In re Green
In re Green
Opinion of the Court
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is an appeal by River-bend Condominium Association, Inc., from a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The decision of the bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED for the following reasons.
BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are undisputed. Torrance Tremayne Green (“Debtor”), the debtor in bankruptcy, is the owner of a condominium in Riverbend Condominiums in New Orleans, Louisiana (the “Condominium”). The Condominium is subject to the Louisiana Condominium Act (the “Act”) and the Condominium Declaration of Riverbend Condominiums (the “Declaration”), which is recorded in the public records of Orleans Parish. The Declaration grants the Riverbend Condominium Association (“Riverbend” or “Creditor”) the right to assess dues for the general maintenance of the complex and file a lien against condominium owners who become delinquent on those dues.
Debtor fell behind on assessments owed to Riverbend. Subsequently, Riverbend filed a lien affidavit in the mortgage records of Orleans Parish and then obtained a default judgment against Debtor for $23,303.72.
After the judgment was obtained, Debt- or filed Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. River-bend filed a Proof of Claim in the bankruptcy proceeding and was recognized as a secured creditor by the Chapter 13 Trustee. Debtor filed a Motion to Avoid River-bend’s Lien on the grounds that after deducting the balance of the first mortgage and the Louisiana homestead exemption, there was only $8,000 left to which River-bend’s lien could attach.
The bankruptcy court bifurcated River-bend’s claim, finding that the $8,000 residual value in the Condominium constituted a secured claim, while the remainder was unsecured.
LEGAL STANDARD
Where a district court sits as an appellate court in a bankruptcy case, “[t]he bankruptcy court’s findings of fact are reviewed under a clear error standard, while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.”
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The classification of a condominium lien is an issue of first impression under Louisiana law. Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, there are three types of liens: (1) statutory liens, (2) judicial liens, and (3) security interests. A statutory lien is a lien that arises “solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions.”
In its appeal, Creditor asserts that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Association is binding on this Court.
Likewise, the Declaration states that:
The unpaid portion of a Common Expense assessment which is delinquent ... shall be secured by a privilege upon the Condominium Parcel of the delinquent Unit Owner after filing for record of a claim of Privilege ... in the Mortgage Office for the Parish where the Condominium Property is located.... At least seven (7) days prior to filing such a Claim of Privilege, the Association shall serve ... on the delinquent Unit Owner ... a sworn detailed statement setting forth the [association’s claim].... The effect of recordation shall cease and the privilege preserved by this recordation shall be preempted unless a notice of filing suit ... is recorded within one year....15
The Declaration essentially repeats the law set forth in the Act. Creditor argues that by filing the Declaration into the mortgage records it has somehow transformed its statutory privilege into a consensual security interest. This Court disagrees for the following reasons.
Under Louisiana law, there are two types of security devices that pertain to immovable property: privileges and mortgages. The Declaration does not satisfy the creation requirements of either. The first, a “privilege,” is a nonconsensual device that arises as a matter of law.
In light of the legal nature of privileges, Creditor’s attempt in the Declaration to give itself a privilege is ineffective. A privilege arises only by law and thus can never be created by the consent of the parties. The inclusion of the above quoted language in the Declaration could not have given Creditor a privilege. If the Louisiana Condominium Act did not expressly provide Creditor with a privilege in Debt- or’s Condominium for unpaid association fees, Creditor’s attempt to take a secured interest in the Condominium based on privilege would have been ineffective.
Because the Declaration could not have given Creditor a privilege in the Condominium, the only other possibility is that it gave Creditor a mortgage, which is a consensual security interest in immovable property.
In short, the parallel inclusion of a reproduction of the Louisiana Condominium Act into the Declaration had no effect. In acquiring a secured interest in Debtor’s property, Creditor was relying solely on the privilege granted to it by the Act. Indeed, it took all steps required by the Act to preserve that privilege, including filing a verified claim of privilege into the mortgage records in the parish where the Condominium is located and bringing suit within one year of filing. The fact that a creditor must take certain subsequent steps to preserve a privilege does not affect the fact that the privilege arises “solely by force of a statute.”
CONCLUSION
The decision of the bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED.
. R. Doc. 40-2.
. La.Rev.Stat. § 9:1123.115(1) (2014) (“The association shall have a privilege on a condominium parcel for all unpaid or accelerated sums assessed by the association, any fines or late fees in excess of two hundred fifty dollars, and interest thereon at the rate provided in the condominium declaration or, in the absence thereof, at the legal interest rate.”).
.In re Green, 494 B.R. 231, 233 (Bankr. E.D.La. 2013).
. Id. at 235.
. In re Amco Ins., 444 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2006).
. 11 U.S.C. § 101(53) (West 2014).
. Id. § 101(36).
. Id. § 101(51).
. In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000).
. Id. at 291, 295.
. Id. at 281.
. La.Rev.Stat. § 9:1123.115 (2014).
. Id.
. Id. § 9:1123.115(B).
. R. Doc. 40-2.
. Luneau v. Edwards, 6 So. 24, 24 (1887) ("Under our laws, privileges arise from the nature of the act or contract as an effect of the law, and not as a result of the stipulations and consent of the parties.”); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Beckwith Mach. Co., 650 So.2d 1148, 1151 (La. 1995) ("[P]rivileges arise by operation of law_”); Michael H. Rubin, Ruminations on the Louisiana Private Works Act, 58 La. L. Rev. 569, 572 (1998) (“Louisiana privileges are non-consensual security devices; that is, they do not arise by any contract between the parties but rather by operation of law.”); Jason J. Kilborn, Louisiana Security Devices: A Precis xix (2d. ed. 2012).
. "Special privileges ... extend only to specific movable or immovable property designated by the statute creating the privilege.” Jason J. Kilborn, Louisiana Security Devices: A Precis 104 (2d. ed. 2012). Here, the condominium unit.
. La. Civ.Code art. 3186 (2012).
. Jason J. Kilborn, Louisiana Security Devices: A Precis 103 (2d. ed. 2012).
. Id. at 104.
. La. Civ.Code arts. 3284, 3286 (2012). Of course, a creditor could also have a noncon-sensual mortgage in immovable property, namely a legal or judicial mortgage, but neither is important here because neither would give Creditor a consensual security interest. See id. art. 3284 (stating that both a legal and judicial mortgage occur by law).
. Id. arts. 3287-88 (2012).
. First Guar. Bank v. Alford, 366 So.2d 1299, 1304 (La. 1978) (quoting Durham v. First Guar. Bank of Hammond, 331 So.2d 563, 565 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir. 1976)) (internal quotations omitted).
. 11 U.S.C. § 101(53) (West 2014).
. "The term 'statutory lien' means lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions.Id.
. This Court’s decision is in accord with the holdings of other courts interpreting the laws of other states. See Young v. 1200 Buena
. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 650 So.2d at 1151 (emphasis added).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- In re Torrance Tremayne GREEN
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- 4 cases
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