STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2022-KA-0817 VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL DASHONE REYNOLDS * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******

APPEAL FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 552-170, SECTION “DIVISON K” Judge Marcus DeLarge, ****** Chief Judge Terri F. Love ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge Dale N. Atkins)

Jason R. Williams District Attorney, Orleans Parish Brad Scott Assistant District Attorney, Chief of Appeals Thomas Frederick Assistant District Attorney South Street New Orleans, LA 70119 COUNSEL FOR STATE/APPELLEE Sherry Watters LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT P.O. Box 58769 New Orleans, LA 70158-8769 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED JUNE 15, 2023 TFL TGC Defendant, Dashone Reynolds, was convicted of manslaughter and DNA obstruction of justice. The district court sentenced Defendant to thirty years at hard labor on the manslaughter conviction and twenty years at hard labor on the obstruction of justice conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The sentencing took place on the same date after the district court denied Defendant’s Motion for New Trial and Motion for Post Verdict Judgment of Acquittal (collectively, “motion for new trial”). On appeal, Defendant raises two assignments of error: (1) the district court erred in immediately sentencing Defendant after the denial of his motion for new trial in contravention of La. C.Cr.P. art. 873; and (2) the sentences imposed were excessive.

The record herein shows that the district court failed to observe the twenty- four hour delay to impose sentencing required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 after the denial of Defendant’s motion for new trial. Defendant did not expressly waive the time delay and he challenged the excessiveness of his sentences. Accordingly,

Defendant’s conviction is affirmed; however, the sentences imposed are vacated and the matter is remanded for re-sentencing.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY1 Defendant’s arrest resulted from the shooting of two brothers, Steve Thompson and Steven Thompson. Defendant was charged by bill of indictment with one count of second degree murder of Steve Thompson, in violation of La. R.S.

14:30.1, one count of attempted second degree murder of Steven Thompson, in violation of La. R.S. 14:27(30.1), one count of obstruction of justice, in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. Defendant pled not guilty to the charges. After an initial hearing in which Defendant was initially found incompetent, a subsequent hearing determined Defendant was competent to stand trial.

The district court granted Defendant’s pro se oral motion to represent himself; however, it appointed defense counsel to act “as an assistant in this matter.”

Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, stating that he “would like to have a bench trial.” Following another competency hearing, Defendant, once again, was deemed competent to stand trial.

At the conclusion of the trial, the district court found Defendant guilty of the responsive verdict of manslaughter as to Steve Thompson and guilty of obstruction of justice. The district court found Defendant not guilty of the attempted second degree murder of Steven Thompson and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

The district court conducted a sentencing hearing on October 19, 2022. On the same date, the district court denied Defendant’s motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal and, thereafter, denied his motion for a new trial. Subsequent to the denial of the motion for new trial, the district court asked the State if it was “ready to move to sentencing.” The district court made no such inquiry of Defendant. After considering five victim-impact statements and a brief statement from Defendant, the district court imposed the following sentences: So, Mr. Reynolds, this Court found you guilty of one count of manslaughter and one count of obstruction of justice. With regards to the manslaughter, this Court is going to sentence you to thirty years in the Department of Corrections. With regards to the [count] of obstruction of justice, this Court is going to sentence you to twenty years in the Department of Corrections. Those counts are to run concurrent with each other and concurrent with any and all other sentences that you may be serving at this time.

Following sentencing, the district court denied Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of his sentence and granted Defendant’s appeal.

DISCUSSION2 Assignment of Error No. 1 Defendant’s first assigned error alleges that his sentence should be vacated because the district court denied Defendant’s motion for new trial and immediately sentenced Defendant on the same day without a waiver of the twenty-four hour delay provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 873. La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 states the following: If a defendant is convicted of a felony, at least three days shall elapse between conviction and sentence. If a motion for a new trial, or in arrest of judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least twenty- four hours after the motion is overruled. If the defendant expressly

waives a delay provided for in this article or pleads guilty, sentence may be imposed immediately.

In the case sub judice, the district court sentenced Defendant immediately after its denial of Defendant’s motion for new trial. Although the district court asked the State if it was ready to move to sentencing, the district court did not ask Defendant, who was proceeding pro se, as to his readiness. The sentencing transcript contains no indication that Defendant waived the statutory twenty-four-hour sentencing delay.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the failure to observe the twenty- four-hour delay is not a harmless error where the defendant does not waive the delay and does not challenge the sentence. State v. Francis, 2019-0227, p. 1 (La. 4/29/19), 268 So.3d 289 (citing State v. Augustine, 555 So.2d 1331 (La. 1990)). As referenced, the record herein indicates that Defendant did not expressly or tacitly waive the sentencing delay. Moreover, the record supports that Defendant asserted challenges to his sentences at both the sentencing hearing through his motion to reconsider the sentences and on appeal. Under this factual scenario, the district court’s error cannot be considered harmless error. Accordingly, this Court is required to vacate Defendant’s sentences and remand for re-sentencing.3

Assignment of Error No. 2 Defendant’s second assigned error asserts that the thirty-year sentence he received in connection with his manslaughter conviction and the twenty-year

sentence he received with respect to his obstruction of justice conviction were excessive. Defendant complains that the district court did not recite the sentencing criteria set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 in imposing the above sentences. However, this assignment of error has been rendered moot based on our determination that Defendant must be resentenced because the district court did not adhere to the prerequisites of La. Cr. P. art. 873 to delay sentencing for at least twenty-four hours after the denial of Defendant’s motion for new trial.

CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

Defendant’s sentences are vacated and the matter is remanded for re-sentencing.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED