GIC Services, LLC v. Freightplus (USA), Inc.
GIC Services, LLC v. Freightplus (USA), Inc.
Opinion of the Court
OPINION
This case concerns the shipment of a tugboat to Warri, Nigeria rather than Lagos, the destination intended by its shipper. The Court held a bench trial on May 11 and May 12, 2015.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
The plaintiff, GIC Services, LLC (“GIC”), is a limited liability company located in Houston, Texas that procures equipment on behalf of its parent company, GIC Oil and Gas Services, Ltd. (“GIC Oil and Gas”). GIC Oil and Gas is based in Nigeria and specializes in waste management and road construction. Sogie Ebolo is the managing director of GIC as well as one of the directors of GIC Oil and Gas and testified on GIC’s behalf at trial. She has previously shipped over fifteen pieces of . heavy equipment, including cranes, a truck, generators, compressors, and other pieces of heavy equipment to Lagos.
Freightplus (USA), Inc. (“Freightplus”) operates as a “middleman” in the shipping industry, connecting shippers to ocean carriers. At trial, Lisa Keel, Freightplus’s vice president, testified that Freightplus receives inquiries from shippers looking to move cargo and locates a vessel and secures a freight rate on behalf of the shipper. Freightplus has filed a surety bond with the Federal Maritime Commission as a non-vessel operating common carrier (NVOCC) and maintained a license to operate as a freight forwarder and an NVOCC at the time of the events at issue.
Industrial Maritime Carriers, L.L.C. (“IMC”) is a vessel owner and operator. It does not employ its own staff. Instead, it engages agent companies such as Inter-marine, LLC (“Intermarine”), whose staff rim its day-to-day operations.
On or about December 15, 2012, GIC contacted Freightplus over the phone on or about December 15, 2012 to inquire about rates for shipping the M/V REBEL (“REBEL”), a tugboat, to Lagos, Nigeria. Lisa Keel, acting on behalf of Freightplus, approached several carriers to solicit quotes for the shipment, including the carrier Yacht Path.
Meanwhile, after being contacted by Freightplus, Yacht Path contacted Inter-marine, the agent- for IMC. Intermarine agreed to ship the REBEL aboard IMC’s vessel, the M/V INDUSTRIAL DESTINY (“INDUSTRIAL DESTINY”). On December 20, Yacht Path sent Freightplus an invoice for the shipment of the REBEL showing Lagos as the tugboat’s destination.
On December 26, Freightplus issued three copies of a “House Bill of Lading” marked “original” (“Freightplus bill of lading”). The Freightplus bill of lading represented that the REBEL had been shipped on board the INDUSTRIAL DESTINY from Houston, Texas on December 26, that the REBEL’S destination was Lagos, and that freight had been prepaid. The bill ' of lading was issued “clean”, meaning that no damage was noted on the REBEL at the time of loading.
Contrary to the Freightplus bill of lading’s representations, the INDUSTRIAL DESTINY actually sailed a day later on December 27.
While the ' INDUSTRIAL DESTINY was en route to Nigeria, correspondence between the vessel, Intermarine, and Yacht Path shows that there was confusion over the REBEL’S final destination. Between January 2 and January 3, 2013, Kyle Branting, an employee of Intermarine, emailed Kevin Cummings of Yacht Path whether Intermarine had the option of discharging the REBEL as well as a second tugboat aboard the INDUSTRIAL DESTINY in either Lagos or Warri. Mr. Cummings confirmed that the “small boat”, referring to the REBEL, desired a Lagos discharge. Mr. Branting replied, “Have to pump the breaks a little, getting some incentive to discharge in Warri.”
In spite of these'indications of a discrepancy in the final destination, no one at Yacht Path, Intermarine, or aboard the Industrial Destiny took steps to rectify the mistake. On the morning of January 10, Mr. Cummings emailed Ms. Keel of Freightplus to provide the contact information for Berend Bosman, who Mr. Cummings explained was the vessel agent and also would “handle the cargo clearing process,” which he pointed' out “can be a hassle.” Mr. Cummings wrote:
I suggest the that [sic] you have the client contact the agent' and start the process of collecting the cost for local charges and have them paid ASAP so the boat can be collected as soon as its discharged.
