KJYM'I'lWAV §

SEP 2 0 2024 Judgment Rendered:

On Appeal from the 22nd Judicial District Court Parish of St. Tammany, State of Louisiana Trial Court No. 592919

J. Collin Sims Attorneys for Appellee, District Attorney State of Louisiana Matthew Caplan Assistant District Attorney Covington, Louisiana

Jane L. Beebe Kessler King Addis, Louana

BEFORE: WOLFE, MILLER, AND GREENE, JJ.

jr + later withdrew that plea and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant' s motion to suppress his confession.

The defendant was tried by a Jury and found guilty as charged.' The trial court

denied the defendant' s motion for new trial and motion for post -verdict Judgment of

acquittal. The trial court imposed a sentence of eighteen years imprisonment at hard

labor, suspended five years of the sentence, and placed the defendant on superviseM probation for three years, upon his release from imprisonment, with general and special conditions. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the admission of prejudicial" evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the denial of his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction, vacate t1s,

who went to the computer area and remained there all morning'. After Moore went hiram

n her lunch break and the other patron left, the defendant asked Atkins to help ind a book. When Atkins walked to the back • the library to show him where th: book was located, the defendant grabbed her around her neck and dragged her towards the bathroom, as she screamed for help. The defendant told Atkins to shut

1 Before the trial, the defendant' s attorney filed a motion to test the defendant' s mental capacity.

The trial court appointed a sanity commission, and the defendant was found competent to proceed to trial.

PA Moore heard Atkins screaming, assisted her out of the library, and called 911.

Officers of the Folsom Police Department responded to the scene and observed till defendant still inside of the library, sitting at a computer desk. The defendant stood

bathroom. He was then taken into custody.

in assignment of error number two, the defendant argues the evidence

ritresented at trial only proved a simple kidnapping or an attempted rape, at best, A? was insufficient to support the conviction of second degree kidnapping.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could

conclude that the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond I

La. 11/ 29/ 06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Welch, 2019- 0826 ( La. App. I st Cir.

The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, A reasonable doubt. Welck 297 So3d at 27. When a conviction is based on botM

2 When issues are raised on appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first assess the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 734 ( La. 1992). When the entirety of the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be discharged as to that crime, and any discussion of trial error issues as to that crime would be pure dicta since those issues are moot. However, when the entirety of the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court must then consider the other assignments of error to determine whether the accused is entitled to a new trial. State v. Germany, 2021- 1614 ( La. App. I st Cir. 9/ 26/ 22), 353 So. 3d 804, 809, writ denied, 2022- 01568 ( La. 1/ 11/ 23), 352 So. 3d 983.

Accordingly, we will first address the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence.

direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence

defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Coleman,

IMM

11/ 21/ 20, 373 o. 3d 460.

When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15: 438 basically provides that the fact finder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. When a case involves circumstantial evidence,

and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant' s own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Alexander,

2014- 1619 ( La. App. I st Cir. 9/ 18/ 15), 182 So. 3d 126, 13 1, writ denied, 2015- 1912 La. 1/ 25/ 16), 185 So. 3d 748.

Second degree • is defined, in • part, as the forcible seizing and carrying of any person from one place to another, wherein any of the following acts occur: the victim is used to facilitate the commission of a felony; the victim is physically injured; or, the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon. La—R.S.

1 841 § I and 2022 La. Acts No. 173, § 1). As second degree kidnapping is a general intent crime, proof of intent requires only a showing that the circumstances of the crime indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must

Crom his act or failure to act. See La. R.S. 14- 10( 2); State v. Dickerson, 2012- 0388

La. App. I stCir. 11/ 2/ 12), 2412 5387365, * 2 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2012 -

At the trial, Atkins testified that, upon the defendant' s request, she initially gave him directions to where he could locate a book on deer hunting in the back of the library, upon his request. However, minutes later the defendant returned to the front desk and told her he was unable to find the book, so she proceeded to walk to

her neck and started R.«•• her body backwards, towards the bathroom. T113 defendant continued to drag Atkins, as she tried to fight, pull, and yank herself free.

her to shut up as she yelled for help. She stated i' was fondling hQ breasts while pulling her by the neck. Atkins further testified that during the

and/ or bruises on her hands. The photographs taken of Atkins when the police

arrived on the scene showed the bruising and cuts on her lip, arms, and hands, I described in her testimony.

Moore, the library manager, testified the defendant regularly frequented the library, with his father dropping him off. She stated that she did not park in h(M normal parking spot on the day of the incident and her vehicle was not visible from

hearing a peculiar sound. At that point, Atkins ran out from in between the

that Atkins did • • any shoes on, her blouse was skewed, and her mouth wel puffy. When Moore called 911, she noticed the entrance door near the bathroon-11 was locked, though it had been unlocked that morning when the library was opened.

