Our Lady of the Lake Roman Catholic Church, Mandeville v. City of Mandeville, Planning & Zoning Commission
Our Lady of the Lake Roman Catholic Church, Mandeville v. City of Mandeville, Planning & Zoning Commission
Opinion of the Court
1 ?The property owner, Our Lady of the Lake Roman Catholic Church, Mandeville, Louisiana (“OLL”), appeals a judgment affirming an action of the City of Mandeville Planning and Zoning Commission (“Zoning Board”), which denied OLL’s application for a zoning permit. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
OLL owns property located in the City of Mandeville’s (“City”) “Old Mandeville” business district. Currently, the OLL campus includes a sixty-year-old church building, school buildings, a multi-purpose facility, an athletic field, administrative and service auxiliary buildings, a rectory, and parking lots. Pursuant to the City’s Comprehensive Land Use Regulation Ordinance (“CLURO”), the property owned by OLL is zoned “B-3 Old Mandeville Business District,” a mixed business and residential district that also includes institutional and governmental uses.
In 1999, following the submission and review of its site plan, OLL obtained a permit from the Zoning Board to construct two buddings on its campus: a multipurpose facility (Chotin Center) and a building to replace the existing library and classroom building (Parish Life Center).
After the filing of OLL’s application, the City’s Design Review Committee held a design review session on July 22, 2011. Thereafter, the more formal process of considering the application under the CLURO’s site plan review process began. After advertising in accordance with law, the Zoning Board held public hearings on this permit application on July 26, August 9, September 7, and October 5, 2011.
Following the decision of the Zoning Board, OLL filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the district court, seeking an order declaring .that the Zoning JjBoard’s denial of its application for a zoning permit was null and granting the requested permit.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On judicial review of a decision by an administrative agency, an aggrieved party may seek review of same by appeal to the appropriate appellate court. On review of the district court’s judgment, no deference is owed by the court of appeal to factual findings or legal conclusions of the district court, just as no deference is owed by the Louisiana Supreme Court to factual findings or legal conclusions of the court of appeal. Maraist v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, 02-2677 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/26/04), 879 So.2d 815, 817. Thus, an appellate court sitting in review of an administrative agency reviews the findings and decision of the administrative agency and not the decision of the district court. Smith v. State, Department of Health and Hospitals, 39,368 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/2/05), 895 So.2d 735, 739, writ denied, 05-1103 (La.6/17/05), 904 So.2d 701.
|BOur review of the district court’s judgment is governed by Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:964(G), which provides:
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1)In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
(6) Not supported and sustainable by a preponderance of evidence as determined by the reviewing court. In the application of this rule, the court shall make its own determination and conclusions of fact by a preponderance of evidence based upon its own evaluation of the record reviewed in its entirety upon judicial review. In the application of the rule, where the agency has the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses by first-hand observation of demeanor on the witness stand and the reviewing court does not, due regard shall be given to the agency’s determination of credibility issues.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
The first two assignments of error raised by OLL are related. First, OLL argues that the Zoning Board erred in following the requirements of the CLURO when it evaluated OLL’s zoning permit application. OLL contends that the Zoning Board exceeded its limited jurisdiction in denying OLL’s zoning permit, arguing that the Zoning Board’s jurisdiction was strictly limited to a determination of
Zoning is a general plan designed to foster improvement by confining certain classes of buildings and uses of property to certain localities. The purpose of zoning is to reduce or eliminate the adverse effects that one type of land use might have on another. Jenkins v. St Tammany Parish Police Jury, 98-2627 (La.7/2/99), 736 So.2d 1287, 1290. Article VI, Section 17 of the Louisiana Constitution gives local governments broad powers to adopt regulations for land use, zoning, and historic preservation. It provides:
Subject to uniform procedures established by law, a local governmental subdivision may (1) adopt regulations for land use, zoning, and historic preservation, which authority is declared to be a public purpose; (2) create commissions and districts to implement those regulations; (3) review decisions of any such commission; and (4) adopt standards for use, construction, demolition, and modification of areas and structures. Existing constitutional authority for historic preservation commissions is retained.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:4721 also confers upon local governments the authority to enact zoning regulations. It states, in pertinent part:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community, the governing authority of all municipalities may regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size of structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of the buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes; provided that zoning ordinances enacted by the governing authority of municipalities or the acts of the zoning commission, board of adjustment as herein provided for, or zoning administrator shall be subject to judicial preview on the grounds of abuse of discretion, unreasonable exercise of the police powers, an excessive use of the power herein granted, or the denial of the right of due process, provided, further, that the right of judicial review of a zoning ordinance shall not be limited by the foregoing.