Please advise me when the receiver [GIC has made contact with the agent so I know the link has been established. The current ETA of the vessel'to Lagos is Jan 17th.19
Despite Mr. Cummings’s recommendation that she notify GIC to contact Mr. Bosman to arrange payment “ASAP”, Ms. Keel did not forward Mr. Bosman’s contact information to’GIC upon receiving Mr. Cummings’s email. Ms. Ebolo also testified, and the Court finds credible, that Freight-plus did not at this time or earlier inform GIC of the need to' complete any pre-clearance procedures..
Beginning on the morning of January 15, Ms. Ebolo emailed Ms. Keel three times to provide the contact information for GIC’s clearing agent, Patricia Ugwun-nah, ask for the vessel agent’s contact information, and inquire about next steps;
At 10:46 p.m. on January 16, Mr. Cummings emailed Mr. Balendra, the vessel agent for the INDUSTRIAL' DESTINY and an employee of MGM Logistic Solutions Services Ltd. (“MGM”), explaining that there was a “small tug boat” in the INDUSTRIAL DESTINY that was manifested to Warn, and that “There was some confusion'during the booking of this boat and it needs to be discharged iñ Lagos.”' This email, coming the night before the REBEL was to arrive at Lagos, was the first time anyone at Yacht Path or IMC discussed the need for changing the REBEL’S destination. Mr. Cummings asked
Despite Mr. Cummings’ imploring, the vessel agent informed him that a last minute change of destination was not possible. At 4:44 a.ni. on January 17, Ikechukwu Isang, an employee of MGM, replied that they would not be able to discharge the REBEL in Lagos “as the information is coming way too late.” Mr. Isang added, “Moreover, we did not get any such instruction from Intermarine.”
However, Mr. Cummings did not share this information with Freightplus. Instead, he contacted Ms. Keel and represented that delivery was compromised because the clearing agent was unavailable and various port charges had not been paid,
At 4:14 p.m., Mr. Cummings wrote to Moses Oyekunie at MGM, explaining that the REBEL had been manifested for discharge at Warri “by mistake” and imploring, “Can you advise if you can make a miracle for me and arrange with local authorities to allow the .discharge of the tug and keep in the custody of the terminal? ? ?” He stated, “I can get Intermarine to agree with this and authorize but I need to know if it is possible before I approach them.” He explained that he had been able to perform such an arrangement in Port Harcourt, another port in Nigeria, on past shipments.
The next morning, Mr. Cummings informed Ms. Keel over email, “I cannot reach anyone in Nigeria and nobody has called our agents from the receivers [sic] side. The ship was unable to discharge the tug in Lagos without completing formalities. The ship is now underway to Warri ...”
Thereafter, both Mr. Cummings and Ms. Keel claimed that the REBEL could not be discharged at Lagos because GIC’s agent, Ms. Ugwunnah, did not timely contact the vessel agent and could not be reached on the phone.
Sorry was on sick leave over the last 2 days. In the meantime you can be assured that my colleagues copied herewith would have assisted if there was a possibility to discharge the boat in Lagos, but considering the manifest and customs documents showing otherwise (Port of discharge as Warri) it was not possible for them to achieve so.35 (Emphasis added.)
The REBEL was discharged upon the INDUSTRIAL DESTINY’S arrival at Warri. Athough Yacht Path initially offered to cover reasonable costs to transport the REBEL back to Lagos, Mr. Cummings did not accept GIC’s quote for the cost of transport, and these negotiations apparently broke down.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 1, 2013, GIC initiated this action against Freightplus seeking damages for the delivery of the REBEL to Warri, Nigeria.
On May 27, 2Q14, IMC answered GIC’s Second Amended Third-Party Complaint and asserted a counterclaim against Freightplus and the REBEL.
On February 12, 2014, the Court denied motions for summary judgment filed by Freightplus and IMC.
III. CLAIMS & DEFENSES
GIC argues that defendant, Freightplus, is liable to it for the delivery of the REBEL to Warri and for intentionally making false representations tó GIC regarding the REBEL’S shipment. In addition to liability for damages to GIC itself, GIC argues that Freightplus shoüld also compensate for the lost profits sustained by GIC’s parent company, GIC Oil and Gas, Ltd.
