Appellant seeks review of a trial court judgment sustaining the appellee's peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription. For the following reasons, we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 15, 2013, Eryon Luke (plaintiff) filed suit against her former employer, CPIace Forest Park SNF, LLC, d/b/a Nottingham Regional Rehab Center (Nottingham). She alleged, among other things, that Nottingham terminated her due to *997her pregnancy, in violation of both federal and state law.1 Plaintiff also alleged that Nottingham violated LSA-R.S. 23:342(4), concerning unlawful employment practices, by refusing to temporarily transfer her to a less strenuous or hazardous position for the duration of her pregnancy.2 Following removal to federal court and a complex procedural history resulting in dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims,3 plaintiff's state law claims were remanded to state district court on November 4, 2014.

On November 28, 2016, plaintiff filed a Supplemental and Amended Petition, seeking to add Traditions Senior Management, Inc. (Traditions) as an additional defendant. Plaintiff alleged that Traditions was also her employer and that both Traditions and Nottingham had violated the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law ("LEDL") by failing to accommodate plaintiff during her pregnancy. Plaintiff also reiterated the prayer of her original petition and sought judgment against the defendants jointly and in solido.

On January 10, 2017, Traditions filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription. Traditions noted that claims brought under the LEDL were subject to a one-year prescriptive period. See LSA-R.S. 23:303(D). Because plaintiff had been terminated on May 24, 2012, Traditions contended that plaintiff's claims against it prescribed no later than May 24, 2013. As such, Traditions asserted that plaintiff's amended petition filed on November 28, 2016 was untimely. In opposition, plaintiff asserted that her claims against Traditions related back to the filing of the original petition since Traditions was aware of plaintiff's claims and of the underlying litigation, given its close working relationship with Nottingham.

Following a hearing, the trial court sustained the exception raising the objection of prescription and dismissed plaintiff's claims against Traditions with prejudice. Plaintiff has appealed, seeking review of the trial court's judgment granting Traditions' exception of prescription.

DISCUSSION

As a general rule, prescription statutes "are strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished." Taranto v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp., 10-0105 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 721, 726. Ordinarily, the party urging prescription bears the burden of proof at trial of the exception; however, if the petition is prescribed on its face, the burden shifts to the *998plaintiff to show the action is not prescribed. Taranto, 62 So.3d at 726.

We note that both the parties and the trial court focused on whether plaintiff's amended petition adding Traditions as a defendant related back to her timely filed petition against Nottingham. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 1153.4 However, if Nottingham and Traditions are either joint tortfeasors or solidary obligors then a timely filed suit against one would interrupt prescription against the other and the discussion of relation back under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1153 would be moot See McKenzie v. Imperial Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 12-1648 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/30/13), 122 So.3d 42, 53 n.13 ("Once a plaintiff establishes that a joint tortfeasor has been timely sued, consideration of the concept of relating back under La. C.C.P. art. 1153 to interrupt prescription is not necessary."); see also Wheat v. Nievar, 07-0680 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/8/08), 984 So.2d 773, 776 and Perkins v. Willie, 03-0126 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/2/04), 878 So.2d 574, 578.

The interruption of prescription against one solidary obligor is effective against all solidary obligors and their heirs. LSA-C.C. arts. 1799 and 3503. If such liability is not solidary, then "liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint and divisible obligation." LSA-C.C. art. 2324(B). "Interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tortfeasors." LSA-C.C. art. 2324(C).

In her supplemental and amending petition, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were liable "jointly and in solido." See LSA-C.C. art. 2324.5 Also, in opposition to Traditions' exception raising the objection of prescription, the plaintiff introduced the deposition of Donna Duplantis, *999Traditions' Regional Director of Human Resources. Ms. Duplantis testified that she "oversaw" the Nottingham facility and that her job duties included approving disciplinary actions. Ms. Duplantis indicated that she, along with supervisory employees of both Nottingham and Traditions, made the decision that there were no accommodations that Nottingham could make that would enable plaintiff to continue in her position.6 Additionally, Ms. Duplantis testified:

When we realized Ms. Luke would not be able to perform the duties of this job or any job that we had available without a whole other person being paid to work [alongside] her, which we felt was-would be an unreasonable accommodation, we placed her and-and gave her notice in mail and I think also verbally that we would place her on leave in accordance with the Louisiana pregnancy statute, which gives up to four months if there is a problem pregnancy.

* * *

The leave was up after-we gave her up to the four months. And she was still unable to perform the job duties for the job for which she was hired. I-I don't know if she called Rachael Carcamo [with Nottingham] or if Rachael just came to me on her own as a result of reviewing the payroll that-I don't remember why. But after the four months was up, Rachael contacted me and said should we knock her off of payroll, should we terminate her employment. And I did-I believe I contacted Heather McKamey [Traditions' Vice President of Human Resources] directly because I felt that-I did feel like she should be terminated off of the payroll. There was-you know, we had complied with the statute and there was no reason to keep her on a list, basically.

And I did contact-I don't remember if it was e-mail or by phone, but I did contact Ms. McKamey, who agreed, and we terminated her employment through a letter.

Based on the allegations in both petitions and considering the foregoing testimony, we conclude that the timely filed suit against Nottingham, a joint tortfeasor with Traditions, interrupted prescription against Traditions. See LSA-C.C. arts. 2324(C) and 34627 ; see also McKenzie, 122 So.3d at 49. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court in this regard and overrule Traditions' exception of prescription.8

In light of our conclusion, consideration of the concept of relation back under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1153 is moot. See McKenzie, 122 So.3d at 53 n.13. Moreover, given our ruling, we pretermit plaintiff's second assignment of error concerning whether the trial court erred in failing to allow her the opportunity to present oral argument at the exception hearing.

*1000CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's May 26, 2017 judgment sustaining Traditions' peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription and dismissing plaintiff's claims against Traditions with prejudice. We overrule the exception, and we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed against appellee, Traditions Senior Management, Inc.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.