In order to exercise these zoning powers, the legislative body of the municipality must appoint a zoning commission. La. R.S. 33:4726(A). The function of the zoning commission is to propose to the legislative body of the municipality a set of recommendations concerning the boundaries of zones and the regulations and restrictions to be enforced therein. If a planning commission exists, that commission automatically becomes the zoning
Zoning regulations must be uniformly applied within each district or zone of the municipality. La. R.S. 33:4722(C); Jenkins, 736 So.2d at 1291 (applying La. R.S. 33:4780.41, a parallel statute for parishes). Such regulations and procedures must be construed in favor of the use proposed by the owner. D'Argent Properties, LLC v. City of Shreveport, 44,457 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/24/09), 15 So.3d 334, 338, writ denied, 09-1726 (La.11/6/09), 21 So.3d 308, citing Wright v. DeFatta, 244 La. 251, 152 So.2d 10 (1963); City of West Monroe v. Ouachita Ass’n for Retarded Children, 402 So.2d 259 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1981). The actions of a|szoning commission will not be disturbed on judicial review unless the court finds that they were plainly and palpably unreasonable, arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, or an unreasonable exercise of police power. La. R.S. 33:4726; D’Argent Properties, 15 So.3d at 338; King, 719 So.2d at 418; see also Jenkins, 736 So.2d at 1291. The test of whether a zoning board’s action is arbitrary and capricious is whether the action is reasonable under the circumstances. King, 719 So.2d at 418.
Pursuant to the authority granted to local governments, the City adopted the CLURO, which governs the building of all structures and use of all land within the incorporated area of the City.
| ¡/Through its 1999 zoning permit application, OLL obtained the required approval of its site plan from the Zoning Board to undertake a building and renovation project, including replacing the then-existing library and school building (which resulted in the construction of the Parish Life Center), constructing a multi-purpose building
The procedural requirements for the site plan review approval shall apply to an application for modification, expansion or other changes in an approved site plan. The proposed site plan modifies and expands the existing site plan that was included on the zoning permit in case Z99-2-4 and that site plan was prepared by Piazza Architecture and Planning dated October 31st, 1998 and revised through February 12th of 1999. This proposed site plan that’s proposed under this case, you know, would replace the existing approved site plan and the conditions of the zoning permit approval, you know, as of 1999. This approval, the 1999 approval, allowed for the construction of the Chotin Center, which is a multipurpose building, the Parish Life Center and other improvements on the site.
The instant case is a situation in which OLL seeks a use permitted-conditionally, in the designated zoning district, with issuance of a zoning permit by the Zoning Board. This type of use is not a use by-right, nor is it a variance, special exception, administrative use, conditional use, or a request for a re-zoning. A use by-right should be presumptively valid and approved. See Wright, 152 So.2d at 14. For a board to deny such a use, the burden on the city is much higher. On judicial review, a board’s decision to deny a use by-right is subject to strict scrutiny, not the normal' standard of broad discretion applied to variance cases. D’Argent Properties, 15 So.3d at 340. If an owner seeks to alter the established | ^zoning, the commission or governing body must apply its great discretion and, as a result, the courts will not “take issue with the council.” See King, 719 So.2d at 416. Here, the use sought by OLL does not raise the Zoning Board’s discretion to “great,” as OLL’s use is not conditional, nor is OLL seeking a re-zoning of its property. Also, since the use is not permitted by-right, the Zoning Board’s discretion is not subject to strict scrutiny.
The Zoning Board is tasked by the CLURO with reviewing and evaluating OLL’s application in accordance with the procedure for obtaining a zoning permit, known as the site plan review procedure.
The Zoning Board denied OLL’s permit application and cited seventeen reasons for its denial. Among the major concerns of the Zoning Board regarding OLL’s site plan were problems and inconsistencies with the CLURO-mandated calculation of on and off-site parking spaces on the OLL campus. In its reasons for denial, the Zoning Board stated:
There is no question ... that there are serious parking and traffic problems not only in the immediate area of the [c]hurch and school, but also stretching all the way to and extending down Lake-shore Drive for many blocks.