IMC has counterclaimed, against Freightplus and-the REBEL, in rem, for the- unpaid freight charges.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Jurisdiction
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Venue is proper in this district.
B. GIC’s claims against Freightplus
The Court finds- that COGSA governs the relationship between GIC and Freightplus. COGSA provides that it “shall apply to all contracts for carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United -States in foreign trade.”
1. Limitation of liability
COGSA limits the liability of carriers to $500 per package except by agreement 'between the carrier and shipper.
The delivery of the REBEL to Warn clearly constitutes a deviation, as Freightplus failed to deliver the REBEL to Lagos, the discharge port named in the Freightplus bill of lading, and instead carried the REBEL farther to the port of Warn. Thus, the Court must determine whether the deviation was reasonable.
The Fifth Circuit has held that “a shipper can make out a case of unreasonable deviation simply by proving that his cargo was offloaded at a place other than the stipulated destination.”
Moreover, the surrounding circumstances indicate that the deviation was unreasonable. Freightplus blames the REBEL’S misdelivery on the fact that GIC’s clearing agent did not complete clearance formalities and pay for applicable port charges prior to when the REBEL should have been discharged at Lagos.
Freightplus also blames the misdelivery on the unavailability of GIC’s clearing agent during the day prior to the ship’s arrival in Lagos. ■ At trial, Ms. Keel testified that,GIC’s agent, Patricia Ugwunnah, needed to make contact with the vessel agent and did not. However, the email correspondence shows that Freightplus unreasonably delayed providing the vessel agent’s contact information to GIC, giving GIC an unrealistically narrow window of time in which to contact the vessel agent. Despite receiving the contact information for the INDUSTRIAL DESTINY’S vessel agent on January 10 and an admonishment from Mr. Cummings that she should provide this information to GIC “ASAP,” Ms. Keel did not provide GIC with the contact information for the vessel agent until roughly 9 a.m. EST on January 16 — about 2:00 p.m. in Lagos.
Although GIC did not share the details of its clearing agent until January 15, the Court finds that this delay did not affect the fate of the REBEL because Freight-plus delayed sharing the vessel agent’s information (which would later be changed) until the afternoon of January 16 — ¡just a few hours before the port closed. Furthermore, the correspondence shows that Desmond Balendra, the vessel agent that Intermarine finally designated and which Ms. Keel passed onto GIC, was out sick on January 16 and January 17— the very window of time during which GIC’s agent is purported to have been unavailable.
The limitation of liability is unwarranted for the further reason that Freightplus allowed an erroneous bill of lading to issue. Courts sitting in admiralty have held that the issuance of an erroneous bill of lading precludes a carrier from claiming this protection.
Freightplus is liable to GIC because of its failure to ensure an accurate bill of lading. The doctrine of estoppel applies to bills of lading and holds the carrier liable for false statements in a bill of lading.
Furthermore, equitable estoppel applies to maritime transactions generally.
he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done,, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.73
Freightplus’ false assertions in its letter'óf indemnity to GIC’s bank bar it from disclaiming liability for GIC’s damages. In the letter, Freightplus represented to GIC and its financers that it had issued an “original House bill of lading” for clearing in Lagos. Responding to concerns from GIC’s bank that there might be a discrepancy between Freightplus’s bill and a bill that could be issued by the vessel itself, the letter claims that the “ocean bill” and “house bill” of lading are the same document and that no other document other than Freightplus’s bill of lading would be issued by either Freightplus or the vessel. Freightplus stated, “Freightplus has sent you the only OBLs [original bills of lading] to be issued against this shipment, no others will be issued.”
■ Because of Freightplus’s unequivocally assurances in its letter of indemnity, GIC and its financing institution relied on the representations made in the Freightplus bill to their detriment. Thus, the letter of indemnity, as well as the erroneous bill of lading, render Freightplus liable for ,the damages arising out of the discrepancies between the Freightplus bill of lading and the bill issued by IMC.
C. Freightplus’s claims against IMC
Freightplus maintains that it is entitled to indemnity from IMC for any damages it may owe to GIC.
