Bosarge v. Cheramie Marine LLC
Bosarge v. Cheramie Marine LLC
Opinion of the Court
ORDER AND REASONS
Before'the Co'urt is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 25). For the 'following reasons, thé Motion ‘is GRANTED IN PART and'DENIED IN' PART. Plaintiffs unseaworthiness Claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
.On July 2, 2014, Defendant Cheramie Márine, LLC hired Plaintiff Richard Bosarge to serve as a relief captain aboard the MTV MR. BENITO, which was owned and operated by Defendant. On July 18, 2014, during his first hitch, Plaintiff alleges that he sustained a serious back injury when he was tossed around in his bunk. Plaintiff specifically contends that the captain of the vessel refused 'to turn back during bad weather with waves ranging from 10 to 14 feet high. Plaintiff asserts, causes of action against Defendant for negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and punitive damages for the arbitrary and capricious denial of maintenance and cure benefits.
Defendant now moves this Court for partial summary judgment on the issues of unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and punitive damages.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment ás a matter of law.”
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendant seeks summary judgment on the issues of unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and punitive. damages. This Court will address each claim in turn.'
A. Unseaworthiness
Plaintiff claims that the MW MR. BENITO was unseaworthy, for two reasons. First, Plaintiff argues that the ves-, sel was unseaworthy because it.was not reasonably fit to safely travel in the hazardous weather conditions it encountered. Second, Plaintiff argues that the crew of the MW MR. BENITO was unfit because members of the crew were under the influence of drugs. “One crew member repeatedly slapped himself in the face. The crew also stored fake urine on the vessel, presumably since they could not pass surprise drug tests without the fake urine.... [The Captain] presumably did [not turn the boat around] due to fear of him (or his deckhand) being drug tested.”
“Seaworthiness, as that term has been defined and redefined, is" reasonable fitness to perform or do the work at hand.”
As a threshold matter, this Court notes that some of Plaintiffs exhibits are inadmissible for purposes of this Motion. “[0]n a motion for summary judgment, the evidence proffered by the plaintiff to satisfy his tiurden of proof must be competent and admissible at tri
Plaintiffs Exhibit A purports to be a message from a member of the crew of the M/V MR. BENITO. It has been submitted to this Court, however, in the body of an email that a unidentified third party sent to herself. The email contains no verifying information about the writer of the text and is unsworn. Exhibit B contains 'first a handwritten account of the events at issue in this case. The writing is unsigned, and the writer is never identified. Next, Exhibit B contains the transcript of a recorded interview with Plaintiff. The authenticity of this transcript is not verified. Both exhibits constitute hearsay. “Hearsay evidence, because it is inadmissible at trial, is not competent summary judgment evidence.”
That said, even considering these exhibits, Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff relies entirely on Exhibits A and B to support his unseaworthiness claim. Neither of these exhibits show that any possible drug use or fake urine aboard the vessel were a cause of the Captain’s decision to proceed in bad weather.. Further, Defendant correctly argues that the isolated, personal act of a fellow crew member cannot render a ship u'nseaworthy.
B. Maintenance and Cure
Next, Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs claim for maintenance and cure. Defendant’s motion raises the McCorpen defense to argue that it does not owe Plaintiff maintenance and cure because he concealed a material medical fact during a pre-hiring medical examination.
To prevail on the McCorpen defense, “an employer must show that (1) the claimant intentionally misrepresented or concealed medical facts; (2) the non-disclosed facts were material to the employer’s decision to hire the claimant; and (3) a connection exists between the withheld information and the injury complained of in the lawsuit.”
At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiffs opposition to this Motion initially argued that Defendant had waived the McCorpen defense by failing to plead it in its answer. Defendant was subsequently granted leave to amend its Answer to assert this defense. Accordingly,' this argument is mooted.
Plaintiff next argues that Defendant is unable to satisfy the second element, of the McCorppn defense — that Plaintiffs prior back trouble was material to Defendant’s decision to hire him. The Fifth Circuit has stated that “[t]he fact that an employer asks a specific medical question on an application, and that the inquiry is rationally related to the applicant’s physical ability to perform his job duties, renders the information material for' the purpose of this analysis.”
Here, it is clear that Plaintiffs undisclosed back injury was material because Defendant specifically inquired as to his past back injuries and such an injury is rationally related to the duties of a vessel captain. “The fact that the questions were asked makes the answers material for McCorpen purposes.”