[[Image here]]
In regards to parking, the [Zoning Board] has been shown plans that show enough on-site and allowable (by code) adjacent street parking, to meet CLU-RO minimum requirements, assuming no major concurrent demands for [c]hurch and/or school functions.... Those CLURO minimum requirements would not be met in certain overlapping use conditions. Based on information given the [Zoning Board], it is difficult to assess how often various demand levels for on-street parking by the [e]hurch and school users will occur. This is made more difficult by the known fact that despite the availability of on-site parking spaces, most people park on the street if it is closer and more convenient for them. There is no question that parking is currently an issue in the area around the [e]hurch....
[[Image here]]
A further complication in the [Zoning Board’s] calculation of an appropriate number of on-site parking spaces is the uncertainty of the use of various buildings on the site. [OLL], for example, says that the old [c]hurch building will be deconsecrated and used for undefined miscellaneous functions at undefined times. For parking calculations, [OLL] assumes it is an “accessory structure” with no additional parking requirements. It is not realistic to assume that a building of approximately 7000 square feet that can hold 500 people for any number of purposes will not be taken into consideration by the [Zoning Board] when determining parking requirements....
The CLURO sets the number of required parking spaces based upon the principal use for the affected property.
CLURO 9.1.1.4 authorizes off-street parking facilities for combinations of mixed uses. The total number of spaces required is the sum of the separate requirements for each- nonresidential use, if computed separately. CLURO 9.1.1.13 allows for an adjustment in the total parking requirements for separate uses located on the same site or adjoining sites; however, the parking spaces adjusted in this fashion must be located in a common, contiguous parking facility.
OLL’s site plan has parking spaces over five city squares and numerous city lots. That is not consistent with the requirements for off-street parking facilities for a mixed-use development under the CLU-RO. The Zoning Board concluded that OLL’s site plan failed to meet the CLU-RO’s minimum requirements relative to the number of parking spaces and their location. Although the Zoning Board has the authority to adjust the number of spaces and their location, it declined to do so. Therefore, the Zoning Board’s denial of the zoning permit application was proper.
In its final assignments of error, OLL contends that the district court erred in failing to conduct a de novo review of the record, relied on arguments it alleges were not made before the Zoning Board in the public hearings, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to reverse the Zoning Board’s decision. As stated previously, on review of the district court’s judgment, we owe no deference to the factual findings or legal conclusions of the district court. Maraist, 879 So.2d at 817. Thus, we review the findings and decision of the administrative agency, here, the Zoning Board, and not the decision of the district court. Smith, 895 So.2d at 739. Therefore, these assignments of error are without merit.
| uDECREE
Therefore, based on our review of the record and considering the applicable law and rules governing these proceedings, we affirm the judgment of the district court
AFFIRMED.
. CLURO 7.2.1, 7.5.10.
. CLURO 6.3.18, 6.3.19, 6.3.22.
. CLURO 7.7, 7.7.1, 7.7.2.
. The Zoning Board also approved OLL’s variance request to allow the proposed buildings to be constructed at a higher elevation.
. OLL revised its application on August 31, 2011.
. The public hearing scheduled on August 9, 2011, was a work session, wherein the Zoning Board took no vote on the application.
. See CLURO 4.3.2.8(2); La. R.S. 33:4727(E).
. The district court vacated the conditions imposed by the Zoning Board on OLL regarding its alleged non-compliance with its 1999 zoning permit, holding that the CLURO provides a procedure to institute an action to prevent the violation of a zoning permit. That procedure requires notice and the opportunity to be heard relative to the alleged violations. Here, the Zoning Board acted on the alleged violations as part of its consideration of OLL’s zoning permit application, which the district court held was improper. The City concedes that it did not cross-appeal that ruling, and it is therefore not before this court.
. CLURO 7.7.2.
. CLURO 1.2.2.
. CLURO 6.3.18-19, 6.3.22, 7.7.
. CLURO 4.1.1.
. CLURO 7.7.1-2.
. CLURO 4.3.2.1-2.
. CLURO 4.3.2.10.
. CLURO 7.5.
. CLURO 9.1.4.
. CLURO 9.1.
. CLURO 9.1.4.
. CLURO 9.1.1.13(a).
.CLURO 9.1.1.13.1(b).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- OUR LADY OF the LAKE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, MANDEVILLE, Louisiana v. CITY OF MANDEVILLE, PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION
- Cited By
- 6 cases
- Status
- Published