Judge Rosemary Ledet *658This is a suit on a promissory note. From the
trial court's judgment granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff,
SBN V FNBC LLC ("SBN"), the defendant, Vista Louisiana, LLC ("Vista"), appeals.
Vista also seeks review of the trial court's interlocutory judgment denying its
motions for new trial and to compel discovery. The issues before us on this appeal
are two-fold: (i) whether the trial court prematurely granted summary judgment without
allowing Vista adequate discovery; and (ii) whether the trial court erred in finding
that SBN was entitled to summary judgment on its claims against Vista. Because SBN's
motion for summary judgment revolves around two legal determinations-construction
of a contract (the Business Loan Agreement) (the "Contract") and interpretation
of a statute (the Louisiana Loansharking Statute, La. R.S. 14:511 ) (the "Statute")1
-we find the trial court did not prematurely rule on SBN's summary judgment motion.
On the merits, we find no legal error in the trial court's rejection of Vista's
defenses. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment granting SBN's
summary judgment motion., On July 15, 2015, Vista executed a promissory note payable
to the order of First NBC Bank ("FNBC") (the "Note"). The original principal amount
of the Note was $ 1,000,000.00. The Note was payable "in full immediately upon Lender's
demand" or, if no demand was made, "no later than February 28, 2016." The Note had
a variable interest rate. Contemporaneously with the execution of the Note, Vista
executed the Contract with FNBC. Pursuant to the Contract, Vista provided a Letter
of Credit (the "LOC"), which was in the same amount as the Note, as security for
the Note., In January 2018, SBN commenced this suit on the Note against Vista. In
its petition, SBN averred that it was the holder of the Note and that it had the
rights of a holder in due course. In its petition, SBN prayed for a judgment against
Vista for the following five items: (i) the unpaid principal balance of the Note-$
1,000,000.00; (ii) the accrued unpaid interest due on the Note through January 5,
2018-$ 75,104.16; (iii) additional default interest of 21% from January 6, 2018,
until paid;2 (iv) late charges-$ 2,000.00; and (v) attorneys' fees of 25% of the
total sum due., Shortly after Vista's answer was filed, SBN filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending that it was a holder in due course. In support, SBN
provided an affidavit of Kelli Wood, SBN's custodian of records. In her affidavit,
Ms. Wood identified the Note and the facts surrounding SBN's acquisition of the
Note. Attached to her affidavit and identified in it were copies of the Note and
the Contract., In support, Vista attached to its opposition affidavits from the
following three people: (i) Lawrence Starkman, Vista's manager; (ii) John Seago,
Vista's attorney; and (iii) Rene Meaux, a certified public accountant retained
by Vista. Mr. Starkman attested that Vista had "filed Interrogatories, Requests
for Production of Documents and Admissions of Fact which requested SBN to provide
the exact amount SBN paid for the Vista loan" (the "Discovery Requests"). Mr. Seago
attested that he prepared the Discovery Requests. Attached to and identified in
Mr. Seago's affidavit was a copy of the Discovery Requests. Mr. Meaux attested
that he performed calculations based on the average price paid in each pool for
each loan and that he concluded the rate of return sought by SBN exceeded 45% per
annum.3 Attached to Mr. Meaux's affidavit were copies of his report and a summary
of his calculations., On May 11, 2018, the summary judgment hearing was held. At
the hearing, SBN conceded, contrary to the allegation in its petition, that it was
not a holder in due course; and Vista requested a continuance to conduct discovery.
Vista stressed that, on April 17, 2018, it filed the Discovery *660Requests; that
SBN had not yet answered them; and that SBN's responses were not due until May
17, 2018, six days after the hearing. At the hearing, the trial court orally granted
SBN's motion for summary judgment and, by implication, denied Vista's request
for a continuance. Although the trial court granted SBN's summary judgment motion
at the hearing, two weeks later (on May 25, 2018), Vista filed a motion to compel,
seeking a response to the Discovery Requests., On June 1, 2018,4 the trial court
rendered a written judgment granting SBN's summary judgment; the judgment was in
favor of SBN and against Vista for the amounts prayed for in the petition with the
one exception.5 Five days later (on June 6, 2018), Vista filed a motion for new
trial, asserting the same two defenses that it raised in its answer and its opposition
to the motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied both the motion to compel
and motion for new trial. Vista appealed., The summary judgment procedure is favored.
