United States v. City of New Orleans
United States v. City of New Orleans
Opinion of the Court
ORDER & REASONS
The Court has pending before it a motion filed by the City of New Orleans to amend the Consent Decree.
BACKGROUND
The history of this case has been set out in greater detail in previous orders. Briefly, after an extensive investigation of the New Orleans Police Department conducted at the request of the City, the DOJ issued a comprehensive report dated March 16, 2011.
On January 11, 2013, the Court approved a Consent Decree between the City and the United States.
To comply with the Consent Decree, the City, through the City Council and the Mayor, passed a series of ordinances establishing the Office of Police Secondary Employment (“OPSE”) and setting hourly rates and administrative fees for secondary employment. See New Orleans Ordinances 25428 M.C.S. 90-121, 90-122; 25429 M.C.S. 70-415.244-70-70^115.246; Ordinance Cal. Nos. 29,656, 29,657. As relevant here, Ordinance 25428 adopted on August 8, 2013 amended Section 90-121 of the New Orleans Municipal Code to establish the fee structure for secondary employment, setting a standard hourly rate, an hourly rate for holiday jobs and days of high officer demand, and an administrative fee for all secondary employment.
OPSE has now been operating since August 2013 and has gradually brought more secondary employment positions under its aegis. It has met with an encouraging and increasing level of success and acceptance. The City now argues that the standard and holiday/high demand rates and the administrative fee presently set by Municipal Code Section 90-121 do not adequately address existing conditions, do not provide sufficient flexibility, and, in fact, are hindering OPSE’s ability to accomplish the purposes of the Consent Decree. The City moves to amend the Consent Decree.
LAW & ANALYSIS
A consent decree is a judgment, and may be modified for any reason set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), including when “applying it prospectively is no longer equitable” and for “any other reason that justifies relief.” See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). “District courts must take a flexible approach to motions to modify consent decrees and motions to modify or vacate institutional reform decrees.” League of United Latin American Citizens, District 19 v. City of Boerne, 659 F.3d 421, 437 (5th Cir. 2011) {“LULAC”) (citation omitted). “Flexibility is ‘often essential to achieving the goals of reform litigation.’ ” Id. (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381, 112 S.Ct. 748). The court has inherent equitable power to modify its own decrees, including consent decrees, to accomplish the intended result. See LULAC, 659 F.3d at 436.
The Court employs a two-step test to decide whether a consent decree should be amended. LULAC, 659 F.3d at 436. First, the “party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. 748. This can be either a change in facts or a change in the law. See id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748. For example, “Modification of a consent decree may be warranted when changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous,” “when a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles,” or “when enforcement of the decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest.” Id. Modification may be warranted even without any factual change “other than recognition of the fact that the initial remedy ha[s] failed.”
Once the movant has established that there has been a change in circumstances or that the decree is failing to achieve its intended result, the second step is for the Court to “consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored” to the issue the change is intended to address. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383,112 S.Ct. 748.
A. Changed Circumstances/Failure to Accomplish Intended Result
In this case, the Court must first determine whether the City has met its burden of establishing that there has been a change in factual circumstances or that the Consent Decree is failing to achieve its intended result of effectively reforming secondary employment to ensure constitutional policing. The Court has met with the parties regularly over the last two years and has received regular reports about OPSE’s efforts from the court-appointed Consent Decree Monitor and from John L. Salomone, Jr., OPSE’s Executive Director. The Court also has reviewed Director Salomone’s affidavit filed in support of the City’s Motion in which he lists his responsibilities, including confirming that officers are eligible to work secondary employment, meeting with current and potential customers, filling requests for secondary employment, identifying secondary employment opportunities, accepting payment from customers, and ensuring that OPSE complies with the Consent Decree.
• Customers and potential customers historically paid and remain willing to pay higher rates for secondary employment than permitted under the current hourly rate schedule established by the City;
• Some jobs demand pay that is higher or different from the amounts permitted under the current hourly rate schedule because some jobs require more difficult security work than other jobs or simply present circumstances that require a different pay rate;
• The marketplace requires that more difficult jobs offer higher compensation to ensure that they are fully staffed;
• Examples of jobs requiring higher pay are Parasol’s Bar & Restaurant’s security for its St. Patrick’s Day Block Party sponsored with Tracey’s Original Irish Channel Bar, for*744 which a rate of $40.00 was offered to ensure sufficient participation by officers;
• Other employers have raised similar concern about events that are difficult security jobs and/or jobs occurring at the same time as other events . requiring a large number of NOPD officers but which are not specified as high demand events under the Consent Decree;
• Additional flexibility is needed to make the hiring of NOPD officers through OPSE practicable for customers,-, who regularly hire large numbers of NOPD officers through OPSE;
• Additional incentives are needed to encourage.NOPD officers to volunteer for secondary employment;
• The current fee and pay rates threaten to limit the number of secondary employment opportunities available for NOPD officers through OPSE;
• The wage and fee schedule proposed by the City is based on market research on the secondary employment pay offered by over 80 customers in New Orleans prior to the establishment of OPSE;
• Flexibility in pay rates is needed to adequately address customer needs and provide high quality security services;
• It is important that NOPD personnel and customers have confidence that OPSE is insulated from political influence and conflict of interest;
• Public safety is enhanced by having NOPD officers volunteer for secondary employment through OPSE.