What is less clear, however, is whether this information would have affected Defendant’s decision to hire Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that Defendant would have hired him even if he had disclosed his prior injury because the injury was extremely minor and Plaintiff had subsequently been cleared for full work duty by a prior employer. Indeed, Plaintiff submits records revealing that he underwent a lumbar spine MRI in 2013 prior to beginning work with Parker Drilling. The MRI results were normal, and he was recommended to work without restriction or accommodation.
C. Punitive Damages
Defendant next seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages for the arbitrary and- capricious denial of maintenance and cure. “It is well-settled that a shipowner who arbitrarily and capriciously denies maintenance and cure to an injured seaman , is liable to him for punitive damages and attorney’s fees.”
Defendant contends - that Dr: Christopher Cenac, - Jr-,,- Defendant’s company doctor, began treating- Plaintiff for his back injury immediately following the accident at issue in this- matter. Defendant began paying Plaintiff maintenance and cure at that time. On September 25, 2014, Dr. Cenac indicated- that Plaintiff had reached MMI, and 'Defendant ceased paying Plaintiff maintenance and cure benefits.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant willfully and wantonly terminated his maintenance and cure benefits for several reasons. First, Plaintiff notes that Dr. Cenac’s MMI opinion came within á week of Plaintiff filing this suit, despite the fact that on September 3, 2015 Dr. Cenac had ordered additional diagnostic testing of Plaintiff. Second, Plaintiff bégan seeing Dr. Paul Fenn on September 9, 2015, and he issued an opinion stating that Plaintiff had not yet reached MMI. Defendant refused to reinstate maintenance and cure despite Dr.
The Fifth Circuit, however, has stated that “where a shipowner had relied on the opinion of its own physician (who had examined the seaman) to terminate maintenance payments in the face of conflicting medical opinions on the issue of whether maximum cure had been reached, a jury question was raised as to whether such behavior would entitle the seaman to punitive damages.”
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs unseaworthiness claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2012).
. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
. Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
. Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
. Johnson v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
. Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
. Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F.Supp.2d 425, 430 (E.D.La. 2005).
. R. Doc. 29, p. 7.
. In re Brown & Root Marine Operators, Inc., 267 F.Supp. 588, 592 (S.D.Tex. 1965) aff’d sub nom. Brown & Root Marine Operators, Inc. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 377 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1967).
. Oliver v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 509 Fed.Appx. 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2013).
. Roucher v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 235 F.2d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1956); Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 2012).
. Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987).
. Travland v. Ector Cnty., Texas, 39 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 1994); Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2727 (3d ed.) ("Material that is inadmissible will not be considered on a summary-judgment motion because it would not establish a genuine issue of material fact if offered at trial and continuing the action would be useless.”).
. Hixson v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:09-CV-3949, 2011 WL 4860004, at *3 (S.D.Tex. Oct. 13, 2011).
. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 500, 91 S.Ct. 514, 518, 27 L.Ed.2d 562 (1971)
. Smith v. Basic Marine Servs., Inc., 964 F.Supp.2d 597, 606-07 (E.D.La. 2013) aff’d, 571 Fed.Appx. 342 (5th Cir. 2014).
. See McCorpen v. Cent. Gulf S.S. Corp., 396 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1968).
. Brown v. Parker Drilling Offshore Corp., 410 F.3d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 2005).
. Id. at 175.
. Jauch v. Nautical Servs., Inc., 470 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 2006).
. Hare v. Graham Gulf, Inc., 22 F.Supp.3d 648, 654 (E.D.La. 2014).
. Id.
. R. Doc. 29-12, 29-14.
. R. Doc. 29-13.
. Jauch, 470 F.3d at 212-13 (“Jauch concealed numerous instances of back injury and mental health problems, disclosure of which would have either prevented his employment, or at least delayed it, preventing his having been present on the M/V LA MADONNA at the time of the accident.”),
. Breese v. AWI, Inc., 823 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted).
. Snyder v. L & M Botruc Rental, Inc., 924 F.Supp.2d 728, 734 (E.D.La. 2013); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531, 82 S.Ct. 997, 8 L.Ed.2d 88 (1962).
. Johnson v. Marlin Drilling Co., 893 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 532, 82 S.Ct. 997 (1962)).
. Id.
. Breese, 823 F.2d at 104 (discussing Tullos v. Res. Drilling, Inc., 750 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1985)).
. Id.
. Tullos, 750 F.2d at 388.
. Snyder, 924 F.Supp.2d at 734.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Richard BOSARGE v. CHERAMIE MARINE LLC
- Cited By
- 3 cases
- Status
- Published