La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2).6 The standard for obtaining a summary judgment is set
forth in La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3), which provides that "[a]fter an opportunity
for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material
fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Whether a fact
is material is a determination that must be made based on the applicable substantive
law. Roadrunner Transp. Sys. v. Brown , 17-0040, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/10/17),
219 So.3d 1265, 1270 (citing Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc ., 93-2512,
p. 27 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751 )., Typically, suits on promissory notes
are appropriate for summary judgment when the debtor establishes no defense against
enforcement. American Bank v. Saxena , 553 So.2d 836, 845 (La. 1989) ;, *661Premier
Bank v. Percomex, Inc. , 615 So.2d 41, 43 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993) ; see also Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cardinal Oil Well Servicing Co., Inc. , 837 F.2d 1369, 1371
(5th Cir.1988) (observing that "[t]ypically, suits on promissory notes provide fit
grist for the summary judgment mill")., A motion to continue is the proper method
to challenge a motion for summary judgment on the basis of prematurity due to inadequate
discovery.7 "When discovery is alleged to be incomplete, a trial court has the discretion
either to hear the summary judgment motion or to grant a continuance to allow further
discovery." Roadrunner , 17-0040, p. 11, 219 So.3d at 1272 (citing Simoneaux v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. , 483 So.2d 908, 912 (La. 1986) ; Eason v. Finch
, 32,157, p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/18/99), 738 So.2d 1205, 1210 ). The trial court
denied Villa's request to continue. We review the trial court's decision under
an abuse of discretion standard. Id., "Construing Article 966, this court has held
that '[a]lthough the language of article 966 does not grant a party the absolute
right to delay a decision on a motion for summary judgment until all discovery is
complete, the law does require that the parties be given a fair opportunity to present
their case.' " Roadrunner , 17-0040, p. 11, 219 So.3d at 1273 (quoting Leake &
Andersson, LLP v. SIA Ins. Co. (Risk Retention Grp. ), 03-1600, pp. 3-4 (La. App.
4 Cir. 3/3/04), 868 So.2d 967, 969 ). This court, as Vista points out, has crafted
a multi-factor test for determining whether adequate time for discovery was allowed
before granting summary judgment.8, *662Nonetheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court
has instructed that "[u]nless plaintiff shows a probable injustice a suit should
not be delayed pending discovery when it appears at an early stage that there is
no genuine issue of fact." Simoneaux v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 483 So.2d
908, 913 (La. 1986). Consistent with that principle, the jurisprudence has recognized
that, despite pending discovery requests, summary judgment is not premature when
the issue presented is purely a legal one and additional discovery will not change
the result.9 In that context, there are no genuine issues of material fact; and
additional discovery would be fruitless. See Jones v. Blanas , 393 F.3d 918, 930
(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Klingele v. Eikenberry , 849 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir.1988)
) (observing that "summary judgment in the face of requests for additional discovery
is appropriate only where such discovery would be 'fruitless' with respect to
the proof of a viable claim").10 When additional discovery would be "fruitless,"
the multi-factor test for determining whether adequate time discovery was allowed
is inapposite. Such is the case here., To determine whether additional discovery
would be fruitless, a court must "look to the legal theories that might sustain
the [non-movant's] claims." Klingele , 849 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir.1988) ; see Smith
, 93-2512, p. 27, 639 So.2d at 751 (observing that materiality of a fact is determined
based on applicable substance law). Here, Vista asserts two defenses in opposing
SBN's motion for summary judgment-the LOC Defense and the Loansharking Defense.
As noted at the outset, both defenses present purely legal issues, which can be
resolved by applying rules of contractual interpretation and statutory construction.
Therefore, this is a case in which additional discovery would be fruitless., Reaching
this result, the trial court, in its reasons for judgment, observed that "[n]o amount
of additional discovery on Vista's asserted defenses would create a genuine issue
as to which reasonable persons could disagree." We agree. Vista's reliance on the
multi-factor test is misplaced. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the request to continue and the motion to compel discovery., Rejecting the
LOC Defense, the trial court, in its written reasons for judgment, reasoned that
"[a]s the [Contract], signed by Vista, did not require FNBC to seek set-off from
the [LOC], Vista cannot now raise the failure to do so as a defense." We reach the
same result for the following two reasons., Second, a contract to provide security
for an outstanding obligation is an accessory contract.13 Here, the LOC is the accessory
obligation; the principal obligation is the Note. As SBN points out, "[w]hile a
surety, under some conditions may, by requesting discussion of the property of the
principal, require a creditor to pursue the principal before pursuing the surety,
La. C.C.P. art. 5152, there has never been a requirement that the creditor pursue
his collateral before pursuing the *664debtor, or that he could only pursue the
debtor if he had pursued the collateral."14 To the contrary, "when a debtor defaults
on the payment of the principal obligation, the creditor avails himself of his security
device, if he has one, but there is no rule of law which prohibits the creditor
from proceeding on the principal debt." D'Amico v. Canizaro , 256 La. 801, 808,
239 So.2d 339, 341 (1970) (internal footnote omitted).15, Vista's second defense
is that the rate of return or "compensation" that SBN realized on the Note violated
the maximum compensation allowed under the Statute-45% per annum-and thus amounts
to criminal usury-loansharking. Vista contends, as the trial court noted, that "because
SBN was able to acquire the [N]ote for pennies on the dollar, it received an 'unconscionable'
amount of 'compensation' considering the standard interest combined with the bonus
resulting from its acquisition of the [N]ote at a discount." Vista contends that
when SBN purchased the Note, it became the new lender for this loan. According to
Vista, "[t]he difference between what [SBN] paid for Vista's loan and what it is
requiring Vista to pay back is 'other compensation' referred to in the Statute."