The Court finds that Freight-plus acted as an NVOCC. An NVOCC, unlike a freight forwarder, “does not merely arrange for transportation of goods, but takes on the responsibility of delivering
Looking to Freightplus’s bill of lading, the Court finds that Freightplus acted as an NVOCC. The bill of lading names Freightplus as the carrier
IMC argues that it did not act .negligently and therefore cannot be 'held liable for indemnity. IMC maintains that it was told by Yacht Path that the REBEL’S final - destination was Warri and therefore fully performed its contractual duties.
Moreover, IMC’s agents were alerted to a discrepancy in the REBEL’S’ final destination nearly fourteen days in advance- of the INDUSTRIAL DESTINY’S arrival in Lagos but failed to act on this information. On January 2, Kyle Branting of Interma-rine wrote to Mr. Cummings of Yacht Path to ask whether the REBEL would be discharged at Lagos or Warri. Mr. Cummings replied on January 3 that the REBEL “wants Lagos, as discharge.”
D. IMC’s Counterclaims
Finally, IMC claims a maritime lien against Freightplus, in person? am, and the REBEL, in rem, for freight charges for the carriage of the REBEL, which it claims were never paid.
However,-, the facts presented here raise several additional considerations: First, GIC did in fact pay freight for the REBEL to Freightplus, but that payment was never remitted to IMC.
In situations similar to the one at hand, where a vessel ■ owner’s claim for unpaid freight could result in the shipper’s double payment, courts have held that it is the freight forwarder, not the shipper, .who must be held liable for the unpaid freight. Indeed, many courts have spoken on this issue -such-that there is a “well-reasoned consensus” that: , .
where a shipper has paid the freight forwarder,-and where the carrier issues a Bill of Lading marked ‘FREIGHT PREPAID’ to the freight forwarder without actually having collected the tariff from the freight forwarder, then the carrier shall be deemed to have unilaterally extended a line of credit to the freight forwarder for the payment of the tariff under the Bill of Lading so marked.97
The Court notes a Fifth Circuit case to the contrary. In Strachan Shipping Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 701 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit held a shipper liable for unpaid freight, though the shipper had in fact paid the freight forwarder, which failed to remit the funds to the carrier. However, the Fifth Circuit based its holding on the language of a conference credit agreement between the freight forwarder and the shipper, which held the shipper absolutely and unconditionally responsible for charges due.
Moreover, principles of equity push the Court towards holding Freightplus liable for unpaid freight charges. A line of cases acknowledged by the Supreme Court holds that when a carrier falsely represents that a bill of lading has been prepaid, an “innocent party” that has already paid the freight charges shall not be made to suffer “duplication of liability” by being made to pay again.
Although Freightplus will also be responsible for paying twice in this situation, unlike GIC, it did not rely on another carrier’s bill of lading when operating under the assumption that freight had been prepaid. Instead, the record and testimony indicates that here, Freightplus departed from its custom of forwarding the vessel’s bill of lading to the shipper and instead issued its own bill without verifying that freight had been paid to the vessel.
For these reasons, Freightplus is liable to IMC for IMC’s unpaid freight.
E. Damages
1. GIC’s damages
GIC has shown by a preponderance of evidence that it will cost $55,985.00 to transport the REBEL from Warri to Lagos, and that it will require an additional $5,600 to pay for a clearing agent for that
GIC argues that it is entitled to compensation for the lost profits of its parent company. It has submitted into evidence several contracts that its parent company, GIC Oil and Gas, had secured that were contingent on the REBEL’S timely delivery to Lagos.
GIC shall bear the costs of litigation, including attorneys’ fees. A prevailing party in an admiralty ease is generally not entitled to an award for attorneys’ fees.
2. Freightplus’s indemnity claim
Freightplus is entitled to be indemnified for 30% of its liability to Freightplus. Freightplus is 70% át fault due to its failure to verify that the information on its bill of lading was accurate, issuing an indemnity letter that contained inaccurate statements, and failing to promptly share information regarding the INDUSTRIAL DESTINY’S vessel agent with GIC. IMC is 30% at fault for mistakenly recording the REBEL’S port of discharge as Warri and failing to correct the port of discharge when it became known to its agent that the REBEL was actually contracted to discharge at Lagos.
