Brown v. City of Alexandria

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION DAQUARIOUS DASHAWN BROWN CIVIL DOCKET NO. 1:20-CV-00541 VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOSEPH H.L.

PEREZ-MONTES MEMORANDUM RULING Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s MOTION TO STRIKE ALL DEFENSES OF THE ANSWER (“Motion to Strike”) [Doc. 11]. In short, Plaintiff contends that the affirmative defenses set forth in Defendants’ Answer should be stricken pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) because they are “both insufficient to state a valid defense and are wholly irrelevant to the causes of action alleged in the complaint” [Doc. 11]. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Strike is DENIED.

A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is a “drastic remedy” that should be used “sparingly.” Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Escambia County, Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962). Further, “even when technically appropriate and well- founded,” a motion to strike should not be granted unless the moving party demonstrates prejudice. Abene v. Jaybar, LLC, 802 F. Supp. 2d 716, 723 (E.D. La. 2011) (quoting 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1381 (3d ed. 2004)); see also Boyd’s Bit Serv., Inc. v. Specialty Rental Tool & Supply, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 938, 944 (W.D. La. 2004).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ assertion of the subject affirmative defenses at this stage in the litigation will cause him prejudice.

Defendants bear the burden of proof with regard to their affirmative defenses. To the extent Plaintiff believes one or more of these defenses to be legally or factually unfounded, he should seek summary judgment on those affirmative defenses prior to trial.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Strike [Doc. 11] is DENIED.

THUS, DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 164 day of March 2021. «fap DAVID C. JOSEPH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Page 2 of 2