury interrogatory No. 2. Rather the jury did not get beyond interrogatory No. 1, on the subject of negligence, which reads as follows:

“SPECIAL VERDICT OF JURY

1. Did an employee of K-mart Corporation negligently drop or hit plaintiffs shoulder with a boxed stereo while in *838the performance of his duties at the DeRidder Store on or about December 6, 1991?”

|2The majority does not take up the question of negligence but proceeds straight to the issue of causation. I believe it errs in doing so.

NEGLIGENCE

While the trial judge’s instructions reveal no error, this is not dispositive, for the jury was the fact finder in this case, and it had an inadequate appreciation of the law when it rendered its verdict. Under the duty-risk analysis, the failure of K-mart’s employee to take precautions and keep a vigilant watch constituted both causes-in-fact of plaintiffs injury (however slight) and a legal cause of the harm incurred. Sinitiere v. Lavergne, 391 So.2d 821, 825 (La. 1980); Crooks v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 620 So.2d 421, 425 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 629 So.2d 391, 392 (La. 1993) (see generally, as similar facts and law applicable). That the jury did not understand the concept of negligence is not mere speculation, as the jury foreman issued a note to the judge asking the trial judge, “Can you reexplain negligent act?”

Where a finding of fact is interdicted because of some legal error implicit in the fact finding process, or when a mistake of law forecloses any finding of fact, the manifest error rule is inapplicable. Thus, in my view, the majority errs in applying the manifest error rule to the factual determination (not) made by the jury. Without considering the issue of negligence, the majority cannot logically dispose of this case by applying the manifest error rule to the issue of causation, an issue not reached by the jury at all. It would seem that its doing so alone constitutes reversible error. Ragas v. Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co., 388 So.2d 707, 708 (La. 1980). In any event, in light of the jury’s faulty understanding of the law, we are required to reverse and render if the record is adequate to make a decision, Gonzales v. Xerox Corporation, supra, or remand if it is not. Ragas, supra.

Moreover, the majority’s conclusion on the issue of causation was wrong, even under the manifest error rule. This is because plaintiffs injuries were at least aggravated by defendant’s negligence, entitling her to at least some relief.

|3The original tortfeasor is only responsible for damages caused by his own fault, not by subsequent aggravations caused by separate negligent acts committed by others. Hayes v. Kelly, 625 So.2d 628 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1993). These aggravations are the responsibility of the subsequent tortfeasor, who takes his victim as he finds him:

“The [subsequent tortfeasor’s] liability for damages is not mitigated by the fact that the plaintiffs pre-existing physical infirmity was responsible in part for the consequences of the plaintiffs injury by the defendant. It is clear that a defendant takes his victim as he finds him and is responsible for all natural and probable consequences of his tortious conduct. Perniciaro v. Brinch, 384 So.2d 392, 395 (La. 1980); Sansonni v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 344 So.2d 42 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1977); Deville v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 258 So.2d 694 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1972); Dufrene v. Miller, 266 So.2d 462 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972); Rachal v. Bankers and Shippers Insurance Company, 146 So.2d 426 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1962); see also Johnston v. Ford Motor Co., 443 F.Supp. 870 (W.D.La. 1978).... The defendant is hable for the harm it causes even though under the same circumstances a normal person would not have suffered that illness or injury. When the defendant’s tortious conduct aggravates a pre-existing condition, the defendant must compensate the victim for the full extent of the aggravation. American Motorist v. American Rent-All, 579 So.2d 429 (La. 1991); Walton v. William Wolf Baking Company, Inc., 406 So.2d 168 (La. 1981); Perniciaro v. Brinch, 384 So.2d 392 (La. 1980); Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La. 1979).”

Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So.2d 1002, 1005-1006 (La. 1993).

In light of the foregoing, plaintiff should ultimately be compensated to whatever degree her pre-accident condition had been ad*839versely affected by defendant, however difficult the task:

“When it is clear that a plaintiff has sustained some damages as a result of the fault of the defendant his demands will not be rejected merely because he cannot establish exactly the amount of damages suffered.”

Koncinsky v. Smith, 390 So.2d 1377, 1382 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1980). In accord, Jordan v. Travelers Insurance Company, 257 La. 995, 245 So.2d 151,155 (1971). This rule has long been axiomatic. Emerson v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 393 So.2d 691, 692-93 (La. 1981).

|4In light of these principles of law, even if causation were the issue before us, I could not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence does not show that plaintiff received no injuries at all, even under the manifest error rule.

CONCLUSION

In my view, the majority errs twice, first by failing to address appellant’s first assigned error on the question of negligence, then by refusing to award plaintiff any damages at all. I respectfully dissent.