Freightplus is also entitled to collect from IMC 30% of the attorneys’ fees spent in' defending against GIC’s claim. Indemnitees in admiralty are entitled to attorneys’ fees on the theory that the in-demnitee bore a burden properly belonging to the indemnitor. However, the cost of prosecuting the indemnity claim itself is not recoverable.
S. IMC’s claim
IMC is entitled to recover unpaid freight in the amount of $70,309.12
Freightplus is liable to GIC for damages that GIC suffered when the REBEL was shipped to Warri, Nigeria, rather than Lagos, pursuant to an erroneous bill of lading issued by Freightplus. Freightplus is entitled to indemnity from IMC for 30% of GI.C’s damages. Freightplus is liable to IMC for unpaid freight for the shipment of the REBEL.
. (Rec. Docs. 181, 182.)
. To the extent that any finding of fact may be construed as a conclusion of law, the Court hereby adopts it as such. To the extent that any conclusion of law constitutes a finding of fact, the Court adopts it as such.
. (Ex. 81, Ex. 82.)
. (Ex. 82.)
. (Ex. 84.)
. (Ex. 89.)
. (Ex. 92.)
. (Ex. 6.)
. (Ex. 85.)
. (Ex. 86.)
. (Ex. 17, Ex, 94.)
. (Ex. 93.)
. (Ex. 94.)
. (Ex, 19.)
. (Ex. 32.)
. (Ex. 26.) ’
. (Ex. 29.) ■
. (Ex. 31.)
. (Ex. 32.)
. (Ex. 38, 39, 45.)
. (Ex. 40.)
. The Court notes that many of the emails cited to in this opinion do not note time zone differences. When pertinent, the Court assumes that the time stamps associated with the emails cited to are based on the time zone of the email account from which the email string is provided. As the email strings discussed in this paragraph are from Ms. Keel's account, the Court assumes that the time stamps represent Eastern Standard Time.
.(Ex. 42.)
. (Ex. 53.)
. (Ex. 53.)
. (Ex. 44.)
. (Ex. 47.)
. (Ex. 48.)
. (Ex. 54.)
. (Ex. 54.)
. (Ex. 49.)
. (Ex. 50.)
. (Ex. 55.)
.(Ex. 56, Ex. 60, Ex. 65.)
. (Ex. 54.)
. (Ex. 65.)
. (Ex. 103, Ex. 79.)
. (Rec. Doc. 1.)
. (Rec. Doc. 60.)
. (Rec. Doc. 92.)
. (Rec. Doc. 93.)
. (Id.)
. (Rec. Doc. 146.)
. (Rec. Docs. 181, 182.)
. (Rec. Doc. 160.)
. (Rec. Doc. 6 at 5; Rec. Doc. 177 at 29.)
. (Id.)
. (Rec. Doc. 93.)
. (Rec. Doc. 177 at 17.)
. (Rec. Doc. 97 at 5.)
. (Rec. Doc. 95 at 5.)
. (COGSA § 13 (previously codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1312).)
. (COGSA § 1(b) (previously codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1301(b)).)
. CITE.
. CITE.
. COGSA § 4(5), previously codified as 46 U.S.C. App. § 1304(5).
. Spartus Corp. v. S/S Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310, 1313 (5th Cir. 1979).
. Ross Indus., v. M/V Gretke Oldendorff, 483 F.Supp. 195, 199 (E.D.Tex. 1980).
. General Elec. Co. Intern. Sales Div. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1983).
. S/S Yafo, 590 F.2d at 1314 (5th Cir. 1979); Lykes Lines Ltd. v. M/V BBC SEALAND, 398 F.3d 319, 326-27 (5th Cir. 2005).
. (Rec. Doc. 177 at 12.).
. (Ex. 53.)
. (Ex. 54.)
.. (Ex, 40.)
. (Ex. 42.)
. (Ex. 64.)
. See, e.g., Berisford Metals Corp. v. S/S Salvador, 779 F.2d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[W]e have steadfastly adhered to ... the proposition that the $500 per package limitation of liability may not be invoked by a carrier that has issued an on board bill of lading erroneously representing that goods were loaded aboard its ship, regardless whether or not the carrier acted fraudulently.”). See also, Mitsui Marine Fire & Ins. Co. v. Direct Container Line, Inc., 119 F.Supp.2d 412, 416-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) aff'd sub nom. Mitsui Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Direct Container Lines, Inc., 21 Fed.Appx. 58 (2d Cir. 2001).
