United States District Court Eastern District of Louisiana, 2026

Clevrn Granger v. Churita Hansell

Clevrn Granger v. Churita Hansell
United States District Court Eastern District of Louisiana · Decided February 11, 2026
Clevrn Granger v. Churita Hansell

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CLEVERN GRANGER CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 26-90 CHURITA HANSELL SECTION “B” (4)

ORDER AND REASONS Plaintiff Clevern Granger (“Granger”) filed a Motion for Limited Discovery (ECF No. 2), Motion for Service of Summons by the U.S. Marshal (ECF No. 3), and Motion to Preserve Evidence (ECF No. 4) in connection with his pro se and in forma pauperis complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his discovery motions, Granger requests the Court order the Defendant to preserve and produce specific discovery as it relates to his claims pertaining to his criminal conviction and alleged prosecutorial misconduct. ECF No. 2 at 1-2; ECF No. 4 at 1-2. Further, Granger requests in his motion for service of summons, that given his pauper status, the Court order service upon the Defendant by the U.S. Marshal’s Service. ECF No. 4 at 1.

The Court is currently conducting its statutory frivolousness review of Granger’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, as applicable. Upon granting Granger’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court ordered that service of summons be withheld. ECF No. 8 at 1. Should Granger’s claims proceed past the initial screening phase, the Court will issue summons upon the Defendant via the U.S. Marshal’s Service in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). In the meantime, any issuance of service upon the Defendant prior to the conclusion of the Court’s statutory frivolousness review is premature.

As to Granger’s discovery motions, discovery in a civil proceeding is governed by Rules 26-37 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Further, the duty to preserve material evidence arises once a party knows or should have known that litigation is imminent; it does not depend on a court order. See Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Georgia, 431 F.3d 191, 203 (Sth Cir. 2005). If a party fails to take necessary steps to preserve electronically stored evidence or intentionally destroys evidence, that party may be sanctioned. FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e)(2); Coastal Bridge Co., L.L.C. v. Heatec, Inc., 833 F. App’x 565, 573 (Sth Cir. 2020) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991)).

Defendant’s preservation of evidence obligation exists even without a court order. As previously noted, the Court is still conducting its statutory frivolousness review of Granger’s complaint. “The district court need not allow any discovery unless it finds that plaintiff has supported his claim with sufficient precision and factual specificity to raise a genuine issue as to the illegality of defendant’s conduct at the time of the alleged acts.” Schultea v. Wood, 47 F. 3d 1427, 1434 (Sth Cir. 1995); see also FED. R. Crv. P. 26(d). Thus, until completion of the Court’s statutory frivolousness review, discovery is premature and will not be allowed.

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff Clevern Granger’s Motion for Limited Discovery (ECF No. 2), Motion for Service of Summons by the U.S. Marshal (ECF No. 3), and Motion to Preserve Evidence (ECF No. 4) are DENIED.

11th New Orleans, Louisiana, this __ day of February, 2026.

KAREN WEIL ROBY UNITED STATES MAGISTRA (£1)pcE

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.