Vista contends that given SBN's actions violate the Statute, SBN's attempt to
obtain a money judgment on the Note was void as against public policy and that the
Note was an absolute nullity.16, *665Agreeing with SBN, the trial court, in its
written reasons for judgment, observed that Vista's interpretation of the Statute
"would effectively outlaw the common practice of purchasing notes at a discount"17
and that "purchasing a note at a discount, no matter how large the windfall that
might accrue on successful collection, is not loansharking as contemplated by La.
R.S. 14:511." The trial court also noted that "Vista does not appear to cite nor
could this Court find any case that supports such an interpretation." The trial
court thus determined that the Statute was not violated by Vista purchasing the
Note from the FDIC at a discount and enforcing the Note according to its terms.
We agree., Because there are no cases construing or citing the Statute and because
loansharking is criminal usury, we look for guidance to jurisprudence construing
the Louisiana civil usury law. The jurisprudence has observed that the usury laws
of this state have historically exempted commercial discounting. Lafayette Royale
Apartments , 397 F.2d at 381 (observing that "[c]ommercial discounting ... is permissible
under Louisiana law"). Given the usury law jurisprudence and strictly construing
the Statute, we conclude that the commercial practice of buying a note at a discount,
here from the FDIC, is not the type of act the Louisiana Legislature was seeking
to prevent in enacting the Statute., When a note is purchased at a discount, and
then enforced according to its terms, the maker of the note is being called upon
to do nothing other than what the maker contracted to do. For this reason, the general
rule is that "the sale or purchase of negotiable or assignable commercial paper
or another chose in action or evidence of indebtedness transferable in trade and
business transactions, for valuable or legal consideration after its first negotiation,
is not usurious even though the price or other consideration determined upon is
less than the nominal or face value of the instrument purchased." 44B Am.Jur.2d
Interest and Usury § 95 (citing *666First All. Bank v. Westover, Inc ., 222 Ga.App.
524, 524-25, 474 S.E.2d 717, 718 (1996) )., Westover is illustrative. There, the
court framed the issue before it as "whether a discount received by one of two joint
lenders at the time it bought the interest of the other lender shall be included
in calculating interest for the purpose of evaluating a usury claim pursuant to
OCGA § 7-4-18." Westover , 222 Ga.App. at 524-25, 474 S.E.2d at 718.18 Addressing
that issue, the court observed that "[t]he gist of the [borrowers'] complaint is
not that [the lender] obtained the Primary Loan at a discount-but rather that [the
lender] improperly prevented the [borrowers] from sharing in the benefits derived
from that discount." Westover , 222 Ga.App. at 527, 474 S.E.2d at 720 (1996). The
court further observed that when the lender purchased the Primary Loan, its principal
value was $ 1.48 million and that the borrowers enjoyed full use of that $ 1.48
million. The court thus found the borrowers' usury argument unpersuasive, reasoning
that "it is not usurious for a borrower to pay interest on the full amount that
it borrowed." Id. (citing Williams v. Powell , 214 Ga.App. 216, 218, 447 S.E.2d
45 (1994) (in conducting a usury analysis, "[i]nterest is calculated on the amounts
of which the borrower had use") ).19, Here, Vista makes a similar argument. It implicitly
contends that it is not being allowed to share in the built-in profit that SBN will
receive on the Note, which it purchased at a discount. The built-in profit-the difference
between the amount a purchaser pays for a note and the face amount of the note-is
what Vista seeks to label "other compensation" under the Statute. There is a difference,
however, between additional charges that are added to the principal amount of a
note-discounted interest and other charges-and the amount a purchaser pays for a
note, with the option of enforcing the note according to its terms-the well-established
practice of commercial discounting. This is a commercial discounting case. SBN purchased
the Note from the FDIC at a discount and is seeking to enforce the Note according
to its terms. Repeating the trial court's remark, "purchasing a note at a discount,
no matter how large the windfall that might accrue on successful collection, is
not loansharking." For this reason, the amount that SBN paid the FDIC for the Note
simply is not relevant to the criminal usury analysis. The Loansharking Defense
is not persuasive.20, For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed., According to his calculations, Mr. Meaux determined that SBN paid
an average amount of either twenty-three cents or thirty-six cents per dollar for
the Note, depending on which of two possible loan pools the Note was included. These
average amounts were used by Mr. Meaux to calculate the "other compensation" SBN
received on the Note; he explained that "the average price per loan paid by SBN
was then compared to the amount SBN is now claiming Vista owed under the [Note]
... to determine the rate of return on their investments.", In its reasons for judgment,
the trial court explained that "[t]he written judgment was submitted after the fact
and not signed by the Court until June 1, 2018.", The exception was that the request
for attorneys' fees. Although SBN requested 25% of the total sum, the trial court
awarded attorneys' fees of $ 10,000.00.