Officer Jeremy Hutchinson, with the Folsom Police Department, testified that Atkins was frazzled and uncontrollably hysterical when he first arrived on the scene.

injuries. Officer Hutchinson testified zip ties were found on the floor next to the computer at which the defendant was seated. Some of the zip ties were connected

111 111111111 11111 lI IF Pill Wil"I E- 5- oll • s a

shorts.

Officer Hutchinson did not photograph the zip ties or the knife, was unabs

evidentiary custody. However, at the trial, Officer Hutchinson drew pictures of the

zip ties and knife, and his hand -drawn pictures were introduced as evidence.

years old, and Detective Huey Davis of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Officl assisted Officer Hutchinson in an unsuccessful effort to contact a concerned adult Cor the defendant. The defendant was advised of his rights, executed a waiver of

trial.

Further, the computer at which the defendant sat while in the library was collected and analyzed, and the results indicated the following search was conducted zt 10.-43 a.m., on the day in question- " How many years in jail for a rape." The

offense took place hours later, after Atkins returned from her lunch break.

Dr. Michelle Garriga, an expert forensic psychiatrist, interviewed the

defendant prior to trial. 3 Dr. Garriga testified that the defendant told her that he was

3 Dr. Garriga was initially appointed to the sanity commission to determine the defendant' s competency to stand trial and later appointed to determine his sanity at the time of the offense. ( R. 1, 11, 950, 952).

The defendant has not on appeal reasserted his challenge regarding his state of mind at the time of the offense. In an abundance of caution, we note that in addition to the defendant being found competent to stand trial, Dr. Garriga testified that he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong when the offense was committed. After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant failed to rebut his presumed sanity at the time of the offense. See La. R.S. 14: 14; La. R.S. 15: 432; State v. Dixon, 2008- 1038 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 23/ 08), 2008 WL 6809594, * 4 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2009- 0189 ( La. 10/ 30/ 09), 21 So. 3d 27.

sexually aroused when he attacked Atkins and that he intended to rape her. She also testified that the defendant told her that he knew where the librarians parked their

cars and that he thought he and, Atkins were alone at the time of the •

The defendant testified at trial and said he did not recall Dr. Garriga

that he was sexually aroused at the time ofthe offense. However, during his recorded police interview and again at trial, the defendant admitted to kidnapping Atkins, i IN I IN 0 NEW F R

defendant further admitted to using his hand to muzzle Atkins' mouth when she

he could not recall searching the internet for the penalty for rape or fondling Atkins' breasts during the attack, and denied the latter on cross- examination. However, the

that he did not think that Atkins, Moore, or Dr. Garriga lied at any point during their trial testimony.

The defendant described the knife that he had on his person at the time of his

arrest as a four -inch, silver sheath knife with a one -and -a -halfto two- inch long blade.

The defendant testified he never pulled the knife out from his pocket or threatened Atkins with it. The defendant further denied trying to use the zip ties, but admitted

When there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Alexander, 182 So3d at 131.

It is well settled that the trier of fact can accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Accordingly, on appeal, this court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder' s detennination of guilt. State v. Lavy, 2013- 1025 ( La. App. Ist Cir. 3/ 11/ 14), 142

N a reviewing court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis

the fact finder. See State v. Calloway, 2007- 2306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 per cur am).

argues the State failed to prove Atkins was used to facilitate the commission of a

felony, that she was physically injured, or that a dangerous weapon was used durinM the offense. This court is not persuaded by the defendant' s arguments. As detailed

I I PERSON I' I 1 11 1 I I 1 4

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14- 41( A) in part defines rape as " the act of ...

sexual intercourse with a ... person committed without the person' s lawful consent."

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14.-43( A)(4) pertinently defines third degree rape as " a rape committed when the ... sexual intercourse [ occurs] ... without the consent of

the victim[.]" An attempt is defined by La. R.S. 14: 27( A) as "[ a] ny person wha having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of 9,nd tending • toward the accomplishing • his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended." It is immaterial whether, under the circumstances,

Specific intent is therefore a required element for a conviction of attempted third degree rape. Specific intent is defined by La. R.S. 14: 10( 1) as " that state of

mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired

M the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." Specific

intent need not be proven as a fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the

rape, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant: ( 1) had tj specific intent to commit third degree rape; and ( 2) he did an act for the purpose of,

MMME La. R.S. 14- 27; see also State v. Walston, 2022- 0317 ( La. App. Ist Cir. 11/ 4/ 22), 2022 WL 16707997, * 2 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2022- 01809 ( La.

