The defendant, Theodore A. LiRocchi, having' exercised his option to purchase certain property by signing a written agreement to purchase and tendering 10% of the purchase price, which was accepted by the plaintiffs, Joe B. Ragusa and Russell R. Saia, subsequently demanded a diminution of the purchase price, or, in the alternative, a return of his deposit, whereupon plaintiffs instituted a suit for specific performance.1 Defendant answered alleging that the option and the agreement to purchase should be set aside because of fraud, or, in the alternative, that plaintiffs should be ordered to effect a diminution of the purchase price; 2 and in a re-conventional demand defendant sought to recover the moneys deposited, damages and attorney’s fees. From a judgment ordering him to specifically perform the contract defendant prosecutes this appeal.

The property involved in this suit3 is located in Devil’s swamp, 4 which is presently being converted into a barge terminal by the construction of a canal (commonly known as Devil’s Swamp Canal), connecting it with the Mississippi River. As soon as the proposed canal project received widespread publicity, land prices in Devil’s Swamp rose sharply on the speculator’s market,5 and defendant, who had speculated in real estate for a number of years, took a 30-day option, dated November 16, 1956, from plaintiff Ragusa to purchase the property for $64,000.00 cash or $69,000.00 if paid on credit terms, paying $1,000.00 as consideration for the option. At the time this option was signed neither one of the plaintiffs owned the property, and only one of them, plaintiff Ragusa, was the holder of a 30-day option from the then owner William J. Borskey. Defendant’s option stated that the property was subject to certain specifically mentioned recorded liens and contained the additional stipulation that *523Defendant was also furnished a map by plaintiff Ragusa, which outlined the proposed course of the channel and the areas to be used for permanent and temporary spoil disposal. On December 15, 1956, defendant, in exercising his option, elected to purchase the property for $69,000.00 on credit terms and submitted an offer to buy the property, as described in the option and shown on the map, “subject to any valid restrictions and servitudes of record, and to any zoning ordinances affecting this property,” no mention being made of the unrecorded Borskey agreement referred to in the option.7 This offer was unconditionally accepted on December 15, 1956, by both plaintiffs, who had purchased the property from William J. Borskey on December 13, 1956. Subsequently, defendant became apprised that a large portion of the acreage involved would be utilized by the canal project and, although having had in his possession the map from which he could have determined the extent of the acreage to be lost, he nevertheless contended that this matter had been misrepresented by the plaintiffs and their agents in that they allegedly assured him that only 5 acres would be used for the canal project, and made demand upon plaintiffs to reduce the price accordingly or, in the alternative, return all moneys deposited. Plaintiffs ignored this demand and brought the suit for specific performance.

*522“the property hereinabove described is subject to servitudes granted to the United States and the Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission for the purpose of the construction of a navigational canal over a portion of the same and for other purposes, such as spoil disposal areas, as contained in written agreements between William J. Borskey, the United States Government, and the Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission, which are not of public record.” 6

*523Defense counsel in open court abandoned the demand for damages and attorney’s fees and also disavowed his claim that the option and the agreement to purchase had been fraudulently procured by the plaintiffs. In arguing that defendant should nevertheless be excused from specific performance, counsel for the defense contends that defendant never accepted the terms of the option making the property subject to servitudes not of record, but instead submitted a counter offer limiting the restrictions to servitudes of record only, which was unqualifiedly accepted by the plaintiffs. In any event, counsel argues that plaintiffs cannot deliver title in accordance with the option, since they executed on December 13, 1956, while the option was still in effect, a ratification and agreement document,8 in which they granted greater rights to the Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission than those granted by Borskey in the agreement referred to in the option, and suggested in open court that we remand the case in order to introduce in evidence a deed,9 executed by the plaintiffs subsequent to trial in the court below, which will show *524that the plaintiffs have breached their agreement, thus making it impossible for them to perform their obligations under the contract.

While neither of these issues was pleaded in the lower court, the record reveals that the plaintiffs introduced in evidence the ratification and agreement document, dated December 13, 1956, wherein it is specifically .stated that whereas under the 1954 [the Borskey] agreement the landowners were ;to have the unrestricted use of the banks of the canal, the Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission in order to facilitate .financing the canal project desired to restrict the use of the canal banks, and the landowners agreed that “the Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission shall have the exclusive right to create, operate and administer public wharves, docks, sheds and landings on the said Baton Rouge Barge Channel on lands hereafter to be acquired in full fee title by said Commission; and they will further agree that Grantors will not construct on lands fronting on said channel any facilities for the handling of molasses or grain, whether public or private.” Consequently, it is immaterial whether the December 15 agreement to purchase was in accordance with the option previously executed or was a new offer as contended by defendant, for from the foregoing it is clear that the plaintiffs themselves are incapable of specifically performing under either circumstances, and are, therefore, not entitled to specific performance. See Pratt v. McCoy, 128 La. 570, 54 So. 1012; New Orleans Polo Club v. New Orleans Jockey Club, 128 La. 1044, 55 So. 668; Lamar v. Young, 211 La. 837, 30 So.2d 853.

Having reached the conclusion that we cannot order specific performance in this case, because plaintiffs, in violation of their contract, executed the Decemeber 13 ratification agreement and the instrument in pursuance thereof, defendant is entitled to recover the amount of $1,000.00 paid to plaintiff Ragusa as consideration for the option of November 16, 1956, and the deposit of $6,900.00 paid to plaintiffs Ragu-sa and Saia on December 15, 1956, in connection with the agreement to purchase.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the lower court is annulled and set aside; and it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiffs’ suit be dismissed, and that the defendant, as plaintiff in reconvention, do have and recover judgment against Joe B. Ragusa, individually, in the amount of One Thousand and no/100 ($1,000.00) Dollars, with legal interest from the date of judicial demand, and against Joe B. Ragusa and Russell R. Saia, in solido, for the sum of Six Thousand Nine Hundred and no/100 ($6,900.00) Dollars with legal interest from the date of judicial demand, and for all cost.