Lynch v. Leckie
Lynch v. Leckie
Opinion of the Court
This is an action to render a Sheriff and the sureties on his official bond, liable for the amount of a judgment, which the plaintiffs aver, by the neglect and various acts of malfeasance on the part of the Sheriff, they have lost all chance of recovering.
It is necessary to state many of the facts disclosed by the record, to show clearly the points which we are called on to decide.
The plaintiffs obtained a judgment against Lames A. Me Waters, for $2452 73, and interest. The judgment was rendered on the 27th of May, 1851 — an execution was issued thereon and placed in the hands of the defendant, Leelde, as Sheriff, on the 11th of November, 1851.
A. & J. Bennistoun & Co., who were the factors of Me Waters, obtained two judgments against him in May, 1851. One of these judgments was for
It is first contended, that the failure of the Sheriff to return the execution on or before the return day, has rendered him responsible under Art. 767 of the Code of Practice. Such would have been the consequence if the plaintiffs had not themselves instructed him to make the seizures of the 9th of January, which made it necessary for him to retain the writ beyond the return day, in order to effect the sale.
The second ground relied on to render the Sheriff responsible, is the release which he made of the first seizure. We think the objections urged by the defendants that there was no actual seizure of the 170 hhds. of sugar, is one which cannot be listened to as coming from the Sheriff — it was his duty to have taken possession of the sugar, and after notifying the debtor in the execution that he had made the seizure, it is too late for him to deny that there was one. It is next urged, that the defendant in execution has a right, by Art. 649 O. P. to point out the property he wishes to be seized and that he cannot be deprived of that right as long as the Sheriff has not advertised for sale the goods seized. We are of opinion the Sheriff has no right to release a seizure and accept a surrender of property thus pointed out, without using due diligence to ascertain whether the property offered to him is in such a condition as to afford a reasonable prospect of its being made available to satisfy the writ in his hands. 3d. But it is contended that the plaintiffs, by their subsequent conduct, adopted the acts of the Sheriff — that by attending the sale of the plantation and consenting to dispense with the appraisement and other formalities, and joining the debtor in the execution in requiring the property to be re-advertised for sale without those formalities, and by causing subsequent seizures to be made, they waived any right they might have had to hold him responsible for his previous acts. On this point, we are of opinion that the conduct of the plaintiffs’ has produced that effect,'and that the Sheriff cannot be held liable on the ground of having released the first seizure.
The third ground of liability is, that the seizures of the 9th of January, should be considered as made at one and the same moment, and that if the plaintiffs’ seizure made on that day is placed on an equal footing with those of the Benmstouns, there would have been a sufficient amount on a pro rata division of the proceeds of the sale made under all the writs to satisfy that of the plaintiffs. This ground, we think, must prevail. The Sheriff must have been aware on the 9th of January, that he had driven the plaintiffs to a fruitless attempt to make their money out of the plantation and slaves, because he is presumed to have been in possession of the certificate of mortgages on the third day of January, when he was to have first offered the property for sale: that certificate made it manifestly impossible that the plaintiffs could
A great deal has been said in argument, on the subject of a privilege asserted for A. & J. Dennistoun, on this fund, for supplies to the plantation. No such privilege has been claimed by the Dennistouns in this suit, and the Sheriff has no right to make use of that as a defence — -it is his duty to pay over the money he has made on an execution, to the plaintiff in the writ, unless by order of the court, on a claim so set up by a third party, he is restrained from doing it.
The plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment against the defendant, Leakie, for the full amount of their claims.
The sureties on the Sheriff’s bond are also before us. The additional de-fence set up by them is, that these acts of the Sheriff were not committed during the term of office when they were his sureties. The bond bears date the 4th day of December, 1847, and is conditioned for the faithful performance by Leokie, of the duties of the office of Sheriff, to which he had been elected. His term of office was fixed by the Constitution at two years, and it commenced on the 1st Monday of November, 1847 — two terms of the office had consequently elapsed, and the third term was entered upon at the date of the plaintiffs’ execution being issued. The Act of the Legislature of 1887, provides that Sheriffs shall continue to perform the duties of their office until their successors, or themselves in case of reappointment, shall be inducted into office, by performing the formalities required by existing laws; so that no interruption may occur in the discharge of any public duty required by said officers, under the same penalties, bonds, obligations and securities, as were given and entered by them when they were first appointed to said offices. The law also gives to sureties the right to have themselves discharged from their bond at any time, and by virtue of these two provisions, it is contended that, as the sureties did not ask to have themselves discharged, it must be presumed that they were willing to continue bound as sureties of the Sheriff during the two terms subsequent to that for which they had originally bound themselves. It is not alleged in the petition, that Leokie was reappointed to the office for the term subsequent to that for which the bond was given, and there is no evidence in the record, that he acted as Sheriff during the second term. The acts complained of, commenced during the third term, and without either allegation or proof to that effect, we cannot presume that the Sheriff was reappointed for both of these terms, and failed to have himself regularly inducted into office by performing the formalities required by law. It was essential to allege and prove that the liabilities of the sureties had been extended beyond the first term; facts, the existence of which, the court cannot presume. We think the plaintiffs have failed to make out the case against the sureties.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the court below be affirmed, except as regards the defendants, William 0. James, Robert G-. Leokie, Ralph Smith, Samuel W. Henasie, and Henry M. Hyams; and
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Hugh Lynch & Co. v. C. P. Leckie, Sheriffs.
- Status
- Published