Herein, testimony showed the defendant searched a library computer regarding the penalty for rape, waited until it appeared he was alone with Atkins,

nd told Dr. Garriga that he was sexually aroused at the time of the offense anE intended to rape Atkins. The State presented ample evidence from which the jury could infer the defendant had the specific intent to rape Atkins and committed

several acts in furtherance of that objective. Accordingly, we find that the jury could have rationally concluded the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt tfa kidnapping was committed to facilitate an attempted third degree rape. See State I Skipper, 97- 2209 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 5/ 5/ 99), 737 So. 2d 872, 877 ( wherein t1a

appellate court, in part, upheld a conviction of second degree kidnapping based om evidence that the defendant " participated in the imprisonment of the victim t*

facilitate his own rape of the victim").

Ife note that the defendant on appeal contends that the State was required to

show the commission of a completed felony to prove second degree kidnappinj under La. R. S. 14: 44. 1( 10(2). However, the State notes that " attempted rape is itself a felony offense." We agree with the State. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14: 2( 4)

defines a felony as " any crime for which an offender may be sentenced to death or

I imprisonment at hard labor." Third degree rape is punishable by imprisonment at 1, 1 1111 III I li ii Rggr

to commit a crime, " shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for

the offense attempted[.]" Thus, attempted third degree rape is a felony because it is

Moreover, as discussed below, we find the jury could have also rationally concluded the State proved the elements of the offense under subsections ( 3) and ( 5) 14- 44. 1( A). Thus, in this case, we need not rely solely on ous

determination ofwhether the use of the victim to commit an attempted felony offense meets the definition of second degree kidnapping pursuant to the discussed portion 1111, 11: 11PNEN0ii 11 01

As the defendant concedes on appeal, La. R.S. 14- 44. 1 ( A)(3) does not require

the victim' s physical injury be serious. In addition to Atkins' testimony, photographs of her injuries were admitted into evidence and shown to the jury. The defendant admitted to inflicting injuries to Atkins' lip, arms, and hands, specifically the bruises and cuts shown in the photographs. See Dickerson, 2012 WL 5387365 at * (wherein the victim suffered bruising injuries to her left eye, her nose, her mouth, and her back right shoulder during a kidnapping and this court upheld the conviction of second degree kidnaping). Thus, the jury could have rationallm deten-nined that Atkins was physically injured by the defendant during the

The defendant admitted to having a dangerous weapon, a knife, at the time of the offense. A " dangerous weapon" includes any gas, liquid or other substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death U or great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14: 2( A)(3). The term is not limited to

instrumentalities which are inherently dangerous. See La. R.S. 14: 2, Reporter' s

the victim to reasonably believe he is armed with a dangerous weapon." La. R.S.

14: 44. 1( A)(5). In State v. Hearne, 55, 311 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 9/ 27/ 23), 373 So. 3d

101, 1051 the defendant argued a pocketknife in his pants pocket was insufficient to show he was " armed" at the time of the offense. The appellate court concluded that

needs to have a dangerous weapon in his possession in order to be considerca

possess a dangerous weapon at the time of the offense to be considered " armed"' for

purposes of La. R.S. 14: 44. 1( A)(5). Thus, the jury could have rationally determined the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon during the commission of the ME= In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that the jury' s determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented. See 1771TIT11102MITIWI

that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the

In assignment of error number one, the defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of the knife, zip ties, and computer search.

He argues the evidence was not relevant to the offense, was prejudicial but not

probative, and consisted of evidence of other crimes or bad acts.

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant is generally inadmissible because of the substantial risk of grave prejudice to the defendant. It is well settled that courts may not admit evidence of other crimes to

his bad character. State v. Calloway, 2018- 1396 ( La. App. I st Cir. 4/ 12/ 19), 276

under La. Code Evid. art. 404( B)( 1), such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceedinim At least one of the enumerated purposes in Article 404( B) must be at issue, haNs liqli III IN All I Ili ,

evidence to be admissible under Article 404. State v. Selders,,2019- 0777 (La. App, I st Cir. 12/ 27/ 19), 293 So. 3d 1170, 1176, writ denied, 2020- 00194 ( La. 7/ 24/ 20),

burden of proving that the defendant committed the other crimes, wrongs, or actl i I I 111W • '

Other Crimes evidence is admissible under the integral act exception formerly known as res gestae) when the evidence relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding - Thus, evidence fon-ns part of the res gestae when the crime is related and intertwined with the charged offense to such an extent that the State could not have accuratelm presented its case without reference to the other crime. The res gestae doctrine in

Louisiana is broad and includes not only spontaneous utterances and declaratiors made before or after the commission of the crime, but also testimony of witnesses and police officers pertaining to what they heard or observed before, during, or afta the commission of the crime, if a continuous chain of events is evident under the

circumstances. Integral act evidence in Louisiana incorporates a rule of narrative

completeness without which the State' s case would lose its narrative momentum and

cohesiveness.

