Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2025

Danilo Augusto Feliciano v. Susan Hutson, in Her Official Capacity as Orleans Parish Sheriff and Nancy Ruth Landry, in Her Official Capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State

Danilo Augusto Feliciano v. Susan Hutson, in Her Official Capacity as Orleans Parish Sheriff and Nancy Ruth Landry, in Her Official Capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State
Louisiana Court of Appeal · Decided June 4, 2025

Danilo Augusto Feliciano v. Susan Hutson, in Her Official Capacity as Orleans Parish Sheriff and Nancy Ruth Landry, in Her Official Capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State

Dissenting Opinion

RECORRECTED COPY DANILO AUGUSTO * NO. 2025-CA-0335 FELICIANO * COURT OF APPEAL VERSUS * FOURTH CIRCUIT SUSAN HUTSON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS * STATE OF LOUISIANA ORLEANS PARISH SHERIFF AND NANCY RUTH LANDRY, * IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS LOUISIANA SECRETARY * OF STATE *******

JCL LOBRANO, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the district court’s dismissal of this election contest.

In Sens v. Plaisance, 365 So.3d 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2020), and Plaquemines Parish Council v. Petrovich, 662 So.2d 542 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1995), we reaffirmed that election statutes are to be construed strictly and the procedure expedited.

While the majority draws analogical support from Brooks v. Tradesmen Intern., Inc., 03-1871 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/04), 883 So.2d 444, that case is procedurally and legally distinguishable. Brooks involved the discretionary application of La. C.C.P. art. 1672(A) in a general civil context and not an election contest governed by a rigid statutory scheme. The court in Brooks was not constrained by La. R.S.

18:1409, which expressly bars rehearing or reconsideration under subsection (I).

To adopt such reasoning would risk undermining the finality and uniformity that the election code seeks to preserve.

Nevertheless, I must also acknowledge a concern that implicates the risk of both procedural fairness and access to justice. The record in this case does not reveal a willful failure to appear, nor a disregard for process. Instead, it reflects documented procedural confusion, stemming from a pro se litigant’s efforts or the difficulties posed by navigating an accelerated and complex legal process without

counsel. The absence of a statutory mechanism for rehearing under La. R.S.

18:1409(I) leaves little room for correction once judgment is entered. As such, despite the equitable concerns, I must conclude that the law compels us to affirm the district court’s dismissal.

I therefore dissent from the majority’s reversal of the district court’s ruling and would affirm the dismissal of the election contest.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.