State of Louisiana Versus Kenneth C. Lods
Opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 23-KA-319 VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT KENNETH C. LODS COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 15-6512, DIVISION "O" HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR, JUDGE PRESIDING
December 27, 2023
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
JUDGE Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois, John J. Molaison, Jr., and Scott U. Schlegel
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED
JJM JGG SUS
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr. Thomas J. Butler Darren A. Allemand Molly Love
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, KENNETH LODS
R. Christian Bonin MOLAISON, J.
In this criminal appeal, pertaining to a conviction for Felony Second Offense Operating a Vehicle while Intoxicated, the State contends that the trial court erred in eliminating mandatory sentencing provisions pursuant to a downward departure motion by the defendant under State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La. 1993). For the reasons that follow, the defendant’s conviction is affirmed. We further vacate the sentence imposed and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The defendant, Kenneth Lods, was charged in a bill of information by the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Office on November 12, 2015, with one count of Felony Second Offense Operating a Vehicle while Intoxicated (“DWI 2nd”), in violation of La. R.S. 14:98 and 98.2(D).1 On November 24, 2015, Mr. Lods initially pled not guilty at his arraignment but, on November 3, 2022, he changed his plea to guilty as charged. On that same date, defense counsel made a verbal downward departure motion at the time of sentencing and the trial court found the mandatory minimum requirements for an enhanced DWI 2nd were unconstitutionally excessive as applied to Mr. Lods. Accordingly, the court sentenced him to imprisonment at hard labor for a term of two years, with credit for time served. The sentence was suspended, and Mr. Lods was placed on active probation for a term of one year. In addition, the court waived all mandatory DWI 2nd requirements, including that he serves at least six months imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. The State objected to the sentence at that time.
On November 29, 2022, the State filed a motion for reconsideration of Mr. Lods’ sentence, which the trial court denied following a hearing on April 12, 2023. This timely appeal followed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in departing downward from the mandatory minimum sentence and other requirements required by La. R.S. 14:98 and 98.2. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The offense to which Mr. Lods pled guilty, La. R.S. 14:98 and 98.2(D), contains mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. La. R.S. 14:98(D)(b) states:
(b) If the conviction of a second offense violation of the provisions of this Section when the first offense was for the crime of vehicular homicide in violation of R.S. 14:32.1, third degree feticide in violation of R.S. 14:32.8, or first degree vehicular negligent injuring in violation of R.S. 14:39.2, the offender shall be sentenced under the provisions of R.S. 14:98.2(D).
La. R.S.14:98.2(D) provides:
D. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, on a conviction of a second offense violation of R.S. 14:98, and regardless of whether the second offense occurred before or after the first conviction, when the first offense was for the crime of vehicular homicide in violation of R.S. 14:32.1, third degree feticide in violation of R.S. 14:32.8, or first degree vehicular negligent injuring in violation of R.S. 14:39.2, the offender shall be fined two thousand dollars and imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor more than five years. At least six months of the sentence of imprisonment imposed shall be without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence except in compliance with R.S. 14:98.5(B)(1), the mandatory minimum sentence cannot be served on home incarceration.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that Mr. Lods’ prior conviction was for a violation of R.S. 14:32.1 from Twenty-Fourth Judicial District case number 03- 5180, “in that he did kill one Alan Herrero, while engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages.” Accordingly, under La. R.S. 14:98 and 98.2(D), at least six months of Mr. Lods’ sentence is required to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
A mandatory minimum sentence is presumed constitutional. State v. Royal, 03-439 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/30/03), 857 So.2d 1167, 1174, writ denied, 03-3172 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So.2d 849. A trial court may reduce a presumptively constitutional sentence if it determines the sentence makes no “measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment” or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than “the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering” and is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime” as applied to a particular defendant. State v. Dorthey, supra at 1280-81. This Court has observed that downward departures from mandatory sentences should only occur in rare cases. State v. Berniard, 03-484 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/15/03), 860 So.2d 66, 75, writ denied, 03-3210 (La. 3/26/04), 871 So.2d 345.
A court may only depart from the mandatory sentence if it finds clear and convincing evidence2 that would rebut the presumption of constitutionality. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676. It is the defendant’s burden to show that he is exceptional, namely, that he is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the gravity of the offense, the culpability of the offender and the circumstances of the case. State v. Nabors, 53,357 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/22/20), 295 So.3d 974, 977, writ denied, 20-00709 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So.3d 527.
In some cases, a defendant’s poor health, standing alone, has been deemed an insufficient basis upon which to claim that a mandatory sentence is unconstitutionally excessive. Courts have rejected this argument even in instances where it has been claimed that a defendant will require dialysis while incarcerated.3 In the instant case, we must determine under the facts presented whether Mr. Lods proved by clear and convincing evidence that the mandatory minimum sentence of six months would be unconstitutional as applied to him because of illness. Here, however, we cannot reach the issue of the evidence’s sufficiency, as none was offered to the trial judge by Mr. Lods prior to sentencing.
The record reflects that no pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) was conducted which could have informed the trial court’s decision.4 There was also no evidentiary hearing on Mr. Lods’ motion. Counsel for Mr. Lods made a verbal motion for a downward departure immediately prior to sentencing, which was sufficient to place the issue before the trial court, but which did not conclude with a single exhibit being introduced into evidence. Defense counsel simply asserted that the mandatory minimum is unconstitutionally excessive because his client was “on dialysis.” Whether or not this is a true statement, the argument of counsel at the hearing is not evidence. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans v. King, 12-1372 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/12/13), 119 So.3d 839, 842. More specifically, as noted by the Fourth Circuit in State v. Brazell, 17-0032 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/18/18), 245 So.3d 15, 38 (citations omitted), writ denied, 18-0868 (La. 3/6/19), 266 So.3d 900, “[m]ere argument—unsupported by factual evidence—that a sentence is excessive is insufficient to carry the burden of proof.”
Despite the absence of evidence offered in support of the motion, the sentencing transcript itself shows that the trial court relied upon three specific factors in granting the downward departure in this matter. The first was Mr. Lods’ unspecified “terminal condition,” and the second was an observation that Mr. Lods was “wheelchair bound” on the date of sentencing.5 A third finding was that Mr. Lods had already surrendered his license and vehicles.6
A trial judge has broad discretion when imposing a sentence and a reviewing court may not set a sentence aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So.2d 7, 16. La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1(C) provides that “[t]he court shall state for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing sentence.” When an appellate court reviews an excessive sentence claim, it must determine whether the trial court “adequately complied with the statutory guidelines in La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, as well as whether the facts of the case warrant the sentence imposed.” State v. Parker, 12-0588 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/20/13), 112 So.3d 366, 373. In the instant matter, where evidence to support the ruling is absent, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the mandatory minimum six-month sentence is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Lods.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction is affirmed. We vacate Mr. Lods’ sentence imposed on November 3, 2022. We remand this case to the trial court for resentencing in a manner consistent with this opinion.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY DECEMBER 27, 2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
23-KA-319 E-NOTIFIED 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK) HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR (DISTRICT JUDGE) DARREN A. ALLEMAND (APPELLANT) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLANT) R. CHRISTIAN BONIN (APPELLEE) MAILED HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR. (APPELLANT) DISTRICT ATTORNEY MOLLY LOVE (APPELLANT) ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 200 DERBIGNY STREET GRETNA, LA 70053
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.