Calloway, 276 So. 3d at 147.

Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. La. Code Evid. art. 401. All

relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by positive law.

Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. La. Code Evid. art. 402. Although

relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, risk of misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or waste of time. La. Code Evid. art. 403M Ultimately, questions of relevancy and admissibility are discretionary calls for the trial court, and its determinations regarding relevancy and admissibility should not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Phillips, 2023- 0243 ( La -

Prior to the trial, the defendant moved to prohibit the State from introducing the evidence at issue. Following a hearing, the trial court agreed with the State' s argument that the evidence was relevant and denied the defendant' s motions. As

4 We note that pertinent jurisprudence questions whether integral act evidence under La. Code Evid, alt. 404( B) remains subject to the balancing test of La. Code Evid. art. 403. State v. Taylor, 2001- 1638 ( La. 1/ 14/ 03), 838 So. 2d 729, 745, cert. denied, 540 U. S. 1103, 124 S. Ct. 1036, 157 L.Ed.2d 886 ( 2004). However, we find that the prejudicial effect of the evidence admitted in this case does not substantially outweigh its probative value. Thus, we need not decide whether integral act evidence presented under the authority of La. Code Evid. art. 404( B) must invariably pass the balancing test of Article 403. See Taylor, 838 So. 2d at 745.

follows, we find that the related testimony and drawings of the zip ties and knife,

evidence of the instant offense, not a separate " other crime" within the meaning of

11 111 111111111re MOM regarding the penalty for rape while at the library, just hours before he committed

library computer, just after the offense. Finally, the knife was found on the defendant' s person at the scene, during his arrest. As discussed in the context of the sufficiency of the evidence, under La. R.S. 14: 44. 1( A)(2), ( 3), and ( 5), the State

introduced evidence to prove the defendant kidnapped Atkins to facilitate till

RM "64M-- to prove elements of the instant offense. Further, the evidence had independent

the State established an independent reason for admission of the evidence at issue.

Finally, we find that the evidence constitutes an integral part of the act that is the subject of the present proceeding, as provided for by La. Code Evid. art. 404( B)( 1).

The evidence forms an inseparable link in the continuous chain of events leading to the defendant' s arrest for the instant charged offense. Accordingly, the contesteM evidence was necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial and allow the State to accurately present its case. See Calloway, 276 So3d at 148.

As the State notes on appeal, the evidence at issue was also relevant to the defendant' s plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason ofinsanity, C y requiring , the jury to determine whether he was capable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the offense.

Considering the highly probative value of the evidence, the relevancy of the evidence was not outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice, confusiolM misleading the jury, undue delay, or waste of time. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court' s rulings finding the evidence admissible. Accordingly, assignment RRIT11017M

In assignment of error number three, the defendant argues the trial court erred

in denying the motion to suppress his confession. He notes he was only fifteen years LK31111- 111 VIONX

him in the presence of his father.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 703( D) provides that, on th,;

trial of a motion to suppress, the burden is on the defendant to prove the ground of

his motion, except the State shall have the burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or statement by the defendant. Before a purported confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that the statement was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, or promises. La. R. S. 15 -.45 1. Prior to questioning, an individual must be advised of his right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an and if he cannot afford an attorney, • will •- appointed • him prior •

any questioning if he so desires. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 8,f--, S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ( 1966). Further, if in any manner and at any stagm the process, the individual wishes to consult with • attorney before speaking,, questioning must cease. Id., 384 U. S. at 444- 45, 86 S. t. at 1612. The confession

of an accused of any age is valid if it was given knowingly and voluntarily. State v.

