UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DERRICK THOMAS, CIVIL ACTION Trustee for Derrick Thomas Trust, Plaintiff

VERSUS NO. 25-289

GERALD D. STICKER, ET AL., SECTION: “E” (1) Defendants

ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court is a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and, alternatively, a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 filed by Defendants Gerald D. Sticker (“Sticker”) and Camil Nanni (“Nanni”).1 Plaintiff Derrick Thomas, Trustee for Derrick Thomas Trust (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion to dismiss.2 Defendants filed a reply.3 The Court declines to convert the pleading to a motion for summary judgment and, instead, will dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(h)(3). BACKGROUND This case arises out of state court foreclosure proceedings filed against Derrick Thomas.4 Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on February 11, 2025.5 Plaintiff styles his complaint as a “Petition” under

Sticker and Nanni move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which the Court

1 R. Doc. 11. 2 R. Doc. 13. 3 R. Doc. 25. 4 R. Doc. 11-5; R. Doc. 11-6. See generally R. Doc. 1. 5 R. Doc. 1. 6

may grant relief.7 Sticker and Nanni attach to their motion to dismiss state court documents from Plaintiff’s foreclosure proceedings and Tangipahoa Parish records

related to Sticker’s position as Sheriff of Tangipahoa Parish.8 The Court takes judicial notice of these documents.9 Plaintiff sues Sticker, the Sheriff of Tangipahoa Parish, in his personal capacity for Sticker’s alleged involvement in the judicial seizure and sale of Plaintiff’s property.10 Plaintiff sues Nanni, an employee of the sheriff’s office, in her personal capacity and makes one allegation against her.11 Plaintiff alleges that he called and spoke to Camil Nanni at the Sheriff [sic] office on 08/09/24 and asked her where the Writ Seizure were [sic] that was supposed to be served and [he] was told that [his] ex wife Kawana Thomas accepted service and [he] told her that was last year in 2023 and that [he] was not served this year and she then stated to me that the old writ of seizure was still good however she is wrong in her statement and should know better.12

Sticker argues the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against him because he is the lawful sheriff of Tangipahoa Parish, was authorized to seize Plaintiff’s property, and seized Plaintiff’s property through the proper legal procedures.13 Nanni moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against her because her alleged statement to Plaintiff “is a correct

7 R. Doc. 11-1. 8 R. Doc. 11-4; R. Doc. 11-5; R. Doc. 11-6. 9 “In general, a court may only look to ‘the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint’ when reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC,

(5th Cir. 2010). The court may also take notice of matters of public record. Funk v. Stryker Corp.,

(5th Cir. 2011); see also Cinel v. Connick,

, 1343 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994). In this case, the documents referenced are a court order rendered in a Louisiana state district court and proof of Sticker’s Oath of Office, which are matters of public record. 10 See generally R. Doc. 1; Meet the Sheriff, TANGIPAHOA PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE, https://www.tpso.org/meet-the-sheriff. 11 See generally R. Doc. 1. 12 Id. at p. 7. 13 R. Doc. 11-1 at pp. 3-5. statement of the law.”14 LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) mandates the dismissal of an action when a federal court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim. A party seeking to challenge a federal court’s jurisdiction, based upon the allegations on the face of the complaint, may file a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).15 In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the Court may rely on “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts and by the court’s resolution of disputed facts.”16 A federal court has an unflagging duty to inquire into its jurisdiction whenever the possibility of a lack of jurisdiction arises.17 As the party asserting federal jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that jurisdiction is proper.18 The Court should consider a “Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing

any attack on the merits.”19 “A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should only be granted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claims entitling him to relief.”20 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the plaintiff has not set forth factual

14 Id. at p. 4. 15 Barrera-Montenegro v. United States,

(5th Cir. 1996) (citing Williamson v. Tucker,

(5th Cir. 1981)). 16 Barrera-Montenegro,

(internal citations omitted). 17 Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). 18 Id. 19 In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Litig.,

(5th Cir. 2012) (citing Ramming v. United States,

(5th Cir. 2001)). 20

at 287 (citing Wagstaff v. United States Dep’t of Educ.,

(5th Cir. 2007)). allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.21 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”22 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”23 The Court, however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory statements, and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.”24 Indeed, “threadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient.25 “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”26 However, “legal conclusions can provide the framework

of a complaint, [if] they [are] supported by factual allegations.”27 “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”28 “Although detailed factual allegations are not required,” “[d]ismissal is appropriate when the

21 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor,

(5th Cir. 2007). 22 Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Twombly,

). 23

24 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La.,

(5th Cir. 2001) (citing Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n,

(5th Cir. 1993)). 25 Iqbal,

(citations omitted). 26

at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 27

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,

. 28 Iqbal,

. complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’”29 Whether a plaintiff “will be able to offer sufficient proof to support [his or her] claims is more appropriate in the context of a

motion for summary judgment or a trial on the merits” rather than in a motion to dismiss.30 “[I]ntensive disputes of material fact . . . are usually more appropriate for summary judgment.”31 LAW AND ANALYSIS I. The Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against Sticker and Nanni that attempt to set aside the state court’s judgment.