. (Ex. 86, Ex. 93.)
. (Id.)
. (Id.)
. See, e.g., Baltic Cotton Co. v. U.S., 55 F.2d 568, 569 (5th Cir. 1932) (holding carrier liable for falsely stating that cargo was in good order) (5th Cir. 1932). See also Schoenbaum, 1 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 10-12 (5th ed.) ("The doctrine of estoppel makes the carrier (or issuer) liable to the consignee for false statements in a bill of lading").
. See, e.g., Olson Distributing Sys., Inc. v. Glasurit America, Inc., 850 F.2d 295, 296 (6th Cir. 1988) (Applying equitable estoppel to case involving unpaid freight charges);
. Glasurit America, Inc., 850 F.2d at 296 (quoting Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 578, 25 L.Ed, 618 (1879)).
. (Ex. 104.)
. (Rec. Doc. 93.)
. (Rec. Doc, 91 at 8.)
. (Rec. Doc. 177 at 30.) ,
. Scholastic Inc. v. M/V KITANO, 362 F.Supp.2d 449, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Prima U.S. Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 223 F.3d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 2000)).
. Id.
. Id. (internal quotations omitted),
. The bill defines "carrier” as the "issuer of the Bill of Lading as named on the face of it.”
. (Ex. 126.)
. Schoenbaum, § 10-7, quoting In re Black & Geddes, Inc., 35 B.R. 830, 832 1984 AMC 451 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y. 1984).
. (Rec. Doc. 152 at 13.)
. (Rec. Doc. 139012 at 43:10-44:6.)
'. (Ex, 19.)
. (Ex. 26.)
. (Ex. 29.)
. (Ex.31-.)
. (Ex. 29, Ex.'37.)
. (Rec. Doc. 93.)
. The Bird of Paradise, 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 545, 555, 18 L.Ed. 662 (1866).
. Id.
. (Ex. 74.)
. (Ex. 126, Ex. 127.)
. (Ex. 59.)
. Compania Sud Americana de Vapores v. Atl. Caribbean Shipping Co., 587 F.Supp. 410, 412 (S.D.Fla. 1984), citing Naviera Mercante S.A. v. Northrup King Co., 491 F.Supp. 508 (S.D.Tex. 1980); Inversiones Navieras Imparca, C.A. v. Polysar, 465 F.Supp. 102 (S.D.Fla. 1979); Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Titan Industrial Corp., 306 F.Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff’d 419 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042, 90 S.Ct. 1365, 25 L.Ed.2d 653 (1970). See also, Olson Distributing Sys., Inc. v. Glasurit America, Inc., 850 F.2d 295, 296 (6th Cir. 1988); Inman Freight Sys., Inc. v. Olin Corp., 807 F.2d 117, 121 (8th Cir. 1986); Mediterranean Shipping Co. v. Elof Hansson, Inc., 693 F.Supp. 80, 84-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
. (Ex. 86, 93.)
. Id. at 489.
. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 351, 102 S.Ct 1815, 72 L.Ed.2d 114 (1982), citing Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Campbell Soup Co., 455 F.2d 1219 (C.A.8 1972); Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1971).
. Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 24, 80 S.Ct. 1470, 4 L.Ed.2d 1540 (1960).
. (Ex. 65.)
. (Ex. 101.)
. Mitsui Marine Fire & Ins. Co. v. Direct Container Line, Inc., 119 F.Supp.2d 412, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
. (Ex. 98, 99, 100.)
. (Ex. 102.)
. See, e.g., DeBoer Const., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 486, 496 (10th Cir. 1976) (Refusing to disregard the separate identities of two subsidiary corporations in order to-allow one to recover certain damages on behalf of another.)
. Noritake Co. Inc. v. M/V Hellenic Champion, 627 F.2d 724, 730-31 (5th Cir. 1980).
. SPM Corp. v. M/V/ Ming Moon, 22 F.3d 523, 525-26 (3d Cir. 1994).
. (Ex. 93.)
Reference
- Full Case Name
- GIC SERVICES, LLC v. FREIGHTPLUS (USA), INC.
- Status
- Published