STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2023 KA 1138

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CHRISTOPHER BELL, JR.

Judgment Rendered: MAY 3 1 2024

Appealed from the 22nd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana Case No. 1217-F- 2019

The Honorable Vincent J. Lobello, Judge Presiding

J. Collin Sims Counsel for Appellee District Attorney State of Louisiana Butch Wilson Assistant District Attorney Covington, Louisiana

Gwendolyn K. Brown Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Baton Rouge, Louisiana Christopher Bell, Jr.

BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., CHUTZ, AND LANIER, JJ.

LANIER,J.

The defendant, Christopher Bell, Jr., was charged by bill of information with

second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1. He pied not guilty, and,

following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. He filed a combined motion for

new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied. The

trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years imprisonment at hard labor and

denied his subsequent motion to reconsider sentence.

The State filed a habitual offender bill of information seeking to enhance the

sentence, and the defendant denied the allegations therein. The trial court

subsequently adjudicated the defendant a fourth-felony habitual offender, vacated

the original sentence, and resentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor

without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The defendant

filed another motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.

The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the constitutionality of the

enhanced sentence and the denial of his subsequent motion to reconsider sentence.

We affirm the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about May 27, 2019, after midnight, Corporal Ryan Robin, the intake

supervisor at the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office, was advised that an altercation

took place in a holding cell. Surveillance footage showed the defendant, who had

been arrested the previous night, repeatedly strike Benjamin Lacombe, another

arrestee placed in the same holding cell. Lacombe was lying on the cell floor, resting

at the time of attack. As a result of the attack, Lacombe suffered a broken jaw, lost

three ofhis teeth, and underwent multiple procedures and surgeries for facial injuries.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In assignment of error number one, the defendant argues that the trial court

erred in imposing an excessive sentence. He contends the trial court failed to

consider mitigating factors or articulate sentencing factors in denying his request to

deviate from the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. In assignment of error

number two, he argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider

sentence.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, §20,

of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive

punishment. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive.

A sentence is considered unconstitutionally excessive if it is grossly

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or is nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered

grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light

of the harm done to society, it shocks one's sense of justice. State v. Anderson,

2022- 0587 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/22), 357 So.3d 845, 852, writ denied, 2023-

00352 ( La. 9/6/23), 369 So.3d 1267.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for

the trial court to consider when imposing a sentence. While the entire checklist of

Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court adequately

considered the criteria. The sentencing judge should review the defendant's

personal history, his prior criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, the

likelihood that he will commit another crime, and his potential for rehabilitation

through correctional services other than confinement. The articulation of the

factual basis for a sentence is the goal of Article 894.1, not rigid or mechanical

compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate

factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has

not been full compliance with Article 894.1. Anderson, 357 So.3d at 852.

Further, the failure to articulate reasons as set forth in Article 894.1 when imposing

a mandatory life sentence is not an error since articulating such reasons or factors

would be an exercise in futility as the court has no discretion. State v. Dickerson,

2016-1336 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 633, 642, writ denied, 2017- 1147

La. 8/ 31/18), 251 So.3d 1062.

The defendant's fourth-felony habitual offender status is based on the

following convictions: three counts of aggravated battery in 2005; illegal

possession of stolen things and possession of cocaine in 2013; and aggravated

battery and aggravated criminal damage to property in 2014. As the instant

offense, second degree battery, and the defendant's prior convictions of aggravated

battery in 2005 and 2014 are defined as crimes of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(B),

the defendant's life sentence under the habitual offender bill of information was

statutorily mandated. See La. R.S. 15:529.l(A)(4)(c). However, the defendant

argues on appeal that the trial court failed to consider or mention his employment

background, educational background, or family history when imposing the

sentence and that the conduct being punished is insufficiently egregious to justify

the sentence imposed.

In State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280-1281 ( La. 1993), the Louisiana

Supreme Court opined that if a trial judge were to find that the punishment

mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1 makes no " measurable contribution to acceptable

goals of punishment" or that the sentence amounted to nothing more than " the

purposeful imposition of pain and suffering" and is " grossly out of proportion to

the severity of the crime," he has the option, and indeed the duty, to reduce such

sentence to one that would not be constitutionally excessive. In State v. Johnson,

97-1906 ( La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676-677, the Louisiana Supreme Court

reexamined the issue of when Dorthey permits a downward departure from the

mandatory minimum sentences in the Habitual Offender Law. A sentencing court

must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under

the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. A court may only depart from the

mmimum sentence if it finds clear and convmcmg evidence rebutting this

presumption of constitutionality. Johnson, 709 So.2d at 676.

To rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence IS

constitutional, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he IS

exceptional, which means, because of unusual circumstances, this defendant is a

victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored

to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances

of the case. Given the legislature's constitutional authority to enact statutes such as

the Habitual Offender Law, it is not the sentencing court's role to question the

legislature's wisdom in requiring enhanced punishments for multiple offenders.

Instead, the sentencing court is only allowed to determine whether the particular

defendant before it has proven that the mandatory minimum sentence is so

excessive in his case that it violates the constitution. Departures downward from

the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law should occur only in rare

situations. Johnson, 709 So.2d at 676-677.

In asking the trial court to consider deviating below the minimum sentence

allowed under the law, defense counsel noted that the defendant's first crime of

violence occurred almost two decades before the sentencing, with another one

occurring roughly ten years after that. Defense counsel further stated that the

victims involved " were not model citizens." In response, the State noted that the

defendant had been under supervision for violent crimes throughout his adulthood

and continued to commit crimes of violence while in jail.

In imposing the mandatory life sentence, the trial court found there was no

evidence to compel a downward deviation. In subsequently denying the

defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, the trial court reiterated the facts of the

instant offense, noting that it could not be considered a typical jailhouse fight, as

the defendant essentially jumped a sleeping inmate. Given the defendant's history

of criminal conduct and the severity of the offense, the trial court concluded that

the mandatory life sentence is appropriate in this case. Likewise, we find nothing

unusual or unique about the defendant's circumstances that would justify a

downward departure from the mandatory life sentence.

As noted by the trial court, Lacombe was lying on the floor in a vulnerable,

sleeping position at the time of the attack. According to expert medical testimony

at trial, " a right mandible fracture of the jaw," inflicted upon Lacombe by the

defendant during the attack, takes a considerable amount of force, due to the

mandible being " the toughest bone in the face." Further, Lacombe's CAT scan

showed " obvious increased intercranial pressure." As a result of the mandible

fracture, Lacombe had a condition called " Trismus[,]" the inability to fully open

his mouth, and a temporary wiring apparatus was inserted prior to two separate

surgeries.

We find that the defendant has not proven by clear and convincing evidence

that he is exceptional such that the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender

Law was not meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of

the offense, and the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, no downward

departure from the presumptively constitutional mandatory minimum sentence is

warranted in this case. See Anderson, 357 So.3d at 853-854. Thus, we find the

sentence imposed is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, and

therefore, is not unconstitutionally excessive.

The record before us establishes an adequate factual basis for the sentence

imposed. We find no error in the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to

reconsider sentence. The assignments of error are without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant' s conviction, habitual offender's adjudication, and sentence.

CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

Under La. Code Crim P. art. 920(2), all appeals are reviewed for errors discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence. In our review, we have found no reversible errors. However, the record reflects the trial court failed to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for applying for post-conviction relief under La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8(C). Nonetheless, the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the limitation period has no bearing on the sentence. State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142-1143, writ denied, 2006-2621 ( La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158.

Out of an abundance of caution, we note for the record and advise the defendant that Article 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. Id. at 1143.