Zacharie & Co. v. Rogers & Harrison
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
This cause is before us on a- re-hearing. A careful review of the facts and law of the case has not satisfied us of the incorrectness of our former opinion. The evidence shows that in February, 1828, the plaintiffs shipped to the consignment of defendants in Richmond, 250 hogsheads of sugar for the account and risk of J. B. Moussier, and advised them at the same time that they would value on the proceeds of the cargo to the amount of $11,000. On the 14th of March following the defendants express their regret of the necessity they were under of suffering plaintiff’s draft to be noted for non-acceptance, because since the receipt of the letter of advice two mails had arrived and neither the invoice nor bill of lading had made their
As to the advances made by plaintiffs to Moussier, and to secure which the sugar was placed by the latter in their hands to be consigned to defendants, the record furnishes positive evidence. We find in it copies of three receipts of Moussier, one for $200, one for $1700, and one for $8444, stating that these sums were paid by plaintiffs to him as advances on this sugar in the course of February, 1828.
On the part of defendants it is urged that the letter of the 14th of March, 1828, contains no positive and unconditional promise to pay the bill; that the plaintiffs did not draw the bill on the faith of any such promise; that a promise to accept between the drawer and drawee is not absolutely binding be-' tween those parties unless based upon an absolute indebtedness; and finally that plaintiffs in drawing this bill as well as in shipping the cargo acted merely as the agents of Moussier.
The transaction which gives rise to this controversy appears to us simple and of daily occurrence between planters and merchants. A factor residing in Natchez receives a planter’s crop, advances him money upon it, ships it to New Orleans “ for account and risk of” the planter, and advises the factor here that he has drawn a bill of exchange on the proceeds. The New Orleans factor promises to accept; can he afterwards instead of paying the bill drawn against the cotton, apply its proceeds to the payment of an old balance due to himself by the planter? Surely not. It is clear from the language used by defendants in their letter of the I4th of March that they understood perfectly, as every merchant must have done, that the condition under which the cargo was consigned to them was that out of its proceeds the bill drawn against it by the shippers was to be paid. They could mean nothing else when they say “ the transaction is entirely regular and if, as we expect, we receive a bill of lading for the amount of the property intended to be shipped us, we shall forthwith accept your draft.” If there could have been any doubt on the subject, it is removed by a letter of the 24th of January preceding, in which Moussier tells defendants, “ I gave order this day to my friend, Mr. Zacharie, an eminent merchant of this place, to ship to your address for my account about 200 hogsheads of sugar, he will draw on you for my account $7000 or thereabouts; the surplus of the sale of the car go shall be to pay off the balance I owe you.” A letter of the plaintiffs of the same u ' date opens their correspondence with defendants. After advising defendants of the intended shipment, they request them to cover it by insurance, valuing each hogshead at sixty dollars, and defendants on the 16th of February answer that the insu-J ranee is effected as directed. By complying with this order to insure and receiving the cargo announced to them by Mous-sier and plaintiffs, they accepted the mandate, were bound to execute it in all its parts, and could apply to their own claim r ri j against Moussier onlv. the surplus of the proceeds of this cargo, , • Z , , , ,1 . _ „ , ° alter the payment oí the bill drawn against it; La. Code, arts,
It is therefore ordered and decreed that the former judgment of this court remain undisturbed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.