Under the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine, a federal court is deprived of jurisdiction in “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”32 A plaintiff cannot circumvent this jurisdictional limitation “by asserting claims not raised in the state court proceedings or claims framed as original claims for relief,” if such claims are “‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment.”33 Likewise, “litigants may not obtain review of state court actions by filing complaints about those actions in lower federal courts cast in the form of civil rights suits.”34 Indeed, the only federal recourse for constitutional questions arising in state court may be found by applying for a writ of certiorari to the United States

29 Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 Fed. App’x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 30 Smith v. GE Healthcare, Inc., No. 19-00492,

, at *7 (W.D. La. Sept. 4, 2019). 31 Dong Phuong Bakery, Inc. v. Gemini Soc’y, LLC, No. 21-1109,

, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2022). 32 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

(2005) (first citing Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.,

(1923); then Dist. of Colum. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman,

(1983)). 33 United States v. Shepherd,

(5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Feldman,

n.16)); see also Carter v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 10-797,

, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2010). 34 Hale v. Harney,

(5th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Dunn,

(5th Cir. 2022); see also Kimball v. The Fla. Bar,

(5th Cir. 1980). Supreme Court.35 The claims in Plaintiff’s complaint are precisely the kind of claims to which the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine is intended to apply. Without explicitly saying so, it is clear that Plaintiff is asking the Court to invalidate, or otherwise negate, the state court’s judgment ordering the seizure and sale of his property, and asking the Court to find that the process undertaken by the defendants and the state court was somehow invalid or improper. A party seeking federal review of a state court foreclosure proceeding is not uncommon, and courts in this circuit have consistently held that claims such as Plaintiff’s are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.36 II. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s state law claims because they are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment.

To the extent Plaintiff brings state law claims, these claims also are barred by Rooker-Feldman, as they all are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s foreclosure judgment, if not direct “appeals” of that judgment. Plaintiff’s state law fraud,37 “ultra vires doctrine,” and defamation claims all stem directly from the state court’s decision to enter a judgment seizing Plaintiff’s home and directing that it be sold at a sheriff’s sale. Setting aside a discussion of the merits of Plaintiff’s state law claims, it is clear that these claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment, and this Court has no jurisdiction over them under Rooker-Feldman.

35 See Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex.,

(5th Cir. 1994). 36 See, e.g., Wylie v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 11-2312,

(E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012); Carter,

, at *2-4; Pease v. First Nat’l Bank, 335 Fed. App’x. 412, at *2 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished); Flores v. Citizens State Bank of Roma, Tex.,

(5th Cir. 1997) (unpublished). 37 Plaintiff titles one section of his complaint as “(Fraud).” R. Doc. 1 at pp. 9-10. Plaintiff’s allegations in this section are only against individuals and entities not named as defendants in this action.

III. Plaintiff does not assert any “independent claims” against Sticker or Nanni.

Next, the Court must analyze whether Plaintiff has asserted any claims against Sticker or Nanni not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude a district court’s jurisdiction over an “independent claim,” even if it is “one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached.”38 Plaintiff’s complaint is a hodge-podge of excerpts of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions, federal civil rights statutes, the Declaration of Independence, Louisiana Revised Statutes, Louisiana Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure articles, and definitions from loan documents.39 The Plaintiff does not clearly describe the causes of action he asserts.40 Nor does he set forth factual allegations in support of any claims that, if accepted as true, would state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.41 If anything, his complaint relates to the state court sheriff’s sale of property.42 In Brooks v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, a different section of this Court reviewed allegations similar to those in this case and held them to be inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.43 The Brooks plaintiffs filed suit challenging the defendant’s actions in connection with a final judgment of foreclosure on the plaintiffs’ home.44 The plaintiffs alleged that defendant “Flagstar did not have the right to foreclose on the property and that defendants’ actions before and after the foreclosure violated numerous

38 Exxon Mobil,

(quoting GASH Assocs. v. Rosemont,

(7th Cir. 1993)). 39 See generally R. Doc. 1. 40 See generally

41 See generally

42 See generally

43 No. 11-67,

(E.D. La. July 12, 2011). 44

. federal and state laws.”45 The Brooks court held, “Certain of plaintiffs’ claims would require the Court to

review the state court judgment ordering issuance of the writ of seizure and sale, or are inextricably intertwined with that judgment, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over those claims” under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.46 For example, the plaintiffs’ alleged “that defendants abused the executory process by failing to meet the requirements for such process under Louisiana law” and “failed to serve plaintiffs with proper notice of the foreclosure or with proper demand for the default amount.”47 Based on “these deficiencies,” plaintiffs alleged that “issuance of the writ of seizure and sale was improper.”48 The Brooks court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ causes of action related to defendants alleged “abuse” of the executory process, failure to properly serve plaintiffs with a notice of foreclosure and a proper demand, improper issuance of a writ of seizure, and bad faith abuse of the executory process “constitute direct attacks on the state court

judgment and seek a thorough review of state court foreclosure procedures.”49 Thus, the court dismissed these claims.50 In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations against Sticker and Nanni are similar to those dismissed in Brooks as inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.51 Like the Brooks plaintiffs’ allegations that the Brooks defendants failed to follow certain executory process procedures, Plaintiff’s allegations in this case against Sticker and Nanni pertain

45

46

. 47

48

49

50

51

See generally R. Doc. 1. to whether they followed the proper executory process procedures with respect to the seizure and sale of Plaintiffs property.s2 As in Brooks, Plaintiffs claims against Sticker and Nanni are “direct attacks on the state court judgment” that require the Court to thoroughly review “state court foreclosure procedures” and are therefore “inextricably intertwined with” the state court judgment.ss In conclusion, to the extent Plaintiff has pleaded claims for relief against Sticker and Nanni, Plaintiffs claims against them are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because they are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment in the foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiff.s4 CONCLUSION IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Gerald D. Sticker and Camil Nanni’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Gerald D. Sticker and Camil Nanni are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as defendants in this action. New Orleans, Louisiana, this 22nd day of April, 2025.

— Ssie —_ SUSIE son UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

52 See generally

53 Brooks,

, at *1, *4. 54

. See generally R. Doc. 1. 55 R. Doce. 11.