In Fernandez, the Louisiana Supreme Court overruled State in the Interest

706 ( 1978), which had previously mandated that, in order to introduce a juvenile' s

confession, the State must affirmatively show the juvenile engaged in a meaningful consultation with an attorney or informed parent, guardian, or other adult interested in his welfare before he waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-

incrimination. Dino, 359 So. 2d at 594. The Fernandez court reinstated the totality of the circumstances standard as the basis for determining the admissibility of juvenile confessions. Thus, all of the facts and circumstances must be reviewed to

determine whether ajuvenile' s confession was freely given. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d

Among the factors to be considered in determining the admissibility of a juvenile' s confession are the juvenile' s youth, experience, comprehension, and the presence or absence of an interested adult. The special needs of juveniles are

analogous to the special needs of individuals with mental deficiencies and are factors to be considered. The waiver of the defendant' s constitutional rights in making a confession or statement does not require a higher level of mental capacity than his level of competency to enter a plea of guilty, to assist counsel at trial, to waive his right to an attorney, or to waive other constitutional rights. The testimony of a police officer alone can be sufficient to prove the juvenile' s statements were freely and voluntarily given. State v. Robinson, 2016- 1594 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 2/ 17), 2017 WL 2399362, * 3 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2017- 1241 ( La. 4/ 27/ 18), So. 3M ME

When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court' s discretion, i. e., unless the ruling is not supported by reliable evidence. See

IM In the instant case, Detective Davis interviewed the defendant and testified at

the motion to suppress hearing. He noted that Officer Hutchinson contacted him

aware the defendant was a victimin an unrelated prior offense. He noted the

defendant' s educational challenges but that he was " very street smart" and internet

savvy. Detective Davis noted that he made several attempts to contact the

understand the rights that were explained to him prior to questioning. The interview lasted approximately twenty- four minutes. After reviewing the inter v- iew, the trial court noted Detective Davis thoroughly explained the situation to the defendant and

trial court concluded that the defendant understood his rights and waived them

intelligently.

The admissibility of a confession is, in the first instance, a question for the trial court; its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony relating to the voluntary nature of the confession are accorded great weight and will not be overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. Whether a showing of voluntariness has been made is analyzed on a case- by-case basis with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a confession is admissible. Once the trial

court has determined that the State has met its burden of proof with respect to voluntariness of the confession, its decision is entitled to great weight on review.

We find that the record fully supports the trial court' s denial of the motion to suppress in this case. At the beginning of the interview, Detective Davis informed the defendant that he made several attempts to contact his father, and that he had

spoken to his aunt but she declined or was unable to attend the interview. Detective

Davis asked the defendant if he knew of any other family that he could try to contact, and the defendant indicated that he did not know of anyone else to ••'•

Davis then carefully explained the defendant' s rights, using plain, simple language.

For example, in explaining the right to remain silent, Detective Davis added, " you don' t have to talk to me." He then told the defendant, in further explaining his privilege against self-incrimination, " if you tell me something ... and a crime is

involved, you can get in trouble." Detective Davis repeatedly reminded the defendant that if he decided to start the conversation, he could stop at any time, or could request an attorney. The defendant, in reading along as his rights were given,

The defendant was fully informed of his rights, confirmed that he understood his rights, and signed a waiver of rights form. There was no indication that the

defendant' s state of mind was altered or that he felt threatened or coerced. Further, as stated, there is no absolute requirement that an attorney or guardian be present with a juvenile suspect at the time he makes the statement. State in Interest of C.11, 2015- 1024 ( La. App. Ist Cir. 11/ 6/ 15), 183 o.3d 567, 571. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress the statement. Thus, we find that assignment of error number three lacks merit.

On appeal, this court routinely reviews the record for error patent. Pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920( 2), in conducting a patent error review, this court shaM

M consider "[ a] n error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence."

As the State notes in its brief, the sentence is illegally lenient, requiring that it be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.' Specifically, the trial court

effective November 1, 2017) against doing so for an offense designated in the court

criminal case does not have a constitutional or statutory right to an illegal sentence.

See State v. Williams, 2000- 1725 ( La. 11/ 28/ 01), 800 So. 2d 790, 797; State v.

Gregoire, 2013- 0751 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 21/ 14), 143 So3d 503, 510, writ denied,

An appellate court is authorized to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 882( A), when the sentence does not involve the exercise of

sentencing discretion by the trial court. The sentencing herein, however, involves discretion. See La. R. S. 14: 44. 1( C). To the extent that amending the defendant' s sentence entails more than a ministerial correction of a sentencing error, a sua sponte correction by a court of appeal is not sanctioned by the jurisprudence. See State v. Haynes, 2004- 1893 ( La. 12/ 10/ 04), 889 So. 2d 224 ( per curiam); State v. Grosl

2016- 1168 ( La. App. lst Cir. 4/ 18/ 17), 218 So. 3d 1089, 1099. Thus, we vacate t1a sentence and remand for resentencing.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDEgi FOR RESENTENCI-WG.

6 At the sentencing, the State noticed its intent to take a writ on the issue of the partial suspension of the defendant' s sentence. However, there is no indication that the State filed a writ on the matter.