The opinion of the court on the original hearing was delivered by Egan, J., and on the rehearing by Manning, C. J.

The accused was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to the Penitentiary under an information filed under section 810 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 which charged him with the larceny of “the sum of twenty-six dollars in current money of the United States of • the value of §26.” The statute provides that “ the robbery or larceny of bank notes, obligations or bonds, bills obligatory, or bills of exchange, promissory notes for the payment of any specific property, paper bills of credit, certificates granted by or under the authority of this State, or of the United States, or any of them, shall be punished in the same manner as robbery or larceny of goods and chattels : ” i. e. by imprisonment at hard labor or otherwise not exceeding two years. The case comes before us on a bill of exceptions (of which it is only necessary to say it was not well taken, the court correctly admitted the testimony for the reason given in the bill); also, on a motion for new trial, in overruling which it seems to us the judge ruled very rigidly, but which, under our view of the case, need not be further noticed; and on a motion in arrest of judg*1242ment, of which it is only necessary to notice one ground; that is in substance that the words “ current money of the United States,” used in the information, without any more minute or particular description of the character or kind of money, is not sufficiently certain to warrant conviction under the information, and does not sufficiently describe any thing named or described in the statute, and that there is no such thing-under our law as the larceny of current money of the United States.

Wharton’s Am. Crim. Law, vol. 1, sec. 363, says : “ Money is described as so many pieces of the current gold or silver coin of the realm called-. The species of coin must be specified,” and, again, “ a count-charging the conversion of $19,000 of money, and $19,000 of bank notes, is bad for uncertainty.” The same author, sec. 347, says, under the general term “money” bank notes, promissory notes, or treasury warrants can not be included. Again, sec. 346 : “ In England, in an indictment under 2 Geo. 2, c. 25, the instrument stolen must be expressly averred to be a bank-note, or a bill of exchange, or some other of the securities specified, and, therefore, it is insufficient to charge the defendant with stealing a note commonly called a bank-note, for none such is described in the-act.” The same author says, sec. 364, et seq.: “It is generally sufficient,, and always necessary, to use the words of the statute. It is not absolutely necessary under our own law to use the precise words of the-statute always, but it is safest to do so in charging a statutory offense,, and in all cases it must be done substantially.” In the State vs. Edson, 10 A. 229, it was held that an indictment charging the embezzlement-of a lot of lumber, or a certain lot of furniture, was bad for uncertainty of description of the articles embezzled. In the State vs. Cason, 20 A. 48, an indictment was held bad, and the judgment arrested when the-charge was larceny of goods and lawful money of the United States-(commonly called greenbacks), of the value of twenty-four dollars and twenty-five cents; a much more minute description than that in the present case.- The court says no such effects or notes as greenbacks are-known to law, but treasury notes of the United States are recognized by the laws of Congress, and cites 5 A. 326 ; 10 A. 191, 207; 11 A. 648-In the State vs. Muster, 21 A., an indictment for the embezzlement of “ the sum of eleven dollars ” was held bad. The court said the indictment does not inform us whether the sum embezzled consisted of gold or silver dollars, or of currency; whether of two or more coins, or treasury notes, or bank-bills. It is not always necessary, under the statute,, to set forth a minute or detailed description of the thing stolen, but it is necessary so to designate it as to make the charge intelligible, and to bring it within, the statute we have already recited. The description of the thing stolen does not conform, either in language or substance, to any thing named or described in the statute; nor is the language “ cur*1243rent money of the United States” sufficient designation of the thing stolen. The motion in arrest of judgment must be sustained on the ground heretofore discussed.

It is therefore ordered that the judgment and sentence appealed from be and it is arrested and set aside; that the information be quashed as defective in law, and that the accused be held to answer such lawful charge as may be preferred against him under the orders of the court a qua.

On Application for Rehearing.

An application for a rehearing has been made, and! we grant it.

On Rehearing.

We are satisfied that our decision in this cause is wrong, because of a special statute relative to the structure of indictments for the larceny or embezzlement of money.

Under the common law, great particularity was required in laying the charge when money was the object that was stolen. The species of coin, or the kind and denomination of the bank-note, had to be set out with descriptive particularity. Our former opinion followed the common-law authorities in requiring a rigid compliance with these (formerly) essentials. There was also error in stating the prosecution was for the offence, denounced in sec. 810, Rev. Stats. 1870. The prosecution was under sec. 812 as well as the other.

The important matter however is the provision that, in every indictment in which it shall be necessary to make any averment as to any money or any bank-note, it shall be sufficient to describe such money or banknote simply as money, without specifying any particular coin or banknote ; and such allegation, so far as regards the description of the property, shall be sustained by proof of any amount of coin or of any banknote, although the particular species of coin of which such amount was composed, or the particular nature of the bank-note, shall not be proved &c. Rev. Stats, sec. 1061.

A statute, mitigating the rigour of the common-law .requirements was commented on in the State v. Edson, 10 Annual, 229, where the court said — in ruling that the words, ‘ lot of lumber ’ were insufficient description of the thing stolen — “ there is one exception to this general rule contained in Stat. 1845, sec. 3 which declares that in prosecutions for larceny or embezzlements of bank-notes, etc. * * * gold or silver money, or any other property of that kind, it shall not be necessary *1244to set forth iu the indictment a detailed description thereof, but a general allegation of the amount or amounts, * * shall be sufficient.”

One provision of sec. 1061 of the last revisal is specially for prosecutions, wherein any averment whatever touching money or bank-notes is necessary, in which cases not only is a description of them as money sufficient, but the proof need be only of any amount of coin or of any bank-note, even though the coin or bank-note proved be not of the particular species, or the particular nature, which was charged.

The law of 1845 dispensed with the detailed description which the common law deemed so essential, and the present law dispenses with any other description than merely, money — and goes farther, by dispensing with proof of the particular kind of money charged, and enacts that proof of any kind shall support the indictment.

The defendant was properly convicted. Therefore

It is ordered and decreed that our former judgment is set aside and avoided, and that the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.