Director Salomone oversees all aspects of OPSE and undoubtedly has personal knowledge of the topics covered in his affidavit and is competent to testify with respect to these matters. Neither DOJ nor FOP dispute the statements attested to by Director Salomone and neither filed a contravening affidavit or other evidence.
The need for rates in addition to the standard rate and holiday/high officer demand rate, with one administrative fee applicable under all circumstances, set in Section 90-121, and the need for flexible rates and fees for certain one-time events, are significant changes in the circumstances facing the City.
B. Narrowly Tailored Modification
Before the Consent Decree may be amended, the Court also must be satisfied that the proposed amendment is narrowly tailored to address the changed factual circumstances or the failure of the consent decree to accomplish its intended purpose, or both. The City’s proposed amendment to the Consent Decree is narrow: amend Paragraph 348 to provide that in the future the Court will set rates and fees for secondary employment.
Because the City has carried its burden as to both steps of the two-step analysis, the Court will exercise its discretion to amend the Consent Decree to place the authority to set rates and fees for secondary employment with the Court.
C. Revising the Secondary Employment Rate and Fee Schedule
As mentioned above, the City urges the Court to exercise its authority under amended ¶ 348 to (1) adopt the City’s proposed schedule of rates and fees in addition to the standard hourly rate and the holiday/high demand rate set forth in Municipal Code Section 90-121,
The Court exercises its authority under ¶ 348 of the Consent Decree as amended and adopts the rate and fee schedule and other provisions suggested by the City.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. Paragraph 348 of the Consent Decree entered by this Court on January 11, 2013
348. A schedule of fees will be established by the City the Court to offset costs associated with the coordination and required support provided through the Coordinating Office to take into account costs, including but not limited to, administrative fees, hourly wage rates, and equipment usages. The schedule of fees shall be publicly available.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court adopts the City’s proposed schedule for hourly rates and administrative fees for secondary employment and the other provisions requested by the City, which the Court shall issue in a separate document.
. R. Docs. 362, 372 (corrected memorandum in support of motion).
. R. Doc. 365
. R. Doc. 374.
. R. Doc. 384.
. U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department (Mar. 16, 2011). See R. Doc. 1-1.
. "Paid details” are referred to as "secondary employment” in the Consent Decree. Many NOPD officers seek secondary employment assignments in order to supplement their NOPD salaries.
. R. Doc. 1-1 at p. 96.
. United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924, (filed July 24, 2012), R. Doc. 159 (granting joint motion to enter Consent Decree); United States v. City of New Orleans, 947 F.Supp.2d 601 (E.D.La. 2013) (denying motion to vacate Consent Decree).
. R. Doc. 159-1 at 85.
. Id. at ¶ 332.
. Id. at ¶ 348.
. Ordinance 25428 also amended Section 90-122 of the New Orleans Municipal Code to provide that all fees charged pursuant to Section 90-121 shall be payable to the City of New Orleans and shall be collected by the Department of Finance and deposited into the Police Secondary Employment Fund and used to fund operations of OPSE.
. R. Doc. 362-2.
. The FOP does not contend that Director Salomone’s affidavit is factually inaccurate. R. Doc. 374.
. The FOP contends that the City has not carried its burden to demonstrate a "significant” change in circumstances because the limitations of the one-size-fits-all rate structure were made known to Colonel Salomone and the City before Section 90-121 was amended. R. Doc. 374 at 6-7. But as the Supreme Court has recognized, requiring a change of circumstance to be both "unforeseen and unforeseeable” is too strict a standard for amending a consent decree. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit recognizes that a consent decree may be amended even if factual circumstances have not changed if "the initial remedy ha[s] failed.” LULAC, 659 F.3d at 438.
. It is not the Court’s intent that this amendment will "open the door to a total bypass of the [City] Council for any issue even tangentially related to implementation of the Consent Decree." R. Doc. 374 at 4.
. The Court notes that the City’s Home Rule Charter does not mandate that the City Council set hourly rates and fees for secondary employment. The Consent Decree approved by the Court provided that the City would set the initial hourly rate and administrative fee. In its brief, the Fraternal Order of Police contends that the proposed amendment is an end-run around the City’s Home Rule Charter and an attempt to bypass the City Council’s authority to set fees and pay rates. R. Doc. 374-at 3-4. But the Home Rule Charter does not require the City Council to set secondary
. The City included a corrected table of hourly rates and administrative fees in its response to the amicus brief. R. Doc. 384 at 4.
. For the sake of clarity, the administrative fee of 15% or a maximum of $5.00 established in Municipal Code Section 90-121 remains unchanged. The definition of Major Special Events remains the prerogative of the City Council and is set forth in Section 90-121. Specified holidays and days of High Officer Demand are as set forth in Section 90-121 and will fall under the Tier 3 rate suggested by the City unless a customer agrees to pay an increased rate. Any administrative fees collected in excess of the amount actually required for the operation of OPSE shall be proportionally refunded to the officers annu
. R. Doc. 374 at 1.
. R. Doc. 362-2 at 3-4.
. The Court approves of and encourages OPSE’s efforts to educate NOPD officers and customers regarding the service it provides, particularly in light of misinformation from other sources.
. R. Doc. No. 159-1.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- United States v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
- Status
- Published