Dex Martin v. Silas Guidry, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA DEX MARTIN CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NUMBER: 25-2195 SILAS GUIDRY, ET AL. SECTION: “P” (5) ORDER AND REASONS

On March 5, 2026, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (rec. doc. 32) came on for oral hearing before the undersigned. Defendants had filed opposition to the motion. (Rec. docs. 35, 36, 37). After the oral hearing, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a supplemental memorandum in which he identifies each and every difference between the original Complaint and the proposed Amended Complaint. Plaintiff has done so. (Rec. doc. 39). The Court also allowed Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s supplemental memorandum, and they did so. (Rec. docs. 40, 41, 42). Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the Court rules as follows.

Because there is no Scheduling Order in place – and therefore no deadline to move for leave to amend – Rule 15 governs. Under Rule 15(a), a party may amend its pleading with the opposing party's written consent or leave of court, which leave should be freely granted when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Rule 15(a) inquiry requires the court to balance the difficult task of assuring a party a fair opportunity to present his claims and defenses while at the same time protectinGgr etghoer yd vis. tMriicttc hceolul rt from being imposed upon by the presentation of theories seriatim. , 634 F.2d 199, (5th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). Although leave to amend is not automatic, given Rule 15(a)(2)’s bias in favor of grantiSnmg itlhea vv.e E MtoC aCmorepn.d, a court “must possess a accord Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co. 2004) (citation omittedM);a rtin's Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trad, 3in7g6 U F..S3. do f4 A2m0,. 4C2o5. (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co. , 195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1999); , 234 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir. 2000)). The five relevant factors considered in determining whether leave to amend is proper or there is substantial reason to deny the request are: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amenGdremgeonryts, (4) undue prejudice toF tohme aonp pv.o Dsianvgi sparty, and (5) futility of the aeme eanlsdom Ue.nS.t .e x rel. Spic, e6r3 v4.

FW.2edst bart o2o0k3 (citing , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); s , 751 F.3d 354, 367 (citation omitted).

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ supplemental pleadings, the Court cannot find that denial of leave is warranted here. Plaintiff’s supplemental pleading details the changes between the original and proposed Amended Complaints. Most of the amendments are innocuous and are only included to further clarify the underlying factual allegations. And while Plaintiff seeks to add two new Defendants, the Court also cannot state that their inclusion is unwarranted at this time. This Court finds no undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive. Plaintiff only filed this lawsuit in October 2025, and, as noted, there is no Scheduling Order in place. Plaintiff has not moved to amend his Complaint before, and therefore he has not failed to cure deficiencies through earlier amendments.

There is no prejudice to Defendants by allowing the amendment, as there is ample time to conduct discovery. Defendants’ supplemental memoranda raise many of the arguments that they have raised in motions to dismiss pending before the District Court.

But this Court need only concern itself with whether the amendment should be allowed, not the merits of the underlying claims. And while the Court recognizes that the amendment maSyee m Eoxoxto DnMefoebnidl aOnilt sC’ omrpo.t ivo. nMsa tros dOiislm Piispse,l tinhea tC ios. ,n Lo.Lt .tCh.e type of prejudice that matters here. , No. CV 25-2001, 2026 WL 290983, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 4, 2026). And, while perhaps unfortunate, additional coSsetes Linocuuirsiraenda i nv. fBilainngk ao fs Aecmo.n Cdo rmpo.tion to dismiss do not constitute undue prejudice either. , No. 19-638, 2020 WL 3966875, at *3 (M.D. La. July 13, 2020) (rejecting argument that costsM aonlidn ae vx.p eCnaslieb eorf Hfiolmineg L“oyaent sa, nInocth. er motion to dismiss” constituted undue prejudice); , No. 15-757, 2016 WL 3660621, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2016) (“As to being unduly prejudiced because of time and money already expended in filing two motions to dismiss, while the Court . . . supports litigation economy, it also recognizes that justice may require some repetition of effort and notes the probability that much of the work already done likely can be resubmitted with minimal additional expense anid.e .effort.”). Moreover, given the limited nature of the proposed Amended Complaint ( , adding different defendants and additional assertions with regard to the pending claims against existing parties), it is difficult to see how Defendants would be required to expend significant time and money (as would be necessary to implicate undue prejudice) by renewing the previously filed motions.

Neither does the Court find the amendment futile. Futility requires that Court to undergo a merits determination, which is better suited for the motions to dismiss that are currently pending (or that will be re-filed) before the District Court.

IT IS OARcDcoErRdEinDgly, and for these reasons, GRAN TthEaDt Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (rec. doc. 32) is . 30th March New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of ______________